




Adriano Furtado Holanda (Ed.)

Perspectives on

PHENOMENOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY

Brazilian experiences



Phenomenology, since its beginning, has always been characterized by rigor and openness, in addition to being a movement that transcended geographical borders, welcoming a diversity of perspectives that made it the center of epistemological reflection in the 20th century, with consequences in the Hermeneutics, in the Philosophy of Existence and in Neurosciences, for example. The transcendence of borders has always accompanied the figure of Edmund Husserl, making Phenomenology, from an early age, a “planetary” tradition – Husserl welcomed around himself and his ideas, a myriad of collaborators and students of the most diverse nationalities – and multidisciplinary (also from an early age, we find phenomenological reflections on the most diverse fields of knowledge), resulting in a movement with different facets and paths: realistic, constitutive, existential and hermeneutic .



Perspectives on Phenomenological Psychology

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Editor

Adriano Furtado Holanda



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Summary

Presentation **9**

Adriano Furtado Holanda

1 **11**

Phenomenological psychology in Brazil: conceptions and plurality

Victor Portugal

Adriano Furtado Holanda

2 **48**

Psychology and philosophy in the early days of phenomenological thought in Brazil

Adriano Furtado Holanda

3 **77**

Phenomenology as a route for deconstructing of the usual understanding of subjectivity in the field of clinical practices

Alessandro de Magalhães Gemino

Crisóstomo Lima do Nascimento

4 **104**

The essential chiasm: Merleau-Ponty, between phenomenology and psychology

Claudinei Aparecido de Freitas da Silva

5 **126**

The mind-body problem and the question of the naturalization of the phenomenology

Tommy Akira Goto

Mak Alisson Borges de Moraes

6 **156**

Husserl's transcendental phenomenology and phenomenological psychology

Tommy Akira Goto

Adriano Furtado Holanda

Illo Izidio da Costa

About the authors **180**

Presentation

*Adriano Furtado Holanda*¹

Phenomenology, since its beginning, has always been characterized by rigor and openness, in addition to being a movement that transcended geographical borders, welcoming a diversity of perspectives that made it the center of epistemological reflection in the 20th century, with consequences in the Hermeneutics, in the Philosophy of Existence and in Neurosciences, for example.

The transcendence of borders has always accompanied the figure of Edmund Husserl, making Phenomenology, from an early age, a “planetary” tradition² – Husserl welcomed around himself and his ideas, a myriad of collaborators and students of the most diverse nationalities – and multidisciplinary (also from an early age, we find phenomenological reflections on the most diverse fields of knowledge), resulting in a movement with different facets and paths: realistic, constitutive, existential and hermeneutic³.

Husserlian ideas impacted not only all the great innovations of the 20th century, but also several countries and languages. The same happened with Latin America, heir of productions in Spanish and Portuguese⁴, and in particular with Brazil, which received Phenomenology

¹ (Editor)

² Embree, L. (2001). The continuation of Phenomenology: a fifth period? *The Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology*, Volume1, Edition 1, April. Available in: <http://www.ipjp.org/online-issues/category/13-edition-1-april-2001>

³ Embree, L. & Mohanty, J. N. (1997). Introduction, *In* Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna, Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebom, Richard M. Zaner (Eds.), *Encyclopedia of Phenomenology* (p. 2). Kluwer Academic Publishers.

⁴ Alves, P. M. S. & Morujão, C. A. (2013). Husserl's Ideen in the Portuguese Speaking Community. *In* Lester Embree & Thomas Nenon (Eds.), *Husserl's Ideen* (pp. 295-311). Springer.

from Psychology, Philosophy and Law, from the 1930s to the 1940s⁵. The language barrier often hides the active and dense phenomenological production in Brazil, notably in Philosophy and Psychology. In this regard, in recent years, Brazil has been the stage of a set of International Phenomenology Congresses – started in 2017 – which culminated, in 2019, in the largest Congress of this nature in Latin America, with more than 800 participants, which demonstrates not only the growing interest in Phenomenology, as the diversity of themes and works⁶.

All this served as motivation for the elaboration of this volume, pointing out contributions from authors from several Brazilian institutions. In this book, we present contributions from authors in Philosophy and Psychology, with readings by authors such as Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty; as well as a setting – historical and conceptual – of phenomenological thought in Brazil. We hope, with this, to be contributing to the expansion of the dialogue with readers of the English language, and presenting a small example of the diversity of phenomenological reflections on Brazilian soil.

⁵ Holanda, A. F. (2007). Apuntes para una Historia del Pensamiento Fenomenológico en Brasil, *Filosofía y Psicología. Anuario Colombiano de Fenomenología*, v. IX, p. 444-461.

⁶ Those meetings began with the 1st South-Brazilian Congress of Phenomenology & 1st Congress of Phenomenological Studies of Paraná (2009), at the Federal University of Paraná; and continued until 2021, with the III International Congress of Phenomenology & Psychology and V Brazilian Congress of Psychology & Phenomenology (all of those meetings, carried out by the Laboratory of Phenomenology and Subjectivity, of the Federal University of Paraná, in partnership with several other groups of Brazilian researchers).

Phenomenological psychology in Brazil: conceptions and plurality

*Victor Portugal¹
Adriano Furtado Holanda²*

Introduction

Since the foundation of the phenomenological school, brought forth by Edmund Husserl, special attention was given to psychology. These disciplines were in constant debate during the development of phenomenology and philosophy at the turn to the 20th century not only by, Husserl, but also a series of Austro-German authors (Brentano, 1911/1995, 1874/2008; Brito, 2012, 2015; Fréchette, 2018; Merleau-Ponty, 2011; Spiegelberg, 1971). Constantly present in Husserl's work, the psychology of the time was analyzed, discussed and criticized, until the emergence of a proposal of a "project" of phenomenological psychology (Hua/IX; Hua/VI; Hua/IX). The developments of this project influenced not only immanent aspects of Husserl's late phenomenology, but also contemporary movements of studies in psychology, psychopathology, psychiatry and cognitive sciences, which subsequently had an interesting and fruitful development around the world (Fuchs, 2002; Spiegelberg, 1972; Zahavi, 2010).

Regarding the relationship between psychology and phenomenology, Husserl states that it refers to a way of giving an account of consciousness from a transcendental point of view, being thus opposed to naturalism and

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objectivism. In reference to the first, Husserl believed that psychology was a project doomed to fail already in its presuppositions. Imposed by universal objectivist science *more geometrico*, psychology came to inherit the psychophysical dualism of these ideas since modernity which would, for the author, not allow it to be what it vigorously claimed to be, i.e., the new foundational science of knowledge and, consequently, also of logic and philosophy. However, there is more to this relationship than a simple denial or negation of psychological science in favour of transcendental philosophy. The debate around this relationship show that this preliminary conflict points out that “(...) the distinction between phenomenology and psychology can at times be hard to draw, and it is no coincidence that their relationship remained of interest to Husserl until the very end” (Zahavi, 2004, p. 339). It is after all a relationship which must be looked upon.

As Husserl originally exposed in the article for the Encyclopedia Britannica in 1927, phenomenology and psychology are not to be confused in the sense of being the same discipline (for this conception was already in the *Logical Investigations* ruled out); however, they do have a relationship that deserves due consideration³ (Hua/IX). For this, the intermediate and later Husserl sought to formulate both a phenomenology as a rigorous science (committed to his transcendental project), as well as the possibility of carrying out a phenomenological psychology. This project establishes a counterpoint to the model given by modern psychology, a model taken by the physicalist and naturalistic lens of the emerging experimental psychology at the end of the 19th century with regard to human consciousness (Hua/VI; Hua/IX).

³ For a similar position, Cf., Husserl's 1911 *Philosophy as Rigorous Science*, in which the author already highlights the similarities of psychology and phenomenology (for both of them deal with similar objects such as consciousness and mental experiences), although in completely different approaches, for phenomenology puts forth a transcendental approach, while psychology remains in the natural attitude.

Given this rather broad overview which originated the concept of phenomenological psychology inside the debate between psychology and phenomenology, it is possible to witness its longstanding impact almost a century later on a worldwide scale. In the Brazilian theoretical context of the last two decades, a series of researchers have been dealing with the complex area of intersection between phenomenology and psychology. Several of these studies report an utmost need to understand more clearly the various characteristics of this relationship (Castro & Gomes, 2011; Forghieri, 2011; Goto, 2015; Holanda, 2016; Holanda, Goto & Costa, 2017; Orenge, Holanda & Goto, 2020). This need is mainly observed by the difficulty of finding, in regard to the theoretical position of Brazilian authors that drawn phenomenological psychology, certain basic and fundamental discussions that express a concern with the foundations and the presuppositions of phenomenology, as well as the nature of its relationship in psychology. This is specially important when considering that the contexts of contemporary studies in psychology (most of the times not of experimental nature, but in general related to the possibility of applying or using somehow phenomenology in a psychotherapeutic setting) can be said to be alien compared to the original discussions in the context of the early phenomenology (the origin of meaning, the foundation of knowledge, the debate between transcendence and immanence, and so on). Although we do not claim that this relationship must go through philosophical and conceptual scrutiny (for one is here working on psychology and psychiatry, not in philosophy), it seems to be a basic step for every type of use or adoption of phenomenology to have clarity of how this relation is to be thought, what are the main concepts taken from phenomenology and how are they to be used in a non-philosophical manner.

This research represents a contribution to this relationship between psychology and phenomenology. This paper aims to characterize and clarify what is understood by phenomenological psychology as such interpreted and developed by Brazilian authors through a bibliographical review of studies which address this theme. In the attempt to recover Brazilian`s contemporary theoretical landscape on this theme, this work sought to provide an overview of the production of Brazilian articles on phenomenological psychology, understanding it as a thematic initially worked by Husserl, but whose scope was largely continued by his predecessors (Spiegelberg, 1972). Lastly, this work seems to be relevant due to a current low number of works in the thematic in what refers to a discussion of a more conceptual order on what is meant by phenomenological psychology⁴. First, we will trace some basic concepts of phenomenology as designed by Husserl; secondly, we analyze Husserl's insights on the relationship between phenomenology and the sciences, highlighting the critique to psychology; thirdly, we will briefly investigate what was Husserl's concept of phenomenological psychology; fourthly, we will analyze some of the developments that came out of this relationship between phenomenology and the "sciences" of the mental (such as psychiatry and psychology); lastly we will explain the method utilized and present the results obtained altogether with a critical regarding them.

Phenomenology: Method, Fundamentals and Important Concepts

From its beginnings at the turn to the 20th century, phenomenology had already attempted to transform both the philosophy and the sciences of its time. As Zahavi (2018) points out, the longstanding importance and

⁴ It will not be discussed here the validity or coherence of the thoughts that were somehow translated or taken by psychology, as enacted by the authors here analyzed. However, it is necessary to try to understand what is meant by phenomenological psychology, its concepts, method and foundations, since it is possible to see their several methodological, theoretical and conceptual consequences on the "praxis" or on the "application" that follows.

of Husserl's phenomenology can be measured by the fertile ground that it left, in which both collaborators and critics felt the need to react to the phenomenological project, denoting its impact over the decades⁵. As an innovative and critical thought, phenomenology is concerned with the dimension of consciousness, seeking to describe and specify the structures that characterize this consciousness in its relation to the world, always parting from the human experience (Gallagher, 2012). More than a set of theories or doctrines, phenomenology is depicted as a transcendental philosophy, that from its own method aims – in a certain continuity to the Kantian tradition (Ricoeur, 1954/2009) – to direct its focus to the relation that the transcendent subject establishes in the constitution of reality, whose condition of existence is given primarily from its experiential and subjective dimension. Phenomenology makes it possible to describe the world that appears (phenomenon) from a first-person perspective, and consequently “avoids metaphysical and scientific postulates or speculations” (Zahavi, 2003, p. 14).

Husserl's intellectual development is already marked both in his biography and in his thought, by the connection with psychology.⁶. Regarding his thought, Husserl puts himself in the intellectual lineage from Descartes to Kant, authors who also are famous by dealing -in different ways- with the initial understanding of psychology of their times. For the author, Descartes inaugurated with his *Méditations Métaphysiques* a radical thought regarding philosophy, in which he

⁵ From the series of “unusual” thinkers who attempted to -with various intentions- comment on phenomenology, it is possible to highlight as remarkable examples Theodor Adorno (whose doctoral thesis was on Husserl's *Ideen I*), Jacques Derrida's *La Voix et le Phénomène*, as well as the early Michel Foucault.

⁶ After mathematics, Husserl moved later towards Psychology and Philosophy, being greatly influenced by Franz Brentano, with whom he studied for two years in Vienna, whose importance in phenomenology is essential for the development of not only Husserl's thought, but of a whole subsequent austro-german movement. Husserl was also highly influenced by the mathematics and logic of Stumpf and Weierstrass in Berlin. Careful reader of the works of his time, Husserl was additionally aware of psychologists such as Wundt, Titchener, as well as the work of William James.

aspired to rebuild it (in his own way) so to establish a foundation of all sciences (*Prima Philosophia*) (Hua/I); Kant, on the other hand, offered the structure of transcendental philosophy that Husserl will employ for the development of phenomenology (Hua/VI). This attempt is connected to a refusal of the epistemological conceptions of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, which were also, at least for Husserl, nonsensical, with no prospect of going forward. On the one hand, empiricism saw in psychology a way out of all kinds of metaphysical commitments. On the other hand, various currents were still being developed, from vitalism to neokantism, which presented philosophy, as well as its relationship with psychology, from different perspectives. By rescuing, criticizing and developing the project of many thinkers from so many schools, Husserl produced a work that, although it has undergone several changes, corrections and variations over time, has drawn consequences that have repercussions in several areas of knowledge, even asserting a considerable impact over the mentioned schools of thought (Zahavi, 2018).

Phenomenology aimed, however, to follow a different path from all these great authors and currents of philosophical thought. Husserl advanced the development of phenomenology by treating phenomena through the perspective they are given to consciousness. Consciousness, in this way, loses a possible passive or static character, being understood as a flow of lived experiences towards the world (Smith, 2014). In partnership with Martin Heidegger in the famous entry “Phenomenology” in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* in 1927⁷, the authors describe phenomenology as a fundamental task for the return to consciousness, stipulating a radical endeavour to carry out this return, through the systematic exploration of the field that is subsequently revealed; thus,

⁷ The *Article* had five versions, being only the first in partnership. The remaining ones were only authored by Husserl, after breaking their collaboration partnership (Husserl, 1927/1990).

phenomenology would serve as a guide to the philosophical problematic on the question of being in their multiplicity of forms and levels (Husserl & Heidegger, 1927).

For phenomenology to have a character of radical foundation of theories of philosophical and scientific knowledge, it was necessary - following the Cartesian example, but going beyond it - to approach both the experience that one has of the world and its different forms of knowledge as *preconceptions* whose validity must be questioned. The way we see the world, in this view, becomes for an indeterminate time not a factual and certain field, but something whose validity is put into question (Hua/III). The introduction of the phenomenological reduction, which was introduced years before, but that reaches its mature form in the *Ideen* was what made possible to access this transcendental region (Husserl calls it a “residuum”) where the absolute foundation of knowledge lies, thus going beyond the natural and everyday attitude that takes the world as given by itself. Far from being a suppression of life, the reduction seeks to put on hold and out of action all seemingly obvious statements about existence, enabling a better understanding of them (Merleau-Ponty, 2011 [1958]).

Although this concern with the possibility of establishing a foundation for knowledge in general can be already observed in his early works on philosophy of mathematics and logic (Hua/XVIII; Hua/XIX; Hua/XXIV), as Husserl eventually came to find out throughout his investigations, this “absolute ground” was not to be found in the essence of phenomena (as his previous attempts in the *Logical Investigations* tried to carry through) but rested actually on consciousness. Phenomenology, in its transcendental form, was then concerned with being an analysis of consciousness. The research for the foundations of knowledge should in this sense be clearly oriented from the subject. As Thévenaz puts it, it is possible to already perceive a “dual concern” in phenomenology: it is to be

in a single moment and in unity, the goal of an absolute objective foundation and also the analysis of the subjectivity of consciousness (Thévenaz, 1962). Phenomenology can thus be broadly understood, at least in Husserl's characterization, as an eidetic science of pure consciousness, which, in the attempt to provide a fundamental ground for knowledge, sought to return to the things themselves, to the essences that present themselves to consciousness and can be described through the execution of phenomenological method⁸.

Phenomenology and the Positive Sciences: The Critique to Psychology

The relationship between phenomenology and psychology is neither fortuitous nor unimportant; much on the contrary, it represents a struggle to understand this “newborn” science, and an attempt of delimiting and therefore reacting to it, be it in a positive or in a negative sense. This ‘tension’ is already visible in his *Logical Investigations*, in which Husserl comments on the need of investigating the sciences through a doctrine of science, considering necessary an analysis of their foundations⁹. The reason behind this attempt is that the sciences, even when dealing with what they claim to be the “real” world, end up offering inadequate explanations when questioned about their underlying assumptions. Science, in this sense, cannot “justify” the underlying foundations that guide its development. And if phenomenology claims to, recovering many canons of philosophy, to be the foundation of all sciences, *prima philosophia* in Descartes' terms or *erste Philosophie* (first philosophy) in a

⁸ By essence, Husserl designates “what is in the being, proper of an individual as what he is”. (Hua/III). It would be possible to deduce these essences by apprehending through pure ideation/intuition (*Wesensschau*) the corresponding pure essences.

⁹ In the first edition of *Logical Investigations*, Husserl characterizes phenomenology as a “descriptive psychology”, still under the influence of Brentano and other authors of his time. In subsequent editions, however, Husserl withdraws the “psychology” part and restores an individuality of the term phenomenology, indicating it as something distinct from both psychology as an activity characterized only by descriptions. Cf. Hua/XVIII (12) in which Husserl characterizes this previous description as a “misleading characterization”

more German sense (which Husserl will increasingly employ), it had to develop some kind of explanation of this relationship (Hua/VII). This science (phenomenology) could not to be a science in the sense of physics or psychology, which rests upon worldly facts (*Tatsachenwissenschaft*), but rather an independent eidetic science (*Wesenwissenschaft*), which grounds on the pure intuition of phenomena, remaining over every kind of material or formal sciences (Hua/III, p. 20). The differentiation between psychology and phenomenology becomes increasingly greater.

Regarding the mode of working of the *Tatsachenwissenschaften* and their explanations of reality, Husserl points out that it operates through that which Husserl calls natural attitude (*natürliche Einstellung*), which characterizes both the natural and psychophysical sciences as “mundane sciences” (Hua/III, p. 56). The natural attitude refers to an ordinary conception of the world, adopting a certain ‘approach’, not an individual act, but a general thesis (*Generalthesis*) in which the world in all its complexity is already given as if it was mind-independent (Zahavi, 2003). This view would indicate a “naivety” put forth by the natural sciences, as well as its limitation regarding something that would be beyond its reach, namely the possibility of claiming to be able to justify its own knowledge in the most secure and certain way¹⁰. Thus, Husserl points out that it would not be possible to account for the *meaning* of certain fundamental aspects of human and cognitive life (such as consciousness, intentionality) by departing from some existing science or thought whose propositions and attitudes still remained as natural. Because of this limitation, phenomenology is taken to be necessary.

¹⁰ This should not be understood as an empty critical consideration of science, treating it as an unimportant activity for mankind, but in fact that Husserl was not opposed to natural scientific explanation. Instead, Husserl was opposed to what can be called *scientism*, namely a positivist view in which everything is fully explicable by natural science” (Gallagher, 2012).

In the midst of the debate about the validity of sciences, task undertaken by phenomenology, psychology emerges in a rather ambiguous way: Husserl both recognizes the importance of psychology and psychic life in itself, at the same time that he condemns the psychological science and all its presuppositions of resting on the aforementioned fragile natural grounds. It is not an overstatement to claim that, through his critique towards psychologism and naturalism, Husserl increasingly sought to differentiate psychology from philosophy *qua* phenomenology. This can be seen already in the second edition of the *Logical Investigations*, in which Husserl recognized the error he had made by restricting phenomenology to psychology in the sense of an eidetic analysis of mental experiences. This is also evident in the 1911 article *Philosophy as Rigorous Science*, in which Husserl claims that, although both of sciences (phenomenology and psychology) may share a common ground by investigating lived experiences, the former does it through a *transcendental* investigation, while the other through a *natural* comprehension. This relationship takes its strongest blow in the *Ideen* in which Husserl definitely poses phenomenology as a transcendental approach which, through its method of *Epochè* and reductions, is able to reach a secure ground for investigation, namely pure consciousness, which *cannot* be reduced to mere psychological occurrences (Hua/III, p. 65, see also p. 122). Thus, psychology cannot ground all the other sciences in the fashion that phenomenology does, since it cannot be identified as an aprioristic science, but as a *model* based on the natural sciences, which aims to explain [psychophysical] facts from the scientific inductive method, and therefore reducing intentional consciousness to a mere thing amongst other things. There is not enough space here to go into the details around Husserl's various continuous and extenuous commentaries on the relationship between phenomenology and psychology. After this rather

quick overview it is possible to claim that Husserl understood more and more the distinction of *kind* (and not of degree) between those two endeavours. Along general lines, phenomenology could be characterized as a philosophical enterprise which seeks to find the foundations of the constitution of knowledge through specific method, and it is understood as transcendental because it investigates the possibility of knowledge as it appears to us by means of the correlation between world and consciousness; psychology in its turn is a natural science, which attempts to, in different ways, describe, understand and modify through its particular methods the realm of mental experiences, which is still understood as putting forward and working within a psycho-physical domain.

The Husserlian Project of a Phenomenological Psychology

Even though Husserl remained highly critical of psychology, demarcating what its realm, its limits and difficulties, it does not mean that Husserl saw as an impossible task the development of a psychological science; rather, he delineated the elaboration of a project of another nature, a project that would establish a counterpoint to the physicalism that, since modern science, has been present in the discussions around the psychic dimension (Hua/VI).

As we saw, phenomenology is an attempt to describe our experience of meaning in a completely different fashion than the way psychology attempts to do (Gallagher, 2012). Transcendental phenomenology's interest was neither in analyzing the psychophysical constitution of the human being, nor in *empirically* investigating consciousness. On the contrary, it aspires to understand “what intrinsically and in principle characterizes perceptions, judgments, feelings, and so on” (Zahavi, 2003, p. 12). A phenomenological approach is, at least in Husserl's

understanding, in general, not interested in the “real” origin of cognition, as psychologists were (and still are) attempting to do, namely whether - and where- cognition lies on the brain, or whether our genetic dispositions can affect our mental capacities, but rather, to identify the foundation of knowledge in consciousness in a way that it is not considered something “real” as other worldly objects.

In this sense, what should a phenomenological psychology amount to? To understand the project of phenomenological psychology provided by Husserl (Hua/VI; Hua/IX) it is inevitable to make reference to Wilhelm Dilthey's initial opposition to a certain psychology, followed by his proposal to reform psychological science. Dilthey, at the time an already known thinker in Germany, claimed that a proper psychological science could not be reduced to objective investigations, but that it should rather be construed as a descriptive science which favoured the non-reductive internal experiences one has (Dilthey, 1964, p. 139). That is naturally a critique of 19th century psychology which was characterized by its close relationship to physiology and physics. As Husserl himself writes, psychology was closely connected with the natural sciences, emerging and merging especially with physiology, which was faithfully adapted to the nature of its method (Hua/IX). In this sense, both Dilthey and Husserl recognize on the one side the growing development and potential of scientific activity, whose project had been established and strengthened since modernity in the form of psychology; however, their criticism refers on the other side to an innocent, and consequently inappropriate view of applying the method of the natural sciences to psychic life, leaving aside the specificity of the ‘mental domain’, characterized by lived experiences (Hua/VI). This can be specially observed in Dilthey's classic division (taken by many other important figures, such as Jaspers) between types of sciences (and consequently, of psychologies). While there are sciences

which objectively analyze the world through a method of explanation (*Erklärung*), there are certain regions, such as those of the subjective experiences of human beings, which demand another type of method, namely a descriptive one of understanding (*Verstehen*) (Dilthey, 1964, p. 154). Contemporary science, then, is doing exactly the other way around, i.e., investigating a subjective domain with the same tools used to observe and handle a thing in the world, which has different properties of something like “mental experiences”.

Although Dilthey and his descriptive method offered an interesting alternative to the physicalist model, emphasizing the unity of psychic life as a set of lived experiences, Husserl saw several limitations in his project of a descriptive psychology. According to Husserl, Dilthey inadequately offered explanations regarding the possibility of carrying out his method, being specially limited in his analysis as directed to the purely individual. The question posed here refers to Husserl's attempt to understand psychology as a science that recognizes certain laws of psychic life and the laws that, according to the universally taken mentality and culture, are developed (Hua/IX, p. 11). Husserl does not want a psychology that is limited to individual explanations, but psychological laws that have a universal value.

Husserl also devises the need for a descriptive and systematic scientific analysis carried out on an intuitive basis, which is understood from a nexus or an interweaving of perceptions, feelings, wills and thoughts, which he called lived experiences (*Erlebnisse*) (Hua/IX), which take place in the pre-judicative, pre-scientific or pre-theoretical dimension. For Husserl, both scientific work as well as any work of theoretical thought are possible if and only if there is a starting point of a first and original lifeworld (*Lebenswelt*), composed of the interweaving of an intersubjective community, under which experiences make any

intelligible comprehension feasible (Zahavi, 2003). This original lifeworld does not refer to the dimension in which individuals take objects as distinct from themselves, but rather to the specification of their existences, which grounds the possibility of later judgment (Gallagher, 2012)

Psychology, at least at the time in which Husserl was living in, was for him doomed to fail, for its task of researching the integral concrete subjectivity could only be achieved by a rather radical study, to be carried out without prejudices, which, therefore, would entail the opening of its transcendental-subjective dimensions. For this to be possible, analyses of the already mentioned pre-given world seemed to be necessary. It is possible to understand the Husserlian project of phenomenological psychology and the differentiation of empirical psychology by means of the following concepts: “Apriority, Eidetic Intuition or Pure Description, Intentionality” (Hua/IX. 46); and Husserl goes on claiming, and that is the line which is drawn separating phenomenological psychology from transcendental phenomenology, that the another fundamental characteristic of the form is that it remains *within* the natural attitude, instead of the philosophical attitude, that is, transcendental. To put it short, the following points can serve to summarize the position of phenomenological psychology.

1. It is a counterpoint to the positive sciences, which emerged from a unilateral relationship towards reality, whose method gave way to an attempt to exclude experience from the general framework by eliminating the (experiential) first-person dimension of human existence and therefore trying to remain with what was left of this equation: the physical.

2. It is likewise an objection against the sciences that Husserl calls “socio-cultural”, which comprise psychology, anthropology, history and others, whose interest was *strictly* direct to the “mental” (understood as

explicit in history or culture); this tendency are not able to achieve correlative results with the matters which concern the origin of the relation of the mental within the inhabited physical world¹¹.

3. It poses the need to return to the pre-scientific world (*Lebenswelt*), in which the division created both by the natural sciences (which excludes the mental) and by the social-historical sciences (which show a lack of concreteness) is intelligible. In this world, both these dimensions of human experience are together intertwined¹².

4. It attempts to describe the intentional process of consciousness without the use of causal explanations within a psychophysical framework, dealing *strictly* with subjectivity, i.e., its original structure and lived experiences, which are made possible by the intentionality of consciousness. All this happens within a *non-transcendental*, i.e. natural attitude.

That said, the distinction between transcendental phenomenology and phenomenological psychology demands further clarification. According to Husserl, they represent two paths for the study of consciousness, which are to be distinguished. Both, in their nature, deal with consciousness, however, from different approaches. In the first, there is an ambitious interest towards the constitutive dimension of subjectivity, analyzing consciousness as a possible condition for meaning and truth. In turn, Phenomenological Psychology is characterized as a regional ontology¹³, in which one investigates consciousness by itself, taking the

¹¹ Some aspects of a similar position can be found in a 1931 lecture that Husserl gave in Frankfurt, Berlin and Halle, entitled *Phänomenologie und Anthropologie* (see Husserl, 1941). Cf. San Martín, 2020.

¹² Husserl goes into the question regarding the *Lebenswelt* in the *Crisis* (see Hua/VI).

¹³ “Husserl’s understanding of ontology comprises formal ontologies and regional ontologies. Considering the formal ontology, it identifies the forms and laws of combination belonging to any objectivity; regional ontologies are defined, in addition to the pure formal categories, by a material concept and, more specifically, by the concept of a region. For each region, there is its own eidetic science. It is this regional eidetic science that Husserl calls “regional ontology”. While regional ontologies are located within the category boundaries defined by formal ontology, they also enrich

perspective of the first person rigorously, and thus, as we have seen, *remaining* within the natural attitude (Zahavi, 2010). This “dual” empirical/transcendental characteristic marks the recognition that the empirical and the transcendental subject are not two different subjects, but “(...) two different ways of conceiving one and the same subject” (Zahavi, 2004, p. 335). It is understood from this an intertwining which needs to be examined between psychology and transcendental philosophy, although both remain having distinct characters¹⁴.

In this line of thought, Husserl seems to want to highlight the transcendental character of the ego, even if not conscious of it within the natural attitude. If the transcendental attitude is taken, namely through phenomenological method, a “territory” characterized by the universality of being is opened, which is not a psychological one (Hua/III, p. 162). However, there seems to be *prima facie* a proximity of phenomenological science and psychological science, and that can be explained both by the object that is commonly shared (consciousness, mind, mental acts), and by the understanding that both ways (phenomenological-transcendental and phenomenological psychology) can be taken into consideration towards the search for an ultimate critique of knowledge, which, if it is to be found in subjectivity, must take into account that the latter also goes through a “paradox” in which one is both subject *for* the world, as well as object *in* the world (Hua/VI, p. 182). Zahavi (2010) additionally considers that Husserl did not disregard the possibility that his analyses could provide several consequences for the study of a psychology of consciousness, as well as the possibility of the opposite being equally

formal ontology, providing material content and forms that essentially belong to the particular region” (Drummond, 2007, p. 180).

¹⁴ To the relationship between transcendental phenomenology and phenomenological psychology, see Iso Kern’s classical article “*Die drei Wege zur transzendental-phänomenologischen Reduktion in der Philosophie Edmund Husserls*” (Kern, 1962), in which, at least in Kern’s reading, phenomenological psychology is only another “path” that, if carried through, will eventually lead to transcendental phenomenology.

possible. In this way, both the analysis of transcendental phenomenology and the theory of the transcendental constitution of the objective world could be thought of as an understanding of the “natural” dimension. This parallel between phenomenological psychology and transcendental phenomenology evokes one interpretation (that was developed by Merleau-Ponty and others) that claims that there is a possibility of the passage from one to the other through a change of attitude, a possibility of mutual and beneficial illumination between two fields of knowledge (Hua/VI, p. 261).

Contemporary Concepts of Phenomenological Psychology

Phenomenology in its relationship with psychology was, however, not only restricted to Husserl’s original project towards the erection of a phenomenological psychology. It was rather adopted – in various ways – by other philosophers, but also by psychologists and psychiatrists, with different goals, methods and presuppositions¹⁵. Common to all of those ‘approaches’ is the attempt to put forward a certain understanding of our lived experiences, of our subjectivity which are not restricted to physicalist, or psychologist interpretations, in contrast to a more favourable understanding of consciousness and of human being himself as subjects of meaning, whose experiences cannot be reduced to whatever medium that does not entail the significative role of certain structures of subjectivity, such as embodiment, intersubjectivity, self-consciousness, etc. As already mentioned, those approaches are extremely plural. If on the one hand we are able to see authors who have directly drawn from Husserl’s writings various philosophical concepts in order to establish

¹⁵ Still on the relationship between phenomenology, psychopathology, psychiatry, and psychology, Spiegelberg (1972) calls the “major implication” the fact that phenomenological philosophy has not only influenced psychology and psychiatry from the outside, but it has in fact invaded them, and is now established within them.

psychopathology (as Jaspers and Blankenburg – although with different perspectives – did), we can also find other authors who were much more interested in Heidegger's fundamental ontology, such as Medard Boss or Ludwig Binswanger. In this sense, the list of classical and contemporary psychologists and psychiatrists can hardly be unified under a common banner regarding their conception of phenomenology (transcendental, naturalized?), their method (is it a descriptive, a hermeneutical, a phenomenological method in which one applies the reductions?), their objective (does it seek to find essential structures of subjectivity, does it attempt to generate a psychopathological science, is it only a clinical endeavour?). It is, however, a common spirit towards phenomenology which animates this movement which increasingly grows worldwide.

In what concerns the contemporary discussions regarding the relationship between psychology and phenomenology in Brazil, a similar variety of epistemological and methodological questions can be seen in relationship to the possibility of using phenomenology as a resource in research or even other forms of applications in psychology. In these aspects, current approaches seem to diverge on the theme. Feijoo and Goto (2016), for example, consider that phenomenological research and investigations in psychology must necessarily be based on the phenomenological method, giving continuity to what has already been proposed by Husserl; thus, the characteristics of a phenomenological research would be the application of the reduction, the description of psychical phenomena, in order to inaugurate a “phenomenological attitude” and therefore establish research in psychology. In this proposal, psychology would not be an approach or empirical method, but a psychology founded essentially on a transcendental eidetic territory (Goto, 2015). In a similar position to this tendency, Raffaelli (2004) also considers phenomenological or eidetic psychology the psychology that would be in

agreement with the structure of Husserlian phenomenology, following the methodological proposal of the phenomenological reduction.

While part of the contemporary Brazilian literature seems to tend to be linked to a more “Husserlian-inspired” attempt, there are also proposals in which it is argued differently. These divergent positions seem to be in favor of the possibility of enlarging the theoretical possibilities of research in psychology when referred to the phenomenological method, as well as the use of a wider spectrum of authors of the phenomenological tradition. These distinctive conceptions seem to be close to propositions whose concept of phenomenological psychology is based not on its original philosophical project, but rather on different movements such as the ones based on humanist, existential, gestalt, or hermeneutical foundation (Amatuzzi, 2009; Dutra, 2013; Roehe, 2012). In these approaches, phenomenological psychology (not in Husserl’s sense) can be understood as an originally philosophical proposition, which is directed toward the same themes dealt with by mental health professionals and the “common” human life, such as existence, suffering, and others. Phenomenological philosophy would be “exercised” qualitatively in another context which is not philosophy. It can be said then that there are schools in psychology inspired by phenomenological contributions that make use of certain themes or certain parts of phenomenology, however employing different methodologies and with different purposes. Regarding this view, it should be highlighted the central role occupied by existentialism for many scholars on the relationship between phenomenology and psychiatry and psychology. Phenomenology is here linked to fields such as psychotherapy mental health¹⁶, without being restricted to only one project of one author,

¹⁶ It is worthwhile mentioning that this passage to a field of a more “empirical” nature was first explored by psychiatrists who, from a deep philosophical study, saw in phenomenology a possible ally in the foundation and in the comprehensive study of human experiences, whether pathological or not (Spiegelberg, 1972; Beumont, 1992)

claiming a wider theoretical scope which diverges from Husserl's transcendental philosophy, adopting perspectives such as those of Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger, which were historically understood as critiques of it.

Another way in which we find the relationship between psychology and psychiatry and phenomenology is explained by Castro and Gomes (2011) and is connected to a more methodological use of phenomenology in research. The authors comment on several alternatives used in the late 20th century for the use of phenomenology in psychology, which inherited and adapted a series of concepts initially worked by Husserl, directing them to a specific use. They cite, for example, the use of phenomenological reduction as a research movement by Duquesne University in the 1960s and 1970s; the use of phenomenology as an experimental resource to study perception, which sought to disseminate a teaching program using an approach in the experimental context using resources from phenomenology such as the *epoché* and imaginative variation; and the naturalized phenomenology movement, which attempts to establish a more integral scientific program than the current paradigms in cognitive science, trying to reconcile the study of first-person experience while still considering to the analysis at the neurofunctional level¹⁷.

Method

The present research is characterized as a literature review carried out in the following open databases: Scientific Electronic Library Online (SciELO); Latin American and Caribbean Health Sciences Literature (Lilacs)

¹⁷ It is a very debatable issue whether the project of Francisco Varela, Humberto Maturana and others of naturalizing phenomenology is to be accepted. Essential to this debate is the position of transcendental phenomenology towards science. Zahavi, for example, argues that "(...) to suggest that the phenomenological account could be absorbed, or reduced, or replaced by a naturalistic account is for Husserl sheer nonsense" (Zahavi, 2004, p. 334). However, the author suggests that transcendental phenomenology can enter into a fruitful exchange with the empirical sciences if we understand and modify what is being called "naturalization".

and the Portal of Electronic Psychology Journals (PePSIC). The indexer used for the research was “Phenomenological Psychology”. The study sought to restrict the search only to articles published online in Brazilian journals. Articles were admitted without any specific temporal cut-off¹⁸.

The option for this indexer occurred after unsatisfactory tests with other indexers. When the terms “Psychology” and “Phenomenology” were indicated, we observed the occurrence of more than 500 articles in search results. However, after a pre-analysis of the results, it was observed that many of them did not make any references to the topics addressed in the research, or had no relationship with Phenomenology, Psychology, or related topics. In this way, we only used the indexer “Phenomenological Psychology”, having in mind its syntactic limitations by restricting the use of the term by the authors. However, we claim that it is more applicable to the type of research to be carried out in a preliminary and exploratory way.

The research carried out a qualitative content analysis of the results from the integral reading of all the articles found, aiming to identify the conception of Phenomenological Psychology present in each article, as well as the nature of the article (whether theoretical or empirical). We also analyzed measurable data from the analyzed articles, such as: authorship, institutional affiliation, date of publication, main authors used as reference, diffusion vehicles, as well as the main keywords used. The qualitative analysis was done through the following steps: 1) Complete reading of all articles resulting from the search; 2) Separation of articles in several groups that sought to establish approximations corresponding

¹⁸ This work is also linked to a previous work done by Orengo (2017), who carried out a research only in the SciELO database, which was limited to a quantitative bibliometric analysis, the reading of which was based on only eight articles. The present study, however, aimed to conduct a qualitative-quantitative research, considering that both statistical informations and data of conceptual and semantic order may offer a more comprehensive and satisfactory result, consistent with the objective of the research in question

to the concepts of Phenomenological Psychology identified; 3) Gradual grouping into macro-categories¹⁹ that sought to represent the conception of Phenomenological Psychology of articles in a more generalist way, emphasizing the similarities between them; and, 4) Individual analysis of the macro-categories, relating to the literature of the subject, and proposing hypotheses of analysis.

Results

The research was carried out in September 2017, selecting a total of 74 articles that could be analyzed from the indexer “Phenomenological Psychology”. The database that generated the most results was PePSIC, with 64 results; followed by LILACS with 24 results and finally SCIELO with 13 results. Of these 101 initial results, after the initial survey, a filtering was carried out through the inclusion and exclusion criteria. The inclusion criteria were: 1) Being a scientific article; 2) Being published in Brazilian journals; 3) Being available for online access. The exclusion criteria were: 1) Be a translation of some international article; 2) Be published in an international journal; 3) not being available online. After applying these criteria, articles that appeared repeatedly in different databases were also excluded.

The articles selected offered the following bibliometric distinctions: I) Institutional Affiliation; II) Year of Publication; III) Authors cited in the references; IV) Journal of publication; and V) Nature of the Articles (empirical or theoretical). It was also possible through the employed method to obtain qualitative results on the different conceptions of Phenomenological Psychology, such as the formation of three categories (units) of articles. These refer to Phenomenological Psychology as 1) a

¹⁹ Described below, in the item “Qualitative Results”.

method of Research in Psychology; 2) a particular category of phenomenological philosophy; and 3) as clinical approaches in psychology.

Bibliometric Results

The bibliometric results of this research point to relevant information regarding the production of articles on the subject. Most articles are authored by a single person (55%). Regarding the authors, even though a measure is subjected to a series of problems, it is noticed that names like Virginia Moreira and Elza Dutra appeared as the authors who produced more articles, with six works each. Next, William Gomes appears with five articles, followed by Mauro Amatuzzi, Danilo Verissimo and Savio Peres with four articles each. The other authors appear with three articles or less, in the scope of this research.

Regarding the bibliographic bases, of the 74 articles selected, the largest amount comes from *PePSIC*, with 53 articles. Secondly, from *Lilacs* were obtained eight articles for research. The database that offered the lowest number of articles was Scielo, with six articles. Adding to the numbers of *PePSIC* and *Scielo*, six articles chosen for the analysis were found in both databases. The articles selected for the *corpus* of the research date mainly from 2014 (12 articles), and 2013 (11 articles), followed by 2009 and 2011 with seven articles each. The oldest article was published in 1991, and the most recent in 2016; it is possible to observe an increase in the number of publications over the years.

With regard to the production of the articles selected by authorship affiliation institution, the Federal University of Rio Grande do Norte (UFRN) was highlighted with eight articles, followed by the University of Fortaleza (UNIFOR) with seven articles; the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS) and the University of São Paulo with six articles;

the Pontifical Catholic University of Campinas (PUC-Campinas), University of Brasilia (UNB) and State University of São Paulo (UNESP) with four articles. Universities like UFPR, UFRJ, whereby other institutions were responsible for three or fewer articles published in the scope of this research.

The most cited authors in the respective bibliographies were Merleau-Ponty and Husserl, present in 27 articles. Followed by these names were: Heidegger (16 articles), Amedeo Giorgi (13 articles); Carl Rogers and Mauro Martins AmatuZZi were cited in 11 articles; William Gomes in ten articles; Yolanda Forghieri in nine articles; Sartre, Medard Boss, Holanda, Moreira and Spiegelberg in seven articles. There were references to Binswanger (six articles); Goto (five); Tatossian, Buber and Minkowski (four); Ricoeur, Freud, Castro, Perls, Bicudo, James and Wundt (three); Giovanetti and Kierkegaard (two). Other authors had only one citation in the articles.

It was also observed that most articles on the subject (18 papers) were published in the journal *Phenomenological Studies - Revista de Abordagem Gestáltica*. In the sequence the journal *Estudos de Psicologia* (Campinas) shows up with eight articles; followed by the journals *Psicologia: Teoria e Pesquisa* (Brasília) and *Psicologia em Estudo* (Maringá) with five articles. Other journals published four or fewer articles. Regarding the type of article, it was observed that the great majority (76%) are categorized as theoretical articles, in contrast to 24% articles as empirical research.

Qualitative Results

After reading the 74 articles, it was possible, through the selected methodology of content analysis to establish three categories that allow to infer hypotheses on what the articles understand by phenomenological psychology in Brazil. Firstly, all articles were read in full. The articles were

subsequently grouped according to the the conception of phenomenological psychology of each work. After that, these various categories were grouped in order to draw relations between the sense of each work; three three main categories emerged out of this process: 1) Phenomenological Psychology as a Research Method in Psychology; 2) Phenomenological Psychology as a Concept of phenomenological Philosophy, and 3) Phenomenological Psychology as a Clinical “Approach” in Psychology. In the end each of the final categories was analyzed, whereby we attempted to describe them and understand their meaning. It is important to say that the goal of this whole procedure was not of establishing a theoretical assessment about what kind of interpretation of phenomenological psychology would be the most correct or viable, but simply to characterize and show the different variations that a concept of phenomenology can present, as well as its impact on the discourse of the scientific community that relies on these derived concepts.

1. Phenomenological Psychology as a Research Method in Psychology.

This category includes articles that consider the use of a phenomenologically inspired method as a possible resource for research in psychology. In this sense, we could say that “phenomenological psychology” is understood in this category not as clinical psychology, but rather connected to a rather experimental interpretation of psychology. The main idea that illuminates this conception of phenomenological psychology is that, derived from the traditional phenomenological method, useful resources can be taken for the study of the subjective experience, giving place to a first person perspective which exalts the discourse and the self-perception of the subject, rather than just making inferences of 2nd or 3rd person perspective (Branco, 2014; Castro e Gomes, 2011). This conception of phenomenological psychology also refers

to qualitative research in psychology, observing as the model of greater application the method of Amedeo Giorgi (Giorgi & Souza, 2010), which runs through quite a number of papers (Amatuzzi, 1996; Castro & Gomes, 2011; Epiphany & Amatuzzi, 1997; Freitas & Michel, 2014; Gomes, 1998; Möller & Andrade, 2011; Zorzi & Boris, 2013). Although Giorgi's method is not the only one to be considered in those researches, it is definitely one of the most important and utilized in the Brazilian scene. In short, this category is characterized by the clarity when discussing its objectives, presuppositions as well as how they see the relationship between phenomenology and psychology. Furthermore, these papers are not committed to one classical author of phenomenology, but rather they attempt to analyze the contributions of phenomenology "in general" in order to advance knowledge (mostly qualitative) by investigating (through different methods) human experience.

2. Phenomenological Psychology as a concept of phenomenological Philosophy.

In this category we observe articles that thematize phenomenological psychology as a concept proper to phenomenological philosophy specifically developed mainly by Husserl. The phenomenological psychology understood here refers to his later works, such as the *Phenomenological Psychology: Lectures, Summer Semester, 1925*, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, 1935, and the *Phenomenology* article for the Encyclopaedia Britannica in 1927. The articles take up Husserl's conception of phenomenological psychology as a non-empirical activity, which attempts not to fall into the same errors of scientific psychology, i.e., that consider the world and subjectivity through a naturalized perspective. In contrast, phenomenological psychology aims to establish an analysis of the essential structures of consciousness as a way of studying subjectivity differing from the path of transcendental

phenomenology. Phenomenological psychology seeks to establish a scientific, systematic, and descriptive analysis, through an intuitive basis. Subjectivity here is understood as an intertwining of feelings, thoughts and perceptions that constitute our lived experiences, which constitutes and are constituted in the *Lebenswelt* (Porta, 2010; Peres, 2014a, 2014b, 2015). This category, which follows Husserl's concept of phenomenological psychology in his own philosophical project, is characterized for being mainly theoretical, i.e., there are no attempts to "transpose" or "apply" this phenomenological psychology to an "approach" in psychotherapy or experimental psychology, but rather to clarify the importance of this concept in relationship with Husserl's bigger project of grounding a transcendental phenomenology, namely, to offer another -non-transcendental- way within phenomenology.

3. Phenomenological Psychology as a Clinical "Approach" in Psychology.

This category encompasses articles that identify phenomenological psychology with a psychotherapeutic approach in psychology, understood as "way" of carrying out a certain therapy based on a phenomenological inspiration, application, derivation, i.e., it does not necessarily seek to perform the phenomenological method as it was primordially proposed by Husserl, but rather to use certain concepts (for example experience, body, subjectivity, etc) from the phenomenological tradition. It could be said that these articles use phenomenology in a rather loose and diverse fashion, in which phenomenology is here understood in its "broader lines". In general terms, the articles take into consideration a psychological approach in which suffering or mental disorders can neither be reduced to naturalized determinations nor withdrawn from their special status of a unique experience in the world. They also consider of utmost importance to denote the primary role of the subject, and therefore of the patient/client

in clinical experience, whereby to present his or hers discourse and suffering, both patient and clinician are able to develop an understanding relationship, something that goes against a certain approach in which only the psychologist possesses knowledge.

This category is specially characterized for having various names for phenomenological psychology, such as: phenomenological-existential psychology; phenomenological-humanistic psychology; hermeneutic psychology, gestalt-therapy, among others. This indicates the variety of theoretical connections that this conception of psychology has. It should be noted that these articles do not have a specific link with some school, as was the case with strictly Husserlian phenomenological psychology, but rather derive from various authors from philosophy and psychology/psychiatry, often connected to existentialism, although there are also references to the humanistic movement (Amatuzzi, 2009; Dutra, 2013; 2016; Moreira, 2010; Roehe, 2006, 2012).

Final Considerations

The research sought to establish a preliminary understanding of publications in the field of phenomenological psychology, as well as the relationship between psychology and phenomenology in Brazil. This complicated but also rich relationship goes across two also complex relations; the first is the history of phenomenology itself in contact with psychology, which was not only complicated through Husserl's take on it, but that also developed throughout the history of the phenomenological movement and became even more complex in the recent history of the relationship between phenomenology with cognitive sciences; the second is the history regarding the arrival of phenomenology in Brazil, which came through psychology and psychiatry rather than through philosophy. This last aspect certainly leads to further questions regarding the challenge

of receiving, interpreting and developing an European tradition which was and still is written in another language than Portuguese, which is increased by social and historical aspects intrinsic to Brazil and the development of its academic context. If these two difficult relationships can tell us something is that, in the course of the consolidation of the relationship between psychology and phenomenology, challenges emerge both from outside phenomenology, -with experimental and clinical psychology/psychiatry-, but also within phenomenology itself. It is a movement that goes both ways and changes what it touches.

Going back to the results of the investigations, the first thing we have observed is that Brazilian authors seem to use different meanings for phenomenological psychology. It was also observed that they use, quote and draw on results from other authors and researches which are also carrying different meanings to this concept. As we attempted to show, there within phenomenological literature already a debate on its usage, but it is not clear whether the authors are aware of this when they use the terms they use. Furthermore, there is a diffuse use in the references of the articles, for they go through philosophical and psychological movements (both classical and contemporary), which in turn employ different meanings transposed to the concept of phenomenological psychology that diverge from each other. In addition, in several of these articles one perceives a lack of greater care and precision towards fundamental concepts of phenomenology, such as phenomenological psychology itself, but also some basic delineation of fundamental concepts, such as their understanding of phenomenology itself and its fundamental concepts such as consciousness, experience or subjectivity. This variety of terminologies regarding phenomenology (often followed by adjectives such as hermeneutics, humanist, existential, qualitative, transcendental), is in most articles carried through with the absence of a basic explanation or

characterization of what is being referred to in their conceptual frameworks, or what is being understood as the relationship between phenomenology and psychology. It is not a question of demanding philological or deep philosophical reconstructions in order to write a paper in psychology, but mainly of clarifying fundamental concepts which are decisive if one wants to develop a field of research in which researchers can debate in a more precise and qualified manner, being able to communicate, criticize and defend a certain position.

What concerns the articles which attempt to approximate and deepen the project of Husserlian phenomenological psychology, one can observe a more direct citation from Husserl's works as well as from classic authors of the phenomenological movement (Feijoo & Mattar, 2014; Peres, 2014a, 2014b, 2015; Porta, 2010; Raffaelli, 2004). In these articles, which vary in degree of commitment to the phenomenological method and the concept of phenomenology exposed, there seems to be a greater concern with the assumptions that Husserl proposed in the development of his thought. These theoretical articles seek to rescue the concept of Phenomenological Psychology discussed in Husserl and commented in Brazil by authors of psychology concerned with conceptual basis for currents in psychology from a phenomenological approach, which often seem to forget the importance of understanding Husserlian work (Goto, 2015; Feijoo & Goto, 2016). This rather conceptual understanding of phenomenological psychology, however interesting, does not seem to be able to bridge (and perhaps it is not even its underlying motivation) or to explain what is exactly the (non-theoretical) role of phenomenology in its relationship with psychology or psychiatry. Furthermore, they take the risk of falling into what Zahavi (2019) suggests – quoting Minkowski – namely of “hiper-philosophizing”, i.e., not being to differ the work done by philosophy, and the one that can be done in its ‘applied’ form.

A further point relates to the use of references that are not so obviously related to phenomenology in its origin, such as Freud, Rogers, Foucault, Frankl and Benjamin. Although there is *prima facie* no problem at all in this, it is surprising that sometimes those authors emerge more than the authors that wrote the works themselves. One could attempt to hypothesize this phenomenon as: a) an epistemic confusion of some of the authors, who attempt to establish theoretical or practical relations of diverse movements of thought whose foundations can be shown contradictory; or it can b) demonstrate a plurality of conceptions and possibilities of dialogue that phenomenology, with all its rigour and criteria, is able to establish. Furthermore, one notes by reading these articles that, in regard to the authors and sources cited, despite the reference to the original authors of classical phenomenology, the presence of Brazilian commentators in this same sample might indicate a certain bias in the interpretation of the multiple meanings of what is understood by “phenomenological psychology”, for there is always an extra interpretation (of the commentary) departing from the original. Moreover, the high number of these commentators might indicate a limited access to the original works (as we put forward above, different social and cultural answers can be drawn regarding this) of the phenomenological movement by Brazilian researchers.

Finally, we point out the need for greater conceptual precision in authors who study the relationship between phenomenology and psychology, especially when dealing with a theme that involves certain traditions with certain interpretations of it in phenomenology and psychology. To think of any application or transposition of the thinking of the main exponents of phenomenology to psychology must, before being taken as certain, be placed under scrutiny and questioning regarding the possible theoretical and practical implications of this use, i.e., it must be

understood in a reasoned and careful way. Again, it does not mean that psychology has to do the work of philosophy, nor that it has to make deep conceptual, historical or methodological analysis, but that it must have clarity of the concepts and presuppositions that it is – even if unnoticed – carrying along in its research. We also point out the importance of connecting the research done in Brazil with international research which was and is being carried out, something that, at least in the articles consulted, represents a minority of Brazilian research on phenomenology and psychology. All in all, Brazil has a distinguished interest in phenomenology and psychology, which is due to its own academic formation, but also to the great interest and creativity of its researchers. Hence, Brazilian perspectives on this theme have the potential of combining its curiosity, plurality and capacity with a better and more precise conceptual apparatus that shall be connected with research done worldwide. For future research on the current reality of this theme, we suggest the expansion of the search query, since the indexers chosen are also limited to the research itself around phenomenological psychology.

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Psychology and philosophy in the early days of phenomenological thought in Brazil

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Presentation

The historiography of philosophy traditionally indicates that phenomenology arrives in Brazil in the 1940s, through an “existentialist pathway”. However, it was in the field of psychology that phenomenology had its first references in the Brazilian scenario. The purpose of this paper is to present a brief history of the entrance and consolidation of phenomenology in Brazil, showing the early referenced authors by tracing its roots in psychology with pioneer such as Wacław Radecki and Nilton Campos, and showing the first references in philosophy with Euryalo Cannabrava and Vicente Ferreira da Silva. Finally, we attempt to discuss the current scenario in light of its historical relations.

Introduction

Phenomenology in Brazil features a curious scenario. Even it is one of the most important contemporary contributions to contemporary thought, phenomenology does not have much space and has received only limited attention in the national academic field. This scenario has been gradually changed due to a set of high-quality publications and translations of some original works by Husserl, Stein, Fink and others (in

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philosophy)², as well as to an increasingly active repertoire of research groups and productions in the field of psychology.

Certainly, the contributions of phenomenological thinking are not limited to these two disciplines, and other areas have extensive production, such as Law, Geography, Physics, Education, Nursing, Theology and Religious Sciences, among others³. However, the focus of this article is on philosophy and psychology because of the close historical ties between both and phenomenology, dating back to Brentano and Husserl. An example of the relevance of phenomenological thinking can be seen from the multiple influences that it has exerted and still exerts on numerous fields of knowledge⁴.

The purpose of this article is to draw a preliminary sketch of the history of phenomenology in Brazil. It belongs to a research project that seeks to understand the roots and relations between phenomenology and Brazilian thought; it attempts to understand their processes of arrival, development and ramifications in our country; as well as understand, through their first readers and commentators, the current places occupied by this science. The project that we are referring to is developed together with the *Laboratório de Fenomenologia e Subjetividade (Laboratory for Phenomenology and Subjectivity, LabFeno⁵)*, linked to the department of psychology and the graduate program in psychology at the Federal University of Paraná, registered under the name “History of the Phenomenological Movement in Brazil”, that is being developed in three

² In the last ten years, the Brazilian public has known more translations of Husserl, for example, than in the previous thirty years, such as the Portuguese versions of important works of other phenomenologists such as Edith Stein, Michel Henry, Eugen Fink, Max Scheler, Jan Patočka, Gabriel Marcel, Emmanuel Lévinas, Hans Jonas; as well as great commentators like Gadamer, Xirau, Zahavi, and others.

³ As described by Holanda, Silva & Goto (2020), we have, in Brazil, more than 130 research groups officially registered, from the most varied areas, representing an entire interdisciplinary colloquium that Phenomenology has always sought to build.

⁴ Holanda, 2014; Spiegelberg, 1972, 1982.

⁵ www.labfeno.com.br

strands: a) it involves a set of historiographic researches that have an emphasis on gathering pioneering themes, works and authors on the transmission of phenomenology in our country through a bio-bibliographic study; b) a conceptual study of phenomenological themes and propositions, searching for its approximation or application to the psychological context and; c) a study that attempts to develop theoretical and technical elements connected to the theme of Mental Health and Phenomenological Psychology and Psychopathology. A number of productions were already derived from this project, such as historiographical and empirical studies⁶, studies of conceptual nature⁷ and Mental Health⁸; included reflections on Psychology of Religion and Phenomenology of Religion⁹.

It is possible to claim that the phenomenological ideas were present in Brazil since the beginning of the 1910s through the work of Raymundo de Farias Brito, considered the forerunner of the existentialist thought in our country¹⁰ and those ideas are highlighted, according to historians of brazilian philosophy, from the 1940s, through a “body of existentialist ideas”¹¹, in three perspectives: 1) With the introduction of existential themes and phenomenological authors on those themes (notably from translations of works by Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger); 2) With a philosophical reflection with tight bonds with philosophy of Right; and, 3) From thoughts and researches in Psychology with significative impact in Psychiatry and Psychopathology.

⁶ Lima & Holanda, 2015; Orengo, Holanda & Goto, 2020; Schleider & Holanda, 2015; Silva, 2014; Silva & Holanda, 2014.

⁷ Goto, Holanda & Costa, 2018; Holanda, 2009, 2014.

⁸ Puchivailo, Silva & Holanda, 2013; Maeder, 2015; Maeder, Holanda & Costa, 2019; Muhl, 2015⁸; Portugal & Holanda, 2019.

⁹ Holanda, 2017.

¹⁰ Guimarães, 1984; Cerqueira, 2002.

¹¹ Guimarães, 1984.

Brief History of the Phenomenological Thought in Brazil

Phenomenology has significantly influenced a great number of thinkers and disciplines in Brazil. The historiographic tradition in philosophy indicates the presence of phenomenology in the Brazilian context starting in the 1940s, initially through the “body of existentialist ideas”, as a theme for philosophical reflection and as a branch of psychological reflection¹²; and the first ones to be quoted as the forerunners of phenomenology in Brazil are Euryalo Cannabrava and Vicente Ferreira da Silva.

Euryalo Cannabrava (1906-1979) published in 1941 “Seis Temas do Espírito Moderno”¹³ (*Six Themes of the Modern Spirit*), in which he quotes authors such as Bergson, Heidegger, Husserl, Jaspers, Marcel, Kierkegaard and Scheler; and briefly mentions Husserl, more specifically the *Cartesian Meditations*. In his philosophical project, Cannabrava attempts to formulate a philosophical theory in a close contact with existential problems, a path that is traced between husserlian phenomenology and German existential phenomenology through his reading of Heidegger and Jaspers¹⁴. Cannabrava was a philosopher influenced by John Dewey, he worked in the Psychology Institute at the University of Brazil (today, the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro) and also taught philosophy at the Colégio Pedro II, in Rio de Janeiro. Between 1940 and 1960, he participated as foreigner Editor of the journal *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, edited by the *International Phenomenological Society*. In addition to the aforementioned text, we can also highlight the following works by him: “Descartes and Bergson” (published in 1943), “Introdução

¹² Guimarães, 1981, 1982, 1984, 2000; Morujão, 1990; Paim, 1979.

¹³ Cannabrava, 1941.

¹⁴ Guimarães, 2000; Abreu e Silva Neto, 2011.

à Filosofia Científica” (*Introduction of Scientific Philosophy*, published in 1956), and “Teoria da Decisão Filosófica” (*Theory of Philosophical Decision*, published in 1977), among others.

Vicente Ferreira da Silva (1916-1963), in his turn was one of the first readers of Heidegger¹⁵, as was possible to be confirmed by the publication of his “Ensaio Filosóficos” (*Philosophical Essays*), in 1948, where we can find an essay on Heidegger and another on Sartre. He was also a pioneer in logical studies in Brazil¹⁶, and one of the founders of the *Brazilian Philosophical Institute*. His work can be divided into three phases¹⁷: A first phase linked to logical and mathematical problems, related to Frege and Carnap¹⁸; a second phase called “existential” and metaphysical, when the philosopher focused on authors such as Berdiaeff, Sartre, Scheler, Husserl, Kierkegaard, Julian Marías, Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, Marcel, Bergson and Heidegger and; a third phase, where he meditates on the Myth, on the philosophy of mythology and the philosophy of History, in all their connections, based on his studies on names like Rudolf Otto, Mircea Eliade, Enzo Paci, Karl Kerényi and others. His complete works were recently published between 2009 and 2010¹⁹.

One aspect to be pointed out is that names such as those of Henri Bergson, Nietzsche, Gabriel Marcel and Kierkegaard were previously highlighted in brazilian literature in relation to the traditional exponents of phenomenology (such as Husserl and Heidegger, or even Jaspers), what corroborates the thesis of the “body of existentialist ideas” of Brazilian phenomenology.

¹⁵ Morujão, 1990; Guimarães, 2000; Ferreira da Silva, 1948.

¹⁶ Da Costa, 1994; Teixeira, 1994.

¹⁷ Petrônio, 2004.

¹⁸ Represented by works like “Lógica Moderna” (*Modern Logical* published in 1939) and “Elementos de Lógica Matemática” (*Elements of Mathematical Logic*, published in 1940).

¹⁹ Silva, 2009a, 2009b, 2010.

We are able to observe this by a series of publications. In 1938, José Perez translated a book of René Gillouin on “*Bergson*”, the first introduction of the French thinker in Brazil; and, in 1940 we have the first publication on “*Nietzsche*”, translated by Sergio Milliet. In the sequence we have a series of publications related to existential themes and authors, such as “*Estudos de Filosofia do Conciente*” (*Studies on the Philosophy of the Conscious*), by Syrio Drummond (published in 1943), a new publication by Euryalo Cannabrava in 1944, “*Descartes e Bergson*”, with some new short mentions to Husserl and Heidegger; a book of Miguel Reale entitled “*Nietzsche e o Valor da Filosofia*” (*Nietzsche and the Value of Philosophy*), in 1945; and an introduction to existentialism, by Heitor Moniz, published in 1948²⁰.

A name of great relevance in this scenario is that of João de Souza Ferraz (1903-1988) – psychologist, poet, journalist and writer, he was for many years responsible for the cultural and literary newspaper *Letras da Província*, from Limeira, São Paulo – whom we refer two works: “*Psicologia Humana*” (*Human Psychology*, published in 1945) and “*Compreensão Fenomenológica das Emoções*” (Phenomenological Understanding of Emotions), in 1950²¹. In those, Ferraz demonstrates the importance of discussing psychological questions – present since the works of Brentano and the first Husserl – besides establishing references to Merleau-Ponty and William James.

Another important name that is highlighted in those connections is that of Miguel Reale (1910-2006), a well-known jurist, philosopher, academic and poet, for its studies and writings that relate phenomenology and philosophy of Right. Graduated from the Law Faculty of the University

²⁰ Paim, 1979, 1986, 1990.

²¹ “Phenomenological Understanding of Emotions”, subtitled “Psychological Aspects of Existential Philosophy” (Ferraz, 1950).

of São Paulo – where he was professor, Rector and professor Emeritus – Reale was a prolific writer in Philosophy of Law and legal thought, particularly by his formulation on the “three-dimensional theory of law”, as a social fact, a value and legal norm²². His work began with political discussions in the 1930s, and soon covers Law and other philosophical questions, in order to understand human being in his totality. He definitely finds phenomenology in 1953 with the publication of “*Filosofia do Direito*” (*Philosophy of Right*), in a dialogue with Husserl, taking the concept of the relationship self-world as a *a priori* and approaching the husserlian notion of *Lebenswelt*²³. In his *Philosophy of Right*, he characterizes the phenomenological method in two sections: “Phenomenological analysis of juridical reality” and “From the phenomenological reduction to the axiological-historical reflection”, in which he grounds his “Juridical Ontognoseology”.

The decade of 1950 presents new publications of existentialist character, such as the book of Alceu Amoroso Lima (1893-1983)²⁴, “O Existencialismo” (*The Existentialism*) and the one of Delfim Pinto dos Santos (1907-1966)²⁵, “Fundamentação Existencial da Pedagogia” (*Existential Grounding of Pedagogy*), both in 1951.

However, even though we have a considerable number of introductory publications, there were no original translations from these philosophers. The first to be known directly from their originals was Gabriel Marcel with the publication in 1952 of “Présence et Immortalité”; in the same year, Vitor Visconti publishes “Três Momentos do

²² Reale, 1953; Paim, 1986, 1999.

²³ Souza, 1991.

²⁴ Another prominent Brazilian thinker, he was a literary critique, professor, writer and catholic leader. He has important works on Economics, Politics and Philosophy

²⁵ A Portuguese scholar, philosopher and educator. His writings were assembled in a four volumes publication by Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, from philosophical, cultural and educational problems. Official site: <http://www.delfimsantos.org/>

Existencialismo” (*Three Moments of Existentialism*). Until the 1950s, the phenomenologists are only known for brazilian readers through few and short introductions, and the access to the originals was possible only to those who had the opportunity of studying in Europe, and particularly in Belgium (where the *Husserl Archives* are located), France and Germany. As a consequence to this, phenomenological thought and, mainly its key concepts, its discussions and posterior elaborations were restricted to few scholars and educational programs.

The first mention to Max Scheler in brazilian publications was through Hélios Lessa Sousa’s book, “A Axiologia e o Personalismo de Max Scheler” (*Max Scheler’s Axiology and Personalism*), published in 1953; only in 1954 the large public know Heidegger, through two short introductions: “Heidegger e o Problema da Filosofia” (*Heidegger and the Problem of Philosophy*) by Carlos Lopes de Mattos²⁶ and “Notas sobre Heidegger” (*Notes on Heidegger*), by Glaucio Veiga. It is worthwhile highlighting that the first original translation of Heidegger took place only in 1966 by Emanuel Carneiro Leão, namely Heidegger’s “Introdução à Metafísica” (*Introduction to Metaphysics*).

The year of 1966 was fruitful in productions, for besides Heidegger, we had three more translations of Sartre’s texts: “Questão de Método” (*The Problem of Method*, translated by Bento Prado Junior), “Esboço de uma Teoria das Emoções” (*Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions*, translated by Fernando de Castro Ferro), and “Marxismo e Existencialismo” (*Marxism and Existentialism*), a compilation of articles by Sartre, Roger Garaudy, Jean Hippolyte, J-P. Vigier and Jean Orcel (translated by Luiz Serrano Pinto). In the same year, Ernildo Stein publishes “Introdução a Heidegger” (*Introduction to Heidegger*).

²⁶ Mattos, 1954. The first part of this book is also available online (Mattos, 2019).

It is very important to highlight that, so far, important names such as those of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty were almost unknown for most in Brazil. The translations of Heidegger, in their turn, were spreading, making the German philosopher – next to Sartre – become one of the most known and directly associated figures with phenomenology in Brazil. In 1967, Emanuel Carneiro Leão translates “Sobre o Humanismo” (*Letter on Humanism*); after that, in 1969, Ernildo Stein translates “Sobre o Problema do Ser: o caminho do campo” (*The Question of Being*) and “O que é Metafísica” (*What is Metaphysics*); in the same year we still had the publication of “Da Experiência do Pensar” (*Discourse on Thinking*), translated by Maria do Carmo Tavares Miranda. In the following year was published “Sobre a Essência da Verdade” (*On the Essence of Truth*) and in 1971, “O que é isto a Filosofia?” (*What is Philosophy?*), both translated by Ernildo Stein. With this, we are able to observe that from early on, phenomenological thought in Brazil had to deal with the ambiguity of various views, at the expense of a more longitudinal perspective. Furthermore, the genesis of phenomenology with Brentano and Husserl was unknown until very recently, above all due to the absence of any translation (or even debates around his positions) of Brentano’s works until the present day, and due to the fact that we still do not have access to a significant number of Husserl’s originals.

The first references to Karl Jaspers date to 1958, through two translations: “Razão e Anti-Razão em Nosso Tempo” (*Reason and Anti-Reason in our Time*), and “A Bomba” (*The Atomic Bomb*). Jaspers becomes more known to Brazil’s wider public due to his works in psychiatry and psychopathology, mainly by his *General Psychopathology*, translated and published in the 1970s, with other editions in the 1980s.

Merleau-Ponty in his turn was introduced in Brazil thanks to Marilena Chauí’s 1967 publication “Maurice-Merleau Ponty e a Crítica ao

Humanismo” (*Maurice Merleau-Ponty and the Critique to Humanism*) and the translation of *Humanism and Terror*. It is interesting to observe that this text – originally published in 1947 – arrives here only twenty years later. Still, it was possible to get a copy of the Portuguese translations (by Fernando Gil) of Merleau-Ponty’s late publication, his book *Signes*. It is curious that the first work of the author, *The Structure of Behavior*, only met its translation to Portuguese in 1975. In Brazil, Merleau-Ponty’s later works were translated before his foundational texts, as was the case of *Eye and Mind* (translated by Gerardo Dantas Barreto), in 1969. In 1971 three translations appeared: *Phenomenology of Perception* (by Reginaldo Di Piero), *The Visible and the Invisible* (by José Artur Gianotti and Armando Moura D’Oliveira) and *The Prose of the World* (translated by Celina Luz); subsequently, in 1973, *Phenomenology and the Sciences of Man* (translated to Portuguese by Salma Tannus Muchail).

We repeat this remark, since that – like for most of the cited philosophers – the brazilian public had no direct access to originals and had only known the works and thoughts of these authors without a perspective of continuity, what might eventually explain the various interpretations (some of those conflicting) of phenomenology in our country. In the case of Merleau-Ponty, for example, his first book has a fundamental importance to comprehend both the formation as well as the evolution of his thought, since the notion of “one’s own body” or “embodiment” find their constitution in this work. This book and his thesis – *Phenomenology of Perception* – are works already implicated with the “presence” and contain elements for the ontological explanation that will emerge in the 1964’s work, *The Visible and the Invisible*”.

With this, we highlight an important detail which will take larger proportions in subsequent years, when the interpretations on these philosophers are to be increasingly carried out by experts and distanced

from great public debates. Thus, besides not having any translated text of Brentano or even an introduction to his thought in portuguese, we might consider as something even more aggravating, in regard to the understanding of the whole phenomenological thought, the fact that the first text of Husserl that was translated in Brazil was an excerpt of his *Logical Investigations* (first volume) – namely, the Sixth Investigation – translated by Zeljko Loparic in 1975 to the old volume of an introduction series about philosophers, named *Os Pensadores*.

One of the consequences of this “alienation” from the main texts to the large audience was that phenomenology was increasingly seen as connected to a small group of scholars, with their own choices of reading and interpretation; a second impact is to be found in the difficulties of accessing the main phenomenological concepts – equally reinterpreted in the light of other thinkers – and the constitution of a context of diverse phenomenologies, what has considerably reduced the appeal towards its reading and study. Connected to this, besides the fact that those are naturally dense texts, the fact that we have had scarce access to a perspective of the whole phenomenological thought, ended up creating “expertises”, specially outside the philosophical field, through the appropriation of phenomenology by other sciences.

The demand for phenomenological knowledge, connected to the difficulty of accessing the originals, ended up favoring the dissemination of “introductions”, which served as “manuals” of reading, and practically as the only source of reading for most of the interested ones in it. Until the 1990s, for example, those who wanted to know Husserl had to appeal to French or Spanish translations, as well as deal with distinct modes of conceptual interpretations. The first of those introductions was Lyotard’s text *Phenomenology*, already known in Brazil in the 1960s, and Dartigues’ book, *What is Phenomenology*, translated in the 1970s. Beside those

introductions, particularly important was the presence, the contributions and the translations by names such as Ernildo Stein, Emanuel Carneiro Leão, Zeljko Loparic, Gerd Bornheim, Maria do Carmo Tavares Miranda, Creusa Capalbo, Newton Aquiles Von Zuben, Urbano Zilles and Benedito Nunes, among others.

First References to Phenomenology in Psychological Research

The fact that we point out Farias Brito as the forerunner of phenomenological ideas in Brazil is due to his pioneering discussions regarding themes such as “consciousness” and by anticipating existentialism. However, since the early days, those ideas were equally highlighted in psychological investigations.

The relationship between phenomenology and psychology was always intimate. Since the writings of Brentano, over Husserl’s reflections, reaching even a privileged status in thinkers such as Edith Stein, Sartre, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, among others. Those relationships are also manifested in Brazilian readings and productions, notoriously by the methodological perspective, and by the development of themes related to psychology, such as consciousness, subjectivity, egology, intersubjectivity, etc. This close relationship between phenomenology and psychology is manifested in Brazil through the works of the two pioneers of this beginning science in the country: Wacław Radecki and Nilton Campos.

Both are professionals related to the beginnings of experimental research and work in Psychology in Brazil at the *Laboratório de Psicologia da Colônia de Psicopatas de Engenho de Dentro* (“Psychology Laboratory of the Engenho de Dentro Psychopath Colony). Wacław Radecki, was a psychologist born in 1887 in Warsaw, Poland, who dedicated his life to psychological research. Radecki studied Psychology with Théodore Flournoy and started to work as research assistant of Edouard Claparède,

in France. In 1911 he obtained his doctoral degree with a thesis about the “Psychoelectric Phenomena”, calling the attention of scholars in Geneva, being consequently named full professor of this university. In the following year, he began the organization of the Psychology Laboratory of the University of Cracow, until the year of 1914. After the Great War, the laboratory was transformed into a Faculty of Psychology²⁷.

In 1923 he moved to Brazil, where he was named professor of the Faculdade de Ciências Jurídicas (*Faculty of Juridical Sciences*) at the Federal University of Paraná, in the city of Curitiba. There he remained for only one year, for he accepted the invitation of the Ministry of Interior and Public Health to organize and direct what would become the Experimental Psychology Laboratory of the Engenho de Dentro Psychopath Colony, in Rio de Janeiro – the third psychology laboratory in Brazil – where he carried forth a detailed plan of experimental research, while he initiated the education of professional psychologists through courses and conferences linked to the laboratory. The laboratory in question has a particular importance for Brazilian psychology due to both the fact that it was, at the time, the most complete in South America – what ends up with its transformation into Psychology Institute in the year of 1932 – and, for being responsible for the first proposal of an official psychology course in Brazil²⁸.

Radecki remains in Brazil until 1933, when he receives an invitation to organize the course of General Psychology in the city of Montevideo, Uruguay. From this moment on, his professional activities are developed between Uruguay's capital and Buenos Aires, until his death in 1953. The importance of Radecki for South American psychology stems from his

²⁷ Cambiaggio, 1977; Centofanti, 1982, 2011.

²⁸ Jonsson, 2011. For a more detailed history of the Psychology Laboratories in Brazil, we refer the reader to the following literature (Massimi, 1990, 2004; Jacó-Vilela, 1999; Bernardes, 2004; Centofanti, 2006, 2011a, 2011b; Antunes, 2007).

effort in constructing a psychological system along the lines developed by Wundt, James and Claparède, and although his system may have a “functionalist” tendency, it was in his works that emerged the first references to phenomenology in brazilian texts²⁹.

It was in his publications of courses given in the Laboratory in the last years of the 1920s that Radecki first mentioned authors of phenomenology in brazilian works³⁰. In the texts published in the “Resumo do Curso de Psychologia” (*Summary of the Course of Psychologia*), in 1928, and in the “Trabalhos de Psicologia” (*Works in Psychology*), in 1929, we find direct references to Bergson, Binswanger, Brentano, Ehrenfels, Geiger, Husserl, James, Koffka, Koehler, Külpe, Michotte, Pfänder, Stumpf, Twardowski and Wertheimer. We should note that the references to Brentano and Husserl are previous to those philosophy authors at their time in Brazil – even if in this moment, regarding the history of sciences, there was no clear distinction with psychology, what implied that some of those who discussed this new science were also philosophers, particularly in Europe³¹ – as we have previously mentioned. In the case of Radecki’s Laboratory, his proximity with medicine must be also highlighted; after all, Radecki answers to a call from Gustavo Riedel who, excited with the Mental Hygiene movement and with the psychology laboratories that he had visited in the United States, attempted to create one in Rio de Janeiro, equipping it with resources from the Foundation Graffée-Guinle and importing instruments from France and Germany³².

²⁹ Centofanti, 1982.

³⁰ Radecki, 1928, 1929.

³¹ An important information regarding the construction (or independent development) of psychology, may be illustrated with the Manifest of German Philosophers against Experimental Psychology, in 1913, when it is observed the growth of the new disciplina in Europe (Araújo, 2013).

³² Antunes, 2007; Centofanti, 2011.

The relevance of Radecki's work was certainly, for our central theme, his influence upon the figure of Nilton Campos, who was his assistant and afterwards his substitute as director of the Laboratory. This influence becomes paramount if we recognize that, still regarding the direction of discussions over psychologist questions, we can say that the first work to carry out a more deepened discussion towards the contributions of Husserl's phenomenology in Brazil, was Campos' 1945 Thesis for the Chair of General Psychology of the Faculdade Nacional de Filosofia (*National Faculty of Philosophy*) at the University of Brazil³³.

Nilton Campos as the First Commentator of Husserl in Brazil

Nilton Campos (1898-1963) graduated in Medicine at the Escola Nacional de Medicina (*National School of Medicine*) and was the first professional to fully dedicate himself to psychology³⁴. After specializing himself in psychiatry, Nilton Campos became in 1924 part of the Engenho de Dentro Psychopath Colony as an assistant of Radecki. From 1944 on he holds the chair of General Psychology at the National School of Philosophy, obtained through a contest in which he presented his 1945 thesis entitled "O Método Fenomenológico na Psicologia" (*The Phenomenological Method in Psychology*). In this work, Nilton Campos anticipates the potential of phenomenology as a method of investigation in psychology, additionally highlighting the proximity with various aspects of Gestalt Psychology, maintaining a critical stance towards this school, stressing the need of modifying the method for it to be adapted to psychological research.

Nilton Campos' text remains until today a unique and current work, due to the clarity of its expositions and, above all, due to its critical and open vision regarding the method. As is stressed in his text, the

³³ Campos, 1945. The University of Brazil became, in 1965, the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro.

³⁴ Cabral, 1964; Holanda, 2012; Mendonça & Holanda, 2021.

“phenomenological investigation attempts to discover, not to invent”³⁵; and that, in psychology – as in human sciences in general – the fundamental mechanism should be the application of comprehension, and not interpretation, in a similar position to Wilhelm Dilthey, a strong philosophical presence on his thought and work, as we can exemplify by others publications such as “A Influência do Pensamento de Dilthey na evolução da psicologia como ciência autônoma” (“The influence of Dilthey’s Thought in the Evolution of Psychology as an autonomous Science”) published in the *Anuário do Instituto de Psicologia* in 1951; and “Diferença entre descrição e explicação no estudo da Psicologia” (“Difference between description and explanation on the Study of Psychology”), in 1953.

However, it was indeed his thesis the main document, chiefly for containing the first deepened commentary on Husserl’s thought in Brazil. Let us remember that we had previously the citations in psychology by Radecki, between 1928-1929; and the first in philosophy by Cannabrava, in 1941. Nilton Campos’ 1945 – already in its introduction - greets the great figures of philosophy at the time, such as Wolfgang Köhler and Gordon Allport. The author himself points out that, in order to carry out this work, he was appealing to the original sources of Brentano and Husserl, thanks to the assistance of Achim Fürstenthal, who had been a student of Herman Schmalenbach in Basel – the latter being an old student of Brentano.

Regarding Brentano there is reference to two books: “*Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*”, in the 1924 edition; and the spanish volume of the “*Psicología*”, translated by José Gaos. In regard to Husserl, we have three cited works: the volumes of the “*Logical Investigations*” (in their spanish edition, published the *Revista de Occidente* in 1929 and

³⁵ Campos, 1945, p. 17.

translated by M. Morente and José Gaos); the first volume of the *Ideas* in its 1931 edition (*Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology*, published in London and translated by W. R. B. Gibson); and the Mexican edition of the “*Cartesian Meditations*” (published in 1942, translated by José Gaos). He still employs other commentators of Husserl’s works, such as Marvin Farber (in *The Foundation of Phenomenology*, the 1943 edition) and Joaquín Xirau (“*La Filosofía de Husserl*”, the 1941 edition).

All his work is a defense of phenomenology as research method and as an approximation to Gestalt Psychology (the Berlin school), supporting the reading of the foundations of psychology, with references to works of Köhler, Koffka, Wertheimer, Guillaume, Hartmann and Lewin. Nilton Campos starts his discussion with a controversy about the epistemology and nature of psychology, speaking already then about “psychologies”, in the contrary direction of a defense regarding this science’s autonomy. He highlights the phenomenological method as a complete and ingenuous description of immediate experience, criticizing the “naturalist” appropriation of phenomenology by the Gestalt school.

He also points out to an interesting similarity between the thought of Husserl and that of Ehrenfels, particularly in what Husserl writes in his *Philosophy of Arithmetics* (1981) and what Ehrenfels describes, in 1890, on the *Gestaltqualitäten*. He additionally draws attention to an important movement of renovation and revision of psychological studies at the end of the 19th century, represented by prominent figures such as Henri Bergson (in the “*Les Données Immédiates de la Conscience*” of 1889), William James (in his 1890 “*Principles of Psychology*”) and Wilhelm Dilthey (in the 1894 “*Ideen über eine beschreibende und zergliedernde Psychologie*”), in an open opposition. “Those thinkers’ objections against the prevailing mechanism gave origin respectively to new teleological criteria on the qualitative character of mental phenomena, the dynamic

nature of consciousness and the difference between *explaining* and *understanding* mental activity”³⁶.

Attempting to initiate an epistemological debate on the psychological science, Nilton Campos reaches the notion of intentionality of consciousness – such as formulated by Brentano – to indicate a psychology of phenomenological orientation, based on the idea of consciousness as flow of lived experiences (similar to James position). His work can be described as a search after the “foundations”, and as a support for psychological practices, seeking to establish a solid psychological science and, to do so, he refers to Brentano and Husserl.

In effect, Nilton Campos was one of the first and main commentators of phenomenology in Brazil with an “academic” concern and, even though the author draws no distinction between the philosopher and the epistemologist Husserl – who dealt with the fundamental problems of psychology³⁷ – and even though he grounds himself only in some of the writings of the Freiburg’s master, his pioneering and effort in applying the phenomenological method are undeniable. Additionally, it was his first readings – certainly influenced by Radecki – which gave impulse to phenomenology in Brazil, with significant repercussions for both psychology and psychiatry, through a change of perspective towards a gaze to the human being, analysing consciousness as bestowing sense³⁸.

Phenomenology in Brazil: Past and Future

The first generation of Brazilian thinkers on Brazilian phenomenological psychiatry and psychology is composed by a list of important names. Besides the forerunners quoted above, we cannot leave

³⁶ Campos, 1945, p. 25.

³⁷ Guimarães, 1981, 2000; Morujão, 1990.

³⁸ Morujão, 1990.

Elso Arruda unnoticed, as the first author to work on questions of psychiatry in this same direction, particularly through his thesis presented to the Faculty of Medicine of the University of Bahia in 1947, with the title “Ensaio de Psicologia e Psicopatologia Husserianas” (*Essay of Husserlian Psychology and Psychopathology*). With Arruda we complete the preliminary field of the first developments of phenomenological ideas in Brazil.

Besides those names, the field started to unfold in the context of psychology and psychiatry with figures such as Isaías Paim, Eustáquio Portela, Nelson Pires, Antonio Gomes Penna, Silvio Lopes and Nobre de Melo. The decades of 1960 and 1970 point out to another new names like Zacaria Ali Ramadam, Joel Martins, Antonio Muniz de Rezende, William Gomes and Yolanda Cintrão Forghieri.

In philosophy, the first generation of professors at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, in Porto Alegre, was very important, whose works in the 1950s are centered around the *oeuvre* of Gabriel Marcel, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger. However, the phenomenological thought remained forgotten until the 1960s, when a new generation of scholars – compromised with academic work – established a new encounter with phenomenological ideas. In this moment, the thought of Ortega y Gasset and that of Oswald Spengler were important, as well as the contact with marxist ideas (through Sartre³⁹) – and Louis Althusser’s structuralism.

This “new encounter” with phenomenology began in 1961 with Gerd Bornheim, who presented his Professorship Thesis on the meaning of philosophizing from a philosophy centered around existence, what took

³⁹ It is important to highlight the visits of Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir to Brazil in august of 1960, those invited to the I Congress of Literary Critique and History in Recife. After the Congress, both kept on giving conferences in the main cities of the country (Sartre, 1986).

him to be one of the most important representatives of Sartre's thought in the country. In the same direction, but in connection to Heidegger, are to be also highlighted the names of Emanuel Carneiro Leão, Ernildo Stein, Gilvan Fogel and Urbano Zilles.

The subsequent developments were under the influence of the philosophical studies conducted at the *Université Catholique de Louvain*, in Belgium, which a great number of Brazilian scholars could attend⁴⁰. Since its foundation, the *Institut Supérieur de Philosophie* of this university had a Tomist direction but started in a second moment to adopt and focus phenomenology. This second step – phenomenological – was developed in the 1950s, thanks to the *Husserl Archives*⁴¹, and its strongest influence took place in the 60s, mainly through the students who carried out researches there⁴². Amongst those we can cite Alvino Moser, Antonio Joaquim Severino, Antonio Muniz de Rezende, Creusa Capalbo, Geraldo Tonaco, João Carlos Nogueira, Newton Aquiles Von Zuben, Olinto Pegoraro, Salma Muchail, Telma Donzelli, Ubiratan de Macedo and Zeljko Loparic, among many others in philosophy, psychology and psychoanalysis. Besides the repercussions in philosophy, we may equally highlight the legacies of Louvain to psychology and psychiatry, with names such as Richard Bucher, Francisco Martins and many others.

The Brazilian scene regarding phenomenology is that of construction, both in original perspectives of reading and interpretation, as well as elaborations around classic authors. From the encounter with Gadamer and Heidegger's hermeneutics, going over the reflections on Lévinas and the Edith Stein's anthropology, besides the already conquered consolidated space by Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, Brazilian

⁴⁰ Pozzebon, 2010.

⁴¹ Van Breda, 2007.

⁴² Pozzebon, 2010.

phenomenology still brings into discussion contemporary thinkers such as Michel Henry and Jean-Luc Marion. It could be said that Husserl is increasingly known thanks to new translations and studies, but it is still regrettable the distance from Brentano's thought.

It is possible to observe today that psychology increasingly occupies a central place regarding the rescue and development of phenomenology in Brazil. Having its roots on the psychologist questions of Husserl and Brentano, we may still today highlight the various research that have been develop in the fields of nursery, medicine and psychology. Even given the fact that in the field of psychology we can still observe an identification between phenomenology and a methodological strategy – of qualitative nature – and that its legacy is not highlighted in other areas, the investigations developed in the field of cognitive sciences or those in the line of psychologies said “existential-phenomenological” draw increasingly attention.

Thus, it is possible to deduce that psychology becomes a fertile ground to work on phenomenology not only due to their historical and conceptual proximities, but also thanks to the recognition of the need of building a strong scientific ground is why phenomenology arises as a strong option. And this is therefore marked by the recent new scientific journals which carry a phenomenological orientation in psychology⁴³, as well as the realization of technical meetings, symposiums and congresses⁴⁴.

⁴³ As Psychology journals in Brazil, we can cite, the *Revista da Abordagem Gestáltica-Phenomenological Studies*, the *Revista do Nufen*, the journal *Psicopatologia Fenomenológica Contemporânea*, and most recently, the *Phenomenology, Humanities and Sciences*. In Philosophy, we have other examples, like *Aoristo - International Journal of Phenomenology, Hermeneutics and Metaphysics*, *Ekstasis: the Revista de Hermenêutica e Fenomenologia*, and not specifically, but also relevant, the journal *Natureza Humana - Revista Internacional de Filosofia e Psicanálise*.

⁴⁴ As examples, we can mention, in 2013, the *1st Brazilian Congress of Psychology & Phenomenology*; consolidated in 2015 and foreshadowing an even greater dimension – both in size and in diversity – that begin with the *1st International Congress of Phenomenology & Psychology*, in 2017, in Brasília, consolidated on the occasion of the *Second International Congress of Phenomenology & Psychology* in 2019. It was certainly the largest phenomenology meeting in Latin America, with about 800 participants.

To know the roots of phenomenology in our country explains the conceptual gaps and the limited appropriation of Husserl's ideas – the same scenario that is observed in other contexts, as Crowell writes, when he points out that the generation of philosophers that put forward his researches were only particular cases, in which, for each of them, "(...) the adoption of the phenomenological approach was followed by the rejection of a great deal of Husserl's own doctrine. As result of this, (...) *Husserlian* phenomenology is frequently treated as a mere historical antecedent"⁴⁵. Furthermore, this knowledge points out to the need for a more precise investigation towards the fact that we had a discontinued presentation in the literature regarding the main authors in phenomenology (with the exception of Heidegger, who had a larger group of works that were previously translated), what might eventually be responsible for such a variety of interpretations and other misunderstandings.

In the field of psychiatry, one still observes – despite Elso Arruda's pioneerism – a late and limited appropriation of phenomenological contributions, what amounts to a curious paradox, especially if we take into account that Jaspers' *General Psychopathology* (as well as its Brazilian commentators, such as Isaías Paim and Nobre de Melo) were constantly present in the Brazilian scene. Regarding psychology, we observe a much more limited approximation in the conceptual field, since phenomenology has been mistaken with methodology – apart from its epistemological positions and scientific project – what made the existentialist movement (prevailing in the first moments of our literature) to be simply identified with it, without understanding the most relevant concepts in a more profound way. This becomes more obvious when one considers the various interpretations which the psychotherapeutic clinics made of

⁴⁵ Crowell, 2012, p. 23.

phenomenology, as well as the oblivion of the roots of phenomenology in the different movements of reexamining the view towards mental health.

Even with the identification between phenomenology with qualitative methodology; even with the existentialist references independent of conceptual constructions; even with the interpretative misunderstandings of multiple psychological and psychotherapeutic clinics, we may conclude towards a promising and captivating scenario, given the efforts of recovering its roots and its founding ground, through profound reflections and increasingly intense researches, what certainly announce from now on a new history to be told.

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Phenomenology as a route for deconstructing of the usual understanding of subjectivity in the field of clinical practices

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Historical context of the emergence of Phenomenology

The decline of the great traditional philosophical systems was a striking phenomenon in the last ten years of the nineteenth century, period of the early works of the German philosopher Edmund Husserl. Hegel, who inspired all German thinking forty years ago, has returned to the shadows, and Schopenhauer's influence is in decline. Powerful emerging thinkers such as Marx, Freud, and Nietzsche are producing, but they are of interest only to restricted circles and will only truly emerge in the next century. It is science that fills the empty space left by speculative philosophy and is based on positivism, for which objective knowledge is protected from the subjective constructions of metaphysics. It is against this stage of Western thought impregnated by this subjectivist positivism structuring base for a growing psychologism that the phenomenology reflected and questions. It is therefore of the utmost importance to look back to the middle of the nineteenth century, when the trembling of the truths that had hitherto been scientifically unchallenged begins, in order to understand the true senses imbricated in the first phenomenological works of Husserl decades later, at the end of the 19th century.

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Scientific-natural thought, that is, the studies of the natural sciences were strongly impregnated by the influence of the Galilean and Newtonian models of physics. It was not long before such influences also concerned the realms of biology and physiology. The psychology that long sought its status of scientific has in the physiological psychology of Wilhelm Wundt the desired path that could distance it from the realms of the philosophy of consciousness, leading it to its scientific autonomy. From then on the thought is strengthened in a psychology considered as a science of consciousness.

By priming the observable, and therefore measurable, facts, psychology was also in perfect harmony with positivism, as were all the sciences of the time. With the philosophy was no different and the positivist arguments directed the search for a theory of knowledge. Kantian theory gains a new outfit with the movement called neo-Kantianism directed this time to the quest for a science of consciousness that accounts for the structure of knowledge. This valuation of the study of consciousness, both by psychology and philosophy, makes scientific psychology, in this positivist case, the basic science of philosophy and of all other fields of knowledge. The "psychologism" that will be one of the main movements criticized by Husserl is born in the future.

Relativism was born of the human sciences (Auguste Comte's positivism, Friedrich Schiller's humanism, William James's pragmatism), leading to their weakening as sciences, insofar as it questions the validity of knowledge, subordinating the principles and logical categories that the psychic processes. However, to make psychology the key science is to destroy it as science, since it is incapable of legitimizing itself. In other words, relativism attacks not only the natural sciences, but also the human sciences, and even beyond the logical infrastructure on which the body of

science is established. It is by the defense of this infrastructure that Husserl began to elaborate his reflections that would lead to phenomenology.

In this environment Husserl begins his work. His phenomenology is a vigorous effort to overcome the prevailing positivist environment in Europe in the second half of the nineteenth century. Against the radical dissolution of the world and of life, all his effort has a rebuilding stamp (Xirau, 1941, p.27)

Some philosophers, however, had already stood against this appropriation of the human sciences over the methods of the natural sciences. According to Dilthey we must first observe the structure of the object of each science before we define its method. Franz Brentano, professor and strong influencer of Husserl also opposed the establishment of a similarity between the human sciences and the natural sciences.

Edmund Husserl is the founder of phenomenological philosophy, one of the most important movements of modern philosophical thought. Husserlian phenomenology is undoubtedly a philosophical attitude or posture before proposing to be a movement of ideas, with its own method, always aiming at the radical rigor of knowledge. To cite a renewal of analogous importance, we can remember what Bergson promoted in France at about the same time.

Having always been passionate about accuracy, Husserl's intellectual activities were continually driven by the insatiable impetus of absolute rigor, seeking an ever more radical scientific foundation. Formed in mathematical sciences, his investigation has a strictly scientific physiognomy that proposes to ditch of any personal suggestion. In Germany, among the many thinkers influenced by him, we highlight Max Scheler and Martin Heidegger as the most prominent. Others, from different schools such as Nicolai Hartmann, Pfänder, Lask and Jaspers, also had a decisive influence on their thoughts.

Husserl was born in Prossnitz on April 8, 1859 and died on April 27, 1938. Initially devoted to the mathematical sciences, Husserl took his first steps in philosophy under the guidance of Franz Brentano, who at that time exercised strong influence in Vienna and Prague. Husserl was a student of Brentano for two years (1884 to 1886) at the University of Vienna. It was during this period, influenced by the ideas of his master and driven by his passion for reflection, that he began to distance himself from mathematical thinking, arousing a growing interest in philosophy.

Brentano's thought, solidly structured in the Aristotelian tradition and in the faithful and direct study of the Greek texts, clashed with that predominant and widely diffused by the Neo-Kantian school of Marburg, represented mainly by Cohen and Natorp. The gradual consolidation of phenomenology and the almost sudden disappearance of Neo-Kantian thought give the Viennese school a significant relevance. The logical investigations of Bolzano, philosopher little known in his time, are decisive for the elaboration of the theory of the objectivity. Their influence connects Husserl's thinking with the great tradition of scholastic philosophy and puts him in close connection with Meinong, one of the most distinguished disciples of the Vienna school. To these, it is necessary to unite the influence of Stumpf's psychology, guided by the introspective description and linked to the classic investigations of Helmholtz on the perception of sounds.

It is by differentiating psychic phenomena from physical phenomena that Husserl rescues the concept of intentionality, which in Latin means "to point to or extend toward." It is this directionality to something that differentiates the psychic phenomena from the physical, which justifies, according to Husserl, the use of different methods for such phenomena.

As a mathematician, it is the concern with the foundation of this science that directs the first steps and therefore the first works of Husserl.

This strong influence of the psychology that seeks in psychology the foundation of mathematics, logic and other natural sciences were still present in most of the thinkers of the time and Brentano's descriptive psychology was no different. It is only years later that Husserl himself perceives this crossing and seeks to overcome this paradigm of psychologism with *Logical Investigations*, which lays the foundations of phenomenology.

Husserl's phenomenological thinking has since undergone constant refinement, always based on the criticism received by those who believed him to practice Brentano's thought slightly improved to his own recognition that psychology, as an empirical science, did not offer him any security. bases of its radical foundation that aimed for a new beginning of the order of knowledge. Thus, only in 1907, at the University of Gottingen, Husserl's phenomenology acquires a more structured idea.

Phenomenology: Etymology and history of the term

According to etymology, phenomenology derives from the Greek word φαίνομαι, which in the original sense means to shine (from the same root as φῶς, light), and subsequently to appear or appear. Since everything that appears is a phenomenon, the domain of phenomenology is practically unlimited and we could not therefore confine it to a particular science. “If we stick to etymology, anyone who deals with the way of appearing of whatever it is, therefore, that describes appearances or apparitions, does phenomenology” (Ricoeur, 1953, p.82)

That phenomenology is born of a conflict is a fact. Determined by the cultural crisis in the 19th century, this conflict was explained by Husserl in 1935 in the conferences entitled *The Crisis of the European Sciences*. It may be said that Husserl's entire philosophical life, from the *Philosophy of Arithmetic* (1891) to the lectures on the *Crisis of European Sciences* (1935),

is dominated by the feeling of a crisis of culture. It is possible, therefore, to affirm that phenomenology was born of a crisis and this crisis is still ours.

From its beginnings, phenomenology has presented itself as an attempt to solve a problem (...) that was put since 1900 for the whole world and that still today is placed. Indeed, Husserl's philosophical effort in his spirit was intended to solve simultaneously a crisis of the sciences of man and a crisis of the sciences simply, of which we have not yet escaped (Merleau-Ponty, 1973, p.15)

The history of the term may, however, be more illuminating than its mere etymology, if we at least admit that phenomenology represents a not inconsiderable moment in the history of philosophy. More than a century before Husserl sketched his first phenomenological writings, the term was beginning to be used. The first text in which this term appears is the *New Organ* (1764) by J. H. Lambert (Penna, 2001, p. 38), a free disciple of Cristóbal Wolff, who understood by phenomenology the theory of illusion about its different forms.

It is perhaps on the influence of Lambert that Kant in turn takes up the term. He uses it in 1770 in a letter to Lambert, where what he calls "phaenomenology generalis" designates the propaedeutic discipline which, according to him, must precede metaphysics. He uses it again in the celebrated Letter to Marcus Herz of February 21, 1772, where he outlines the plan of the work that, after a long gestation, will appear in 1781 under the title of *Critique of Pure Reason*. The first section of the first part of this work should, according to the letter to Herz, be entitled: Phenomenology in general. The fact that Kant did not subsequently retain this title and preferred the Transcendental Aesthetic has undoubtedly delayed the career of the term.

However, a phenomenology is not absent from the Kantian Critique, since it is by task to circumscribe the domain of appearance or the "phenomena" by indulging in an investigation of the structure of the subject and the "functions" of the spirit. The goal of such an investigation is, however, less the elucidation of this appearance than the limitation of the pretensions of knowledge which, by attaining only the phenomenon, can never prevail from being knowledge of being or of the absolute. We can therefore say that if we find in Kant a phenomenology in the strict sense of the term, this is nothing but a critical phenomenology.

It is with Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807) that the term definitely enters into the philosophical tradition and then becomes in common use. The fundamental difference between Hegel's phenomenology and that of Kant lies in the conception of the relations between the phenomenon and the being or the absolute. According to Hegel, the absolute, being knowable, is by this fact even qualifiable as Yes or as Spirit, so that phenomenology is at once a philosophy of the absolute or the spirit.

But this philosophy is also a phenomenology, that is, a patient recovery of the path that the Spirit travels in the unfolding of History. It is not, therefore, for Hegel to construct a philosophy in which the truth of the absolute would be stated outside or apart from human experience, but rather to show how the absolute is present in every moment of that experience, be it religious, aesthetic, juridical, politics or practice. Even the tragic of human history is a necessary moment of the becoming of the Spirit, since it constitutes what Hegel calls the negative, that is, the motor of the movement of history without which the Spirit could not be enriched by its figures or manifestations successive. Without a doubt, this phenomenology is only, as Kant wanted, a propaedeutic to ontology, a systematic science of being; but instead of revealing the impossibility of

this ontology, it instead furnishes all its material to the philosopher who has but to think his hidden order and to say its absolute significance.

It is not, however, the Hegelian phenomenology that would perpetuate itself in the twentieth century in the form of the movement of thought which bears the name of phenomenology. The real initiator of this movement must have been Edmund Husserl, who gave a new content to an already old word. If, however, we compare Husserl to Kant or Hegel, with whom it would be possible to approximate him to several particular points, we can note that, with respect to the ontological problem, his attempt represents something like a third way: while the phenomenology of Kantian type conceives being as that which limits the pretension of the phenomenon while it itself remains out of reach, whereas inversely, in Hegelian phenomenology, the phenomenon is reabsorbed into a systematic knowledge of being, Husserlian phenomenology proposes itself as doing the ontology itself, since, according to Husserl, the sense of being and that of the phenomenon can't be dissociated.

Husserl seeks to replace a limited phenomenology with an impossible ontology and an ontology that absorbs and surpasses phenomenology by a phenomenology that dispenses ontology as a distinct discipline, which is, in its own way, ontology - the science of being. Husserl advances with the purpose of giving independence to the phenomenon regarding the existence of the thing in itself. Somehow, all the philosophers mentioned above always retained an aspect of relativity in relation to an object, somehow external.

With Husserl, the phenomenon will be exclusively enclosed in the field of consciousness, although in a very original way. Without denying any relation to an external object, the German philosopher will disregard it radically, considering the phenomenon in what he called his absolute

purity, as appearance in itself, that is, as the thing itself simply as revealed to consciousness, and this, characterizes it of pure or absolute.

This path of the history of a term, which is also that of an important stage of philosophy, allows us to at least specify in what sense phenomenology can be said to be rigorous:

At bottom, phenomenology was born at the moment when, by putting in parentheses, temporarily or definitively, the question of being, it is treated as an autonomous problem the way of appearing of things. There is rigorous phenomenology from the moment this dissociation is reflected by itself, whatever its ultimate destiny; it falls to the level of a banal and diluted phenomenology at the moment when the act of birth that causes it to appear at the expense of being or having as a background the being is by no means perceived or thematized: under the name of phenomenology it is not done more than a popular presentation of opinions, of convictions, without taking sides on them (Ricoeur, 1953, p.82)

This means that the philosophical perspective is essential to the constitution of a phenomenology that is either rigorous or first Philosophy. That is why we can not dwell on "banal phenomenology" whose descriptions cover the most varied domains, since it is not enough to describe an object, from a point of view and the interest of its description, to adorn this description with the title "phenomenology". Nor can we go back to the "prehistory" of the phenomenological movement born of Husserl, which in itself would require a long study. We will therefore limit ourselves to the idea of phenomenology as Husserl developed it and as it developed after him and under his inspiration.

It is necessary to emphasize here that Husserl does not discuss the technical character of the sciences. It is, however, the fact that it has become a non-philosophical study of mere facts that has made them lose their genuine meaning for human life, thus bringing a visible disinterest

among younger generations to such questions. The "world of life" (*Lebenswelt*) has always been a question for Husserl, but it has been taken up more strongly in the period 1930/1938, known as the period of its crisis. "In the exclusion to which science proceeds from all the practical, axiological, and cultural predicates with which objects assume meaning for us, it is manifested that the world of science is a world without life" (Dartigues, 1973, p.77).

From the earliest formulations of phenomenology as a descriptive psychology until its conception as a philosophy of rigor many were the dissatisfactions, doubts and reflections that made Husserl permanently debug his thinking. It is above all from the profound study of Descartes' meditations and Kant's Critique of Reason that in 1907 the conferences entitled *The Idea of Phenomenology* emerge and they announce the first systematization of that new philosophical science that would become phenomenology. At this moment, Husserl definitively abandons any influence of psychologism, and phenomenology gains an autonomous science character.

Husserl thus clearly explained the problem of the theories of knowledge developed so far: they were all based on the natural sciences and, therefore, the natural attitude that believes in the world as existing in itself, as well as everything in it, such as subjectivity, with no strangulation about knowledge. This is a natural fact and is simply given every moment. Philosophical thought, on the contrary, does not regard knowledge as an obvious fact, questioning its own possibility. Inasmuch as Husserl criticizes theories of knowledge, he "sculpts" his theory, no longer immersed in a natural attitude, but a truly philosophical and rigorous method. It is with this initial inspiration that Husserl thinks phenomenology depriving itself of all scientific-natural influence as well as its characteristic methods, its representational substantialization and,

among them, the conception of subjectivity as a nuclearized and self-constituted instance.

Next, some characteristics of the clinic are evidenced, in order to make clear the epistemological commitment of this field with the so-called "metaphysics of subjectivity", besides pointing out the possibility of deconstructing the relationship between clinic and science in the light of Heidegger's phenomenology.

On the epistemological status of the clinic

What does "clinic" mean? What is the nature of so-called "clinical practices"? Does the clinic belong to a specific profession (doctor or psychologist) or does it refer to a specific experience? What, if it can be said, is the purpose of clinical work? These questions move in a broad field, since they presuppose several epistemological prerequisites. In all psychotherapeutic work, several words are taken as already given and that, in a way, they have been object of reflections and debates by the several authors who helped in the constitution of the field of clinical practices. Patient, cure, normality, science, psychic, and theory are some of the terms whose meaning is taken in advance in the day-to-day practice of psychotherapeutic exercise, and which do not necessarily incite the clinician to a more rigorous look at their presuppositions.

The current goal is basically to take as a matter of fact one of the nodal themes of clinical practice, in other words, how the question of "subjectivity" has become fundamental to clinical practice, and even more, how phenomenology helped think otherwise of this question. What is sought, therefore, is to understand some steps that preceded the emergence of phenomenology as the thematic axis of the relationship between clinic and science, as a critical horizon to the relation between

clinical and subjectivity and as a possibility of deviation from the epistemological dispersion that circumscribes the field of practices.

The task assumed here concerns an attempt to make explicit clinical experience beyond theoretical distinctions, in addition to discussions of a possible shift from modernity to a postmodernity, short of the current discussion of inter, plural “and even” trans “disciplinarity” of the clinic. To think about clinical experience invites us to trace its ontological characteristics, that is, to explain what or what are the relations between the clinical doing and the very being of the man.

Some questions will be considered to address the topic of clinical experience from the phenomenological exercise. Firstly, we will question the role that the theoretical dimension has in the foundation of clinical practice. This issue is important because, usually, in undergraduate courses, the field of clinical practice is usually presented from its division in different lines, often excluding each other, emphasizing to students the supposed exclusivity of each one of them without often presenting their ontological presuppositions and their historical-political roots. Still here, it is worth mentioning that although there are several theoretical lines, they are always only samples of the wealth of this field.

When we take into account the theoretical dispersion present in the field of clinical practices, another questioning becomes important, referring to the very place of thematization of the foundation of clinical practices. If recourse to the theoretical dimension helps to make such questioning even more obscure, what then would be the alternative? In order to justify the chosen path, it is necessary to resume, albeit briefly, the course of constitution of the field of clinical practices, particularly its relationship with the paradigm of modern science. The epistemological dispersion therefore presents itself as the horizon to be questioned,

leading us to affirm the need for an ontological-phenomenological routing to approach the complexity present in the clinical experience as it appears.

On the possibility of understanding the clinic as a foundation of practice

“The theory serves to ground clinical practice”. The sentence reproduced here is part of the imaginary of Psychology students in numerous undergraduate courses. Such a presence occurs because our culture has chosen scientific discourse as the hegemonic discourse for the unveiling of truth. How many students still think that entering a Psychology course will be the key to understanding – finally – the human mind? Such prior understanding does not inhabit the mind of common sense by mere chance. It is an image gradually built through innumerable meanders that can be revisited as we look even briefly at the constitution of clinical practices.

The usual understanding mentioned above is, day by day, strengthened in the office hours. “Dr., all I wanted was a happy family!”, Or “I just wanted to be normal”. Where does this lawsuit come from? What is the address of these complaints? There is a “supposed knowledge” that sustains desire. And what is the desire? The desire to speak. This desire often departs from the effort to elaborate what can not be elaborated, often part of the effort to escape the daily injunctions that restrict the possibilities of meaning present in the daily life lived amid the impersonality’s and appropriations simply given by the “voices of” everyone. “Labels, classifications, and real norms imposed on a daily basis find, in clinical space, in the clinical attitude, the possibility of being deconstructed in favor of new interpretations, new understandings and ways of reestablishing freer sense relations. There is, therefore, a *savoir-faire* that is historically authorized through the very constitution of this field.

The psychotherapeutic clinic as we know it today has sought, in its historical constitution, a kind of legitimation on the horizon established by the technical and scientific model characteristic of modernity. It was in this environment, where scientists began to take on the task of advancing the growing progress being driven by the Industrial Revolution, which both psychology and clinic were born. The overestimation of the theory, the controversy over the existence of one or several clinical methods, the bet on the effectiveness achieved through the application of a certain technique and the purification represented by the possibility of obtaining an "objective certainty" in relation to the "psychic problems" have emerged as the battlegrounds of discussions among clinicians/scientists. In this perspective, irremediable historical inheritance to all of us, the clinical psychologist assumed – consciously or not – the role of technician/intervener in the psychic reality of the other. This assumption stems both from the identification by the population of the role of the health professional as being a professional qualified to "solve" problems that, on the part of the professional, of the professional formation, often based on reproducing far-reaching theoretical discourses instead of to promote the critical questioning regarding their role, as a health professional, in society.

As Philosophy, after almost losing in the second half of the nineteenth century its *raison d'être* in favor of the privilege claimed by scientific discourse, it was revived vigorously in the twentieth century through such characters as Martin Heidegger, Jean Paul Sartre, Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze, to name but a few. Philosophy understood as a recurrent inquiry from a critical position in relation to the data presented under the name of "surrounding reality" had, in these philosophers, a vigorous revival, reviving the old impulse to philosophize from the *thaumatzéin*, the astonishment and the sense of inquisitive curiosity itself not of the one

who reproduces discourses, but of the one who, in astonishment, discursively recomposes the data, inferring critically in order to create the new. The meditative work, the contemplative look, and the very office of the philosopher were and are being discussed at length in order to promote the role of philosophy beyond the prevailing technicism. This technicality, combined with the policy of offering results and solutions ready for consumption, whether in the field of health or in other fields (political, economic, etc.), has, in considering the philosophical task as a scientific "court of accounts" and in the process of uprooting language – attested in the development of the information sciences – its origin and its end. If many of the disciplines – once “branches” of philosophy – have confirmed their emancipation, they have in turn turned to “Great Mother” to revise its foundations. The Spanish philosopher Manuel Garcia Morente, in a course of introduction to philosophy taught in 1937, more specifically in the second lesson, briefly outlines the movement that, in philosophy, led to the emergence of both the modern sciences and, in the nineteenth century, provoking a true “short circuit between knowledge” (Ferreira et al, 2005, p.36 ss). This is the case with psychology, specifically in some of its various fields of research. After two centuries (XVIII and XIX) privileging in its debates the affirmation of its own existence the current panorama is of emancipation. However, this apparent emancipation continues, by its own constitution, crossed by diverse interests that make impossible the demarcation of an autonomous field. There are several areas of psychology that support research independently of philosophy. In the case of the clinic, however, if in the classic books of history and introduction to psychology we often find the old classification of the clinic in three basic axes – psychoanalysis, humanist and behavioral – this is more due to blindness in relation to the complexity of the field of the clinic than by the effort to present it respecting its polysemy. In

addition to the discussions on clinical application situations (psycho-oncology, burn clinic and social-clinical psychology, for example), there is currently a proliferation of research aimed at reviewing the very basis of the psychotherapeutic clinic. Thus, if we return to the initial statement of this section and, taking into account the heterogeneity of the clinical practices themselves, we will place as its question its place of foundation.

The question about the foundation of the clinic and its place of thematization

In an article, entitled “The Emergence of Psychological Clinic: From Curative Practice to Health Promotion Devices”, Moreira, Romagnolli & Neves (2007) proposes to make a brief genealogy of the clinical practices. Thus, they show us that the initial link of clinical activity belonged to the doctor's doing, which, in order to make a prognosis, would use observation and the application of interviews. This rationalization of the doctor's work emerged on a specific historical horizon that is confused with the very coming of modern science. However, the doctor's doing can be traced back to the ancient Therapists of Alexandria described by Philo of Alexandria. The old therapists, identified by Philo as true “doctors of the soul”, already showed the complexity between soul and body, between that which was visible, palpable, and that whose existence would reside in an instance other than the sensible, that is, to beyond the physical. In this way, the connection between clinic and medicine does not seem surprising. Still in the quote from Philo, we see a consideration of the specificity of the education of the therapists. If before it was the sacred laws and the glimpse of nature also made sacred the primordial source that conferred the healing power of the therapists, looking at the recent history of medical practices what appears as a source of legitimation of the identification of the clinic with Medicine is the so-called modern scientific paradigm. Hippocrates, Galen, and even the priests of the Church gave

place to the figure of the scientist, versed not in magical powers arising from an explicitly assumed and metaphysical construction, but in a transfiguration of metaphysics in objectivity, accuracy and control, characteristic of an era named by German philosopher Martin Heidegger as being “The Age of Technique”.

It is not our purpose here to revisit the constitution of clinical practices as Jacqueline Moreira does in the cited article on the emergence of the clinic (Moreira, Rogmanolli & Neves, 2007), And others, but only to affirm that in its historical unfolding, the place of foundation of the clinical practices was and still has as scenario the theoretical dimension, that is, the dimension of theoretical-conceptual explicitation that has the objective of framing the clinical experience from previous interpretive models in order to conform the causality to the predictability.

When we take into account the relationship between clinical and science some characteristics can be highlighted:

- 1- From its earliest days, the practice of the clinician / therapist has been closely linked to medical practice, while retaining distinctions based on the body / soul dichotomy;
- 2 - With the configuration of the modern scientific paradigm and the outline of the figure of the scientist, medical authority has passed from the magic to the accuracy, objectivity and control supposedly achieved through a correct execution of methodical reason;
- 3 - The subject / object dichotomy, made explicit from interpretations of Cartesian thought, gave rise to another dichotomy: that of the physician (subject) and patient (object);
- 4 - Since the physician is the holder of a legitimate knowledge (science), the patient has become the object of study for the confirmation and / or refutation of a certain formal-logical apparatus whose ultimate objective is the explanation of a certain psychopathological phenomenon.

In addition to the mentioned characteristics, another point to be considered refers to the clinical / political dichotomy, as pointed out by Moreira, Romagnolli & Neves (2007). For the moment, it is for us to review in a very succinct way some of the reasons why we affirm that since its appearance in modernity clinical practices have had as its mainstay the modern scientific paradigm.

On the relation between clinic and science

Thinking the relationship of science with the question of meaning, Heidegger (2002) argues that so-called Western European science has determined and still determines how we "see" the reality around us, that is, the preponderant mode of interpretation and understanding of reality that surrounds us. Further, the German philosopher launches an initially enigmatic phrase, but is gradually being dissected throughout the text; "Science is the theory of the real." Science, theory and reality are analyzed by Heidegger through a deconstruction carried out having as the guiding thread the intricacies of the etymological path of each one. This critical deconstruction made through a hermeneutic whose object is the context in which each meaning and each translation proved the most propitious in a polysemic field, have in common the fact that they belong to a horizon that gives them a "around" meanings, that is, a "spirit of time" - *Zeitgeist*. Thus, the apparent truism with which we treat these terms hides a series of naïve pre-judgments in which impersonality and ethical disengagement are only legitimized from a common understanding. This spirit, called the "era of technique", modernity or even "postmodernity" can be seen, as a whole, as coming from the prevalence of what we will call the "metaphysics of subjectivity." But what do we want to name here when using such an expression? It is not in our interest here to examine the whole history of metaphysics, since this would be a long and purposeless

task for the forwarding of our question. What is important is to emphasize the relation between metaphysics and the human essence:

To what extent does metaphysics belong to the nature of man? Metaphysics represents, at first, man as one of the others, endowed with capacities. The essence, qualified in this or that way, the nature, the content (what) and the modality (the how) of its being, is in itself metaphysical: animal (sensibility) and rationale (nonsensitive). Restricted, therefore, to the metaphysician, man remains attached to the unseen difference between being and being. Everywhere, the mode coined by the metaphysics of man to represent in propositions only finds the world constructed by metaphysics. Metaphysics belongs to the nature of man. But what is nature itself? What is metaphysics itself? In the midst of this natural metaphysics, who is man himself? Is it only a self that, in reference to a you, only consolidates its egoity by confirming itself in the self-relation (Heidegger, 2002, p.63)?

Here, what is interesting to point out is that in the relationship between metaphysics and man what is hidden is what Heidegger calls "ontological difference", that is, the fundamental difference between Being and being. This difference appears as fundamental in that it marks the impossibility of "entifying" the "Being" itself. The Being can not be treated as being, since the latter finds its meaning in the horizon opened by the former. Man, while being whose way of being consists precisely in asking himself about his Being, preserves this difference in himself, even if at first, he is not aware of it at all. Metaphysics then appears as the horizon which offers modes of man's determination which, for different reasons, disregard the interrogative character in relation to itself that accompanies human existence as such. In listening to the considerations that Heidegger presents to us here and taking into account the constitution of clinical practices - particularly the concern of "clinicians" in scientifically legitimizing their practices - as a whole, the various clinical proposals have

as scope metaphysics, which, in turn, underlies all understandings about science, theory, reality, and even about man's (normal and pathological) nature. What we mean is that the field of clinical practices presents different conceptions about the human essence based on different epistemological projects that are based on different metaphysical presuppositions.

If a brief look at its constitution reveals something of the clinic's apparent identification with modern science, we must now propose a detour so as to move away from the dense forest of dispersion as far as the dimension that shelters much of the basis of clinical practice.

Shifting the critical study of clinical practices from their essentially epistemological reference

As we have seen, the constitution of clinical practices was traversed by the modern scientific paradigm. This, insofar as it brought with it the promise - not always possible - of finding or identifying the truth about a certain phenomenon or event, gave rise to a number of proposals for the foundation of the clinic where each one makes up a certain pre-comprehension that forms the sense of its fundamental concepts. In relation to this characteristic of the sciences, Heidegger (1999) makes some considerations in paragraph 3 of his fundamental work - "Being and time":

Fundamental concepts are determinations in which the sector of objects that serves as the basis for all the thematic objects of a science is pre-understood in order to pre-empt all positive research. It is, therefore, concepts that only achieve true legitimacy and "foundation" by means of a previous investigation that corresponds properly to the respective one. Now, as each of these sectors is cut off from a region of entities, this prior investigation, which produces fundamental concepts, means an

interpretation of this being in the fundamental constitution of its being. Such investigations must precede the positive sciences.

In pointing out that the fundamental concepts of a given science fear a prior ontological clipping of its base, it is possible to recognize it in what concerns the direction of research circumscribed by the natural sciences. But what if this "object" is existence? From the considerations of Heidegger, we ask: to what extent do the various theories of personality, which in turn legitimize such and such modes of clinically intervening in the other, bring with it explicitly the reasons for an ontological "cut" to be of man? In order to clarify our questioning, it is necessary to go a little further in the paragraph mentioned above:

Scientific research performs, naively and roughly, a first survey and a first fixation of the sectors of objects. The elaboration of the sector in its fundamental structures has, to a certain extent, been effected by pre-scientific experience and interpretation of the region of being that delimits the very sector of objects (Heidegger, 2002, p.35).

Although in its historical constitution it presents a sometimes-explicit commitment to the scientific paradigm, particularly that of the so-called "natural sciences", the fact is that this commitment (or commitment) gave rise to a series of possible misunderstandings. If we take into account that the "object" of the clinic is man, and if we meditate on the fact that the elaboration of the way we understand the object is effected in the pre-scientific experience, we can admit that the various theorizations of the personality his turn, previous delimitations regarding our relation of sense to that object that, being not an intermundane entity, summons us to think our own relation with otherness.

To the terms as the basis for the considerations that follow Heidegger's analytic of existence in "Being and time" (Heidegger, 1999)

we may say that, once in its being-released, human existence previously understands things through an affective disposition which, for in turn, is revealed as language. It is important to emphasize that the "being-launched" of the existence to which Heidegger refers us is far from being restricted to a concept whose origin would refer to a consideration of a metaphysical character, that is, a prior model of man's being. On the contrary, it concerns our daily coming-to-be, originating from our character of openness in which the meaning of the beings is made to appear to us at all times, since "we exist". In proposing to look phenomenologically for existence, Heidegger makes explicit certain characteristics that are more original than the metaphysical, scientific, and theoretical conceptualizations that permeate our Western tradition.

Thus, when we consider that every theory has behind it a certain way of understanding and circumscribing the affections, and that each way corresponds to a certain cut made by that clinician who, for pre-scientific and pre-theoretical reasons, is refined with a certain theoretical approach, it is up to us to delineate the horizon in which the discussions about the rationale of the various possibilities of theories about the clinic and, above all, to point out the possibilities and limits of this place are traditionally explained.

Some books on psychotherapies and clinical practices present them as a complex field, but do not shed any light on the reasons for such a characteristic. On the reasons for this absence, perhaps Heidegger can give us a clue in the text "Science and Thought of Meaning":

Psychiatry deals with the mental life of man in his manifestations of illness, which always includes the manifestations of health. And it represents them by and from the objectivity of the integration of body, soul, mind and constitutive spirit of every man. In the objectivity of Psychiatry, the already existing mode of being is presented and exposed each time. This mode of being, the existence

of man, as man, always remains the unavoidable of psychiatry (Heidegger, 2002, p.53-54).

Although Heidegger refers specifically to psychiatry, considering the breadth of clinical practice it would not be wrong to apply his considerations to the office of the clinic in its broad sense. In order to deviate from the prior modeling of existence from traditional ontological cuts, which in turn have different epistemological consequences, which makes the clinic essentially dispersed, and take as a guide the fact that there is something uncontrollable in the clinic, the main question is to reaffirm the place from which we sustain our questioning, that is, it is now necessary to replace phenomenology as an alternative to the overlapping and scattered horizon of the epistemic field.

Final Considerations

Every day we live linked to certain structures of meaning related to the most diverse facts of life. Such a structured organization of meanings announces what we customarily call personality, subjectivity, way of acting and thinking or, ultimately, posture before the world. Usually, we do not usually make an experience of freedom in front of these senses, on the contrary, the status of these organizations confers on them an alterity that places us in a subjugation dimension to them. With this, they mark us, characterize us and differentiate us as people from others. This is an example, in the quotidian, both tacit and explicit, of what Husserl called a natural attitude. In this, as we can see, we only apprehend the world and phenomena, which we believe to have an existence in itself, independent of us. To realize the relational dynamics in play that makes it, as a person, act resolutely is to expose the fluid constitution of structures of significance and, therefore, new possibilities of meaning. More or less frequently, each of us, at some point in our lives, undertaking a reflection

on his actions or thoughts is, in some way and in some degree, in a posture of placement "in parentheses" the senses present there. Thus, in a non-systematized form, the epoché, to a greater or lesser degree, operates there, although in a way not always perceived.

Husserl's thinking evolves directed by the needs of his inner dialectic from a logical and intellectualist realism embedded in the Platonic tradition to a Philosophy of life in which the theory of essences, and therefore of the reality of ideas, becomes an essential moment, if not the only one of a much broader ontological conception. Since the earliest times, the heterogeneity of consciousness and of life has been emphasized in the face of the rigidity of logical concepts.

From a radical critique of the philosophical tradition, inspired by the phenomenology of his master Husserl and attempting a deconstruction of the Western metaphysics that would originate in Plato, Heidegger sought to give a new direction, a new sense to philosophy, which was also the search for something more primordial and more fundamental: the resumption of the ontology, the overcoming of the "emotion of the Being", that would have taken place in this tradition. The *Daseinsanalyse*, approximation between psychology in its clinical dimension and the hermeneutic phenomenology proposed by Heidegger, an important bias in the understanding of the clinical activity of psychotherapy, presenting itself as a vigorous alternative in the field of understanding of a psychotherapeutic practice less instituted by the technical perspective of acting, enbreeding the phenomena as such and deterministic in their ways of understanding reality. the way of being of this being that we ourselves are existence, this term is understood in a different way from what we are traditionally accustomed to think, that is, empirically proven presence. Rather, Heidegger speaks of a conception of existence that is associated with a mode of being that is always at play in the historical-temporal

becoming of that being. It can not, therefore, be characterized by any a priori, timeless sense, therefore an essence in the traditional sense of the term.

From the clinical point of view, the Heideggerian understanding has important implications for the conception of psychotherapy. The expectation of the constitution of a knowledge about man, of a supposedly substantiated subjectivity, on this being whose mode of being is fundamentally temporal is decontextualized. The conception of clinical as applied theory starts from the assumption that one has a theory or an adequate representation of this being that we are. From this adequate representation there is a practical application of it, therefore a technique based on a knowledge that, supposedly, would allow us, from a diagnosis, even if tacit or implicit, an understanding of the situation, an intervention with a minimally reasonable degree predictability. It is clear that we are talking about the very conception of science itself and its implications for clinical psychology.

Heidegger's phenomenological-hermeneutic understanding is situated in a different perspective that makes any prior essentialization of this being that we are unfeasible. The kind of knowledge one can have of man, if one can have any, no longer has this essentialist character from which one can derive a technique, in this understanding of technique as applied theory and that is of the production of a subject whose In this sense, any subjectivist perspective that proclaims a psychic interiority governed by laws, which when discovered, explain the human behavior if they deconstruct. We understand that the clinic is one of the situations in which the senses are most clearly concealed at the expense of a contemplative dimension that provides the opening for surprise and the non-ready. On the part of the client as well as many other times on the part of the therapist, the difficult locus of conquered non-knowledge, such

as learned Socratic ignorance, is no longer of any value, or even understood as a real possibility of life, in the face of the insistent and seductive appeal in which we are permanently subjected to calculation, predictability and explanation of reality, and by extension, of man.

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The essential chiasm: Merleau-Ponty, between phenomenology and psychology

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Initial Background

The current idea that the relations between psychology and phenomenology are nothing more than a simple flirtation or, at worst, a "forced" or "arranged" pairing has certainly its theoretical background. From this point of view, the figure of Merleau-Ponty seems strategic to uncover the background of such a scenario, at least for a special reason. He is, in the context of the phenomenological tradition, one of the authors who takes most sides in this debate, questioning all the time the ultimate status of philosophy, science, and their relations. Psychology, among the other sciences, has since become the beloved child who will always attract the attention of this philosopher, which in fact was never discreet in closely following its development also from his related specializations (psychiatry, neurology, etc.); and this, whether in Germany, France itself or abroad, as in the USA.

A full account of this are his two research projects on the "nature of perception" submitted in 1933 and 1934 to the CNRS. In both texts, the reader is informed of how much the author, in still incipient investigations, is already firmly aware of the decisive task ahead: to explain the nature of the relationship between psychology and phenomenology. To begin with, Merleau-Ponty is moved, at the time, by a

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strong impulse from the Husserlian phenomenology and, of course, by the influence it exerted in a multidisciplinary scope, having psychology as a privileged channel of dialogue:

They say Husserl is not interested in psychology. The truth is that he maintains his old criticisms of “psychology” and always insists on the “reduction” by virtue of which one passes from the natural attitude, which is that of psychology, like all positive sciences, to the transcendental attitude, which is that of the phenomenological philosophy. This difference in attitude is enough to establish a very clear demarcation between, for example, the phenomenological analyses of perception and the psychological analyses concerning the same subject. However, besides giving an example of a proper psychological analysis of perception, Husserl expressly compares the relation of phenomenology and psychology with that of mathematics and physics and expects from the development of his philosophy a renewal of the principles of psychology. The proper phenomenological analyses, for instance, those of memory and image, have consequences for psychology (Merleau-Ponty, 1996, p. 21-22)².

Then, Merleau-Ponty places another important reference: *Le Philosophie de la Sensation* de Maurice Pradines (1934). It is a significantly remarkable work since it represents, so to speak, the work which, in France, becomes an initial milestone concerning the resonance of the phenomenological movement on psychology. What might be assessed from this is that “the phenomenology and psychology that it inspires deserve, therefore, the highest consideration about its ability to help us revise our own notions of consciousness and sensation, besides conceiving, in another way, the 'cleavage' of consciousness” (Merleau-Ponty, 1996, p. 24).

² About this, see: (Husserl, 2006, Section I, chap. II).

First of all, it is worth to mention, as Merleau-Ponty (1996) notes, that “the psychology of perception is loaded with philosophical assumptions” (p. 20). It is this full acknowledgement that is reaffirmed as an issue, one year after the publication of the *Phénoménologie de la Perception*, in the famous conference *Le Primat de la Perception et ses Conséquences Philosophiques*. Pronounced on November 23, 1946, the lecture undoubtedly ignited a heated discussion already elicited by the title around the status of perception and its primordial function. What is the thesis? “The perceived world would be the background always assumed by all rationality, all value, and all existence” (Merleau-Ponty, 1996, p. 43). It is this style of organization or relationship beared by the world as we originally perceived it that, however, is not, in our classical culture, recognized by the psychologist or by the philosopher. We also find ourselves, here, observes Merleau-Ponty (1996, p. 52), in a “perceptual field in which the conduct of the other is traced, a behavior that I realize in which I watch the emergence of another subjectivity invested with equal rights appear”. It is true that the theme of perception, the main thread of the conference, becomes the common core from where our relationship with the world and with others, rooted in the corporal and behavioral experience, is concentrically challenged. Therefore, in reviewing his theoretical itinerary, it is not by chance that Merleau-Ponty extracts from these theses his philosophical consequences, which were never explored by scholars of psychology such as gestaltists;

The very same psychologists who have described the world as I have in the beginning, the theoreticians of form in Germany, have never drawn from these descriptions their philosophical consequences. They remain, in this respect, on the classical plane. The structures of the perceived world are regarded by them, after all, as the simple result of certain physical and physiological processes that take place in the nervous system and create,

everywhere, the forms and the experience of the forms. The organism and the conscience itself are functions of external physical variables. Ultimately, what is true is the physical world as it has always been conceived and which engenders our own consciousness (Merleau-Ponty, 1996, p. 63-64).

It should be noted that this fundamental criticism does not apply only to Gestalttheorie. If, on the one hand, one recognizes in this school the undeniable merit of “going beyond the classical alternative of objective psychology and the psychology of introspection” (Merleau-Ponty, 1996, p. 64), on the other hand, the old and classical notion of “being” and “objectivity” is still retained. Behaviorism is even less capable of extracting the due philosophical consequences of its practice. The greatest background lesson – shows Merleau-Ponty (1996, p. 64-65) – is that “psychological science is not built, therefore, outside the human world”. This is enough to understand that the description of the perceived world is not a fiction or something valid only as a psychological inventory. In a description of this nature, reason or objectivity are never sacrificed in the name of excessive idolatry, reducing themselves, as one would expect, “to the psychological singularities of perception” (Merleau-Ponty, 1996, p. 53). What we are dealing with here, and in this psychology is invited, together with philosophy, to retract itself, is to overcome every dogmatic illusion, typical, by the way, of a certain positivist ontology. This is why

The perceived event can never be reabsorbed into the set of transparent relationships that the intelligence builds on the occasion of the event. But if this is so, philosophy is not only the awareness of these relations, it is also the awareness of the obscure term and of the the "non-relational background" on which such relations are established without which philosophy would lack in its task of universal elucidation (Merleau-Ponty, 1996, p. 57).

There is a deeper order of experience, the "non-relational background", the "obscure term" whose consciousness is questioned by philosophy. Psychology also appears there, since "as a science it has nothing to fear from a return to the perceived world nor from a philosophy that extracts the consequences of that return. Far from hindering psychology, this attitude exposes, on the contrary, the philosophical significance of its discoveries" (Merleau-Ponty, 1996, p. 66). To this extent, "there are not two knowledges, but two different degrees of explanation of the same knowledge. Psychology and philosophy are nourished by the same phenomena, problems are only more formalized at the level of philosophy" (Merleau-Ponty, 1996, p. 66; emphasis added). It may even seem – Merleau-Ponty believes – that for many philosophers an enormous amount of space is being granted here to psychology, putting in check, after all, rationality. It is necessary, however, to understand that

When philosophers want to save reason from history, they cannot simply forget everything that psychology, sociology, ethnography, history, and mental pathology have taught us about the conditioning of human conduct. It would be a very romantic way of loving reason by setting its realm on the confession of our knowledge. (Merleau-Ponty, 1996, p. 67).

Merleau-Ponty wants to demystify a certain rationalist romanticism that is widespread in the philosophical practice. There is nothing to gain from this, either by philosophy or, in turn, by science. Deep down, this solemn devotion, so eloquently romanticized, only conceals a betrayal of reason itself. It is working not for, but against it. Now, it was precisely this broader view of rationality that had escaped the ears of Césari, who, immediately after the conference, was troubled for not understanding how the phenomenological study of perception could serve scientific progress. To which, immediately, the lecturer replies: "I do not know if the phenomenological attitude serves the other sciences, but it certainly serves

psychology" (Merleau-Ponty, 1996, p. 95). And he says: "the experience lived is only interesting immediately for those who are interested in the human being. I never expected that my work could interest the physicist as a physicist³, since his grievance is also directed to all works of philosophy". (Merleau-Ponty, 1996, p. 95). Reason enough "philosophy has nothing to fear from a mature science, nor does this science have anything to fear from philosophy" (Merleau-Ponty, 1996, p. 92).

In this perspective, three years later, from 1949 to 1952, when Merleau-Ponty took up teaching at the Sorbonne, he revived this debate in a series of *Courses* devoted to different themes that intersect the philosophy and the more general scope of the human sciences. One of these courses, motivated in part by the interventions of the 1946 conference, is enunciated, programmatically, under the title: *Phenomenology and Human Sciences*.

Phenomenology and Human Sciences

In a brief retrospective, Merleau-Ponty begins his course by evoking Husserl and the acute theme of the European knowledge crisis. He shows, therefore, that the very origin of phenomenology is confused with the attempt to overcome this crisis, diagnosed under at least three aspects: crisis of the sciences; crisis of the human sciences, and crisis with philosophy. In the field of the humanities, for example, there is a tendency of psychology towards psychologism, that is, "psychology ends up uprooting its own foundations, since the postulates of the psychologist must be considered as determined and questioned" (Merleau-Ponty, 2001, p. 398). Seen in this way, psychology requires, for itself, an ideal of scientificity, reducing the "phenomena" studied to causally determined

³ Despite "having noticed a certain convergence between the physics of relativity and the space of phenomenologists" (Merleau-Ponty, 1996, p. 92).

objective "facts". What, then, is the real problem of Husserl? Beyond psychologism, historicism⁴, and scientificism, "his problem is to make philosophy, sciences, and humanities possible again, as well as their coexistence" (Merleau-Ponty, 2001, p. 398)⁵.

That said, Merleau-Ponty then outlines the perspective of his course: there is little interest in making it a school or doctrinal exhibition of phenomenology. More than resuming, in the light of the texts, the ideas of the authors linked to the phenomenological movement, it is in fact a matter of exposing their intentions, that is, of discussing what Husserl, Scheler and Heidegger think about psychology and, vice versa, what psychologists think about these philosophers. There is no way here to conceal a fundamental question: "phenomenologists have not understood that psychologists were sometimes in harmony with their reflection, and psychologists believed that phenomenology is a return to introspection" (Merleau-Ponty, 2001, p. 399). If this is so, how can so many misunderstandings be cleared up?

For this, two treatment orders must be taken into account. First, it is necessary to ask what the phenomenologist of the human sciences expects and how he puts them in relation to the phenomenology. The second question addresses how the development of contemporary psychology converges with the phenomenological research. Starting from the question initially posed, then the reference to Husserl surfaces again. In addition, this is for the strong reason that there is an increasingly evident maturation throughout his production; this evolution is not always perceived by most of his critics or readers. What leads Husserl to question

⁴ "If I have therefore evaluated historicism as an epistemological error which, because of its absurd consequences, must be rejected as brutally as naturalism, I would expressly like to stress that I fully recognise the immense value that history in the broadest sense represents for the philosopher". (Husserl, 2003, p. 67-68).

⁵ It should not be forgotten that, besides Husserl, the work of Georges Politzer (1947) becomes, under the lens of Merleau-Ponty, a precious source regarding the diagnosis of the symptomatic crisis that goes through psychology and philosophy.

psychology at first is that it reduces "consciousness to a fact of nature" (Husserl, 2003, p. 20)⁶, insofar as

Psychology does not play the role of philosophy; it is not sufficing itself as philosophy, since it shares the convictions of common sense and receives its realistic postulates from common sense. The enterprise of psychology is legitimate, but it remains a "naive" way of thinking, without ontological status (Merleau-Ponty, 2001, p. 403).

By resuming this critical formulation programmatically, Merleau-Ponty shows how much Husserl seeks an ultimate evidence of consciousness which, however, psychology does not envisage, since it remains on a still naively restrictive plane, which is that of the natural attitude. From this comes the need to overcome such a realm, under a new orientation: transcendental analysis. It is only in the strict sense of this analysis that one can finally arrive at a notion of consciousness grasped in its ultimate stronghold, that is, a consciousness absolutely irreducible to the empirical sphere of objects. The pure self is nothing more than this instance that is reached as the highest level of evidence in which the "being" and the "appearing" are not distinguished. Now, this thesis, as Cartesian as it may be, is not confused with an introspection⁷. Introspection is defined, on the contrary, as an inner perception, that is to say, as an entirely passive consciousness to pure factual observation. In a different direction, transcendental reflection is the radical attempt to grasp *a sui generis* sense, the sense of an experience.

⁶ Husserl understands that the fundamental error of modern psychology and, therefore, of its lack of scientificity, stems from the fact that it has neither recognized nor elaborated the phenomenological method. On the other hand, he never seems to lose hope that, one day, imbued with a spirit freer from all naturalistic prejudice, psychology may finally render productive the enormous experimental work of current times as a "practiced phenomenology. It is from this perspective - he believes - "that psychology is in a close relationship, very close indeed, with philosophy" (Husserl, 2003, p. 57).

⁷ "[...] It is necessary to avoid committing the same confusion as Hume, as well as confusing phenomenological intuition and 'introspection', interior experience; in short, confusing phenomenological intuition with the acts that, far from putting essences, establish the individual singularities that correspond to them" (Husserl, 2003, p. 53).

The dialogue with psychology within phenomenology is increasingly assuming new contours as the work of Husserl matures. The German philosopher advances his program based on the fact that knowledge of facts presupposes a vision of essences. More than that: "he underlines", as Merleau-Ponty (2001, p. 410) says, "the concrete character of essence". It is clear that

Husserl never recognized the total homogeneity of the two modes of knowledge, the inductive and the eidetic, as different degrees of explanation; however, his notion of experienced essence encapsulated this in germ. There is a dialectic to the concept of essence; the essence must not imply a supra-sensitive faculty and must be as contingent as a fact (Merleau-Ponty, 2001, p. 412).

The question posed by Merleau-Ponty is that Husserl is cautious about "the danger that a vision of essences that had no ballast in the experience would represent" (Merleau-Ponty, 2001, p. 413). This is not the case, of course. On the other hand, it is well known that Husserl rejects Gestalttheorie for relying again on a naturalistic explanatory model, despite the fact that it is a school founded fairly on his teachings⁸. The problem is that this phenomenologically imputed criticism (rightly so), on the other hand, seems to lose in phenomenological terms, a certain productive reach achieved by the clinical gestalt practice. In other words, it must be said that Husserl ends up wasting the rich opportunity to recognize in this current a significant theoretical step: it is a psychology in which everything has a meaning, that is, "there are no psychic phenomena

⁸ Taking part in this colloquium, Piaget observes that "Husserl opposes both to idealism and Kantian apriorism, which attribute everything to the subject, and to empiricism or positivism, which forget him in favor of the object. The fundamental data is, therefore, for him, the phenomenon as an indissociable interaction, and it is from this indissociability that he wants to start in order to reach the real. It was due to this aspect of his doctrine that phenomenology inspired the psychological theory of Gestalt, which was oriented towards an entirely anti-husserlian physicalism, increasingly neglecting the subject. This is because, with the notion of indissociable interaction, the Psychology of Form or Gestalt also inherited from phenomenology what could be called its actualism or its total absence of consideration for the historical or genetic dimensions" (Piaget, 1968, p. 141).

that is not oriented to a certain meaning. Under this sense, it is a psychology based on the idea of intentionality" (Merleau-Ponty, 2001, p. 414). The "integral psychology" of Koffka, for example, is a genuine sample of this truth, "for the simple reason that it has entered the terrain of facts, that it has clarified some of them, that it has glimpsed certain essential and philosophical truths, even without knowing it and without wanting it" (Merleau-Ponty, 2001, p. 414).

Despite this deficit of attention by Husserl – evaluates Merleau-Ponty – it is obvious how much more decisive and, therefore, more radical than Scheler and Heidegger, the founder of phenomenology is, with regard to the relations between philosophy and psychology. It is undeniable that these latter were known for renouncing an eternity conception to engage in a philosophy of temporality. However, the link between two orders of practice (philosophical and temporal) does not seem to have been more radical in them than in Husserl. Thus, the primacy of philosophy in relation to the sciences is advocated without concession. In the case of Scheler (1955), there is a direct view of the essences so that knowledge of them only acquires validity in the absence of physiological particularities or historical individualities. Heidegger, in turn, when describing a person in a situation, advocates that a pure thought or a tête-à-tête with the truth is impossible. It happens that, at the same instant, the philosophical enterprise is elevated to an absolute power of knowledge. Now, it is this absolutely clear and crystalline intention, that the §§3 and 11 of *Being and Time* (2012) reiterate, in a categorical manner, by presuming the principle that to philosophize is to describe, to explore the natural notion of the world before science. As Merleau-Ponty (2001) comments (p. 422):

In this description, he uses a philosophical power considered unlimited, which does not require resorting to ethnology or psychology. The human sciences are purely and simply subordinated to philosophy. One must already know

what is essential for the facts to induce. Heidegger claims a priority of philosophy over psychology, while Husserl, as we have seen, tends to replace this relationship of dependence with one of reciprocal involvement. They (Scheler and Heidegger) affirm the opposition between ontology and ontic, between philosophy and positive knowledge. Husserl, on the contrary, indicates the secret relations between these two orders of research⁹.

Heidegger explains that "science as such is not rejected in any way. Only its claim to the absolute, to be the parameter of all truths, is judged pretentious" (Heidegger, 2009, p. 148). Let us look at the case of the physicist: "Physics, as a science, is the determining form of knowledge. [...] The physicist does not descend from his throne. He does not let his position be questioned beforehand. Until this happens, it is not possible to talk to him" (Heidegger, 2009, p. 84). Here, surely, the philosopher paints, with precision, a symptomatic picture of our scientific-cultural crisis. He insists on saying that it is not a question of "fighting science as science, but

⁹ About the Heidegger case, a comment is important. Other interpreters, such as Ricœur, evaluate that, due to the project of *Being and Time*, there is an ontological structural impossibility that prevents the return to the entities. He writes (1986, p. 94): "With the heideggerian philosophy, one does not cease to practice the movement of returning to the foundations, but becomes incapable of proceeding with this movement because, since the fundamental ontology, it would lead us again to the very epistemological question of the status of the spirit sciences. Now, a philosophy that cuts off dialogue with the sciences is no more directed than to itself". Santander (2008, p. 208), in his review of the Zollikon Seminars, argues that, in the context of the analytics of existence, these Seminars show a Heidegger more determined to undertake that 'return', as is evident in his ontic analyses of the concepts of 'stress' and 'neurosis' employed in psychiatry in those years. Medard Boss, in turn, would report: "One day, Heidegger himself confessed that from the beginning he had had high expectations of connection with a doctor who seemed to understand his thinking. He saw the possibility that his philosophical insights would not be limited to the rooms of philosophers, but could benefit a much larger number of people, and especially people in need of help" (Boss in Heidegger, 2009, p. 13). This is what Ernildo Stein also ratifies: "From what Heidegger himself said, in the last interview I had with him in 1965, I could see that this work, which he did two or three times a semester in Zollikon, was very important to him and represented the window that opened from the conceptions of Being and time to the fields of Psychiatry, Psychoanalysis, and Psychology. It was therefore the philosopher himself who had an interest in observing the possible applications of his thought in the field of various theories and therapeutic practices" (Stein, 2012, p. 13). In any case, in spite of the value of these testimonies, or of the significant material that these precious Seminars represent, it is worth asking how far this presumed "applicability" is based on that "primacy" previously alluded by Merleau-Ponty of the "theoretical" over the "practical", that is, of the "ontological" over the "ontic". Heidegger expressly follows the thesis of ontological difference, whether at the time of *Being and Time*, or in the last period, as in Zollikon. The constant reservations about psychiatry, psychoanalysis (see Heidegger, 2009, p. 264), and even Daseinanalyse in its binswangerian version, is an incontestable demonstration of how the philosopher, due to that thesis, does not see, in any of these currents, any sign of evolution towards a phenomenological convergence. It is true that, in the case of Daseinanalyse, he at least believes, by the hands now of Boss, in a renewal, but this should only be accomplished, conditioning itself to that primacy of the "transcendental" over the "empirical", even if in a different sense from Kant or Husserl.

only the absolutization of natural science" (Heidegger, 2009, p. 162); and this without forgetting that "all science is based on an implicit ontology of its object" (Heidegger, 2009, p. 161). So far, so good! There is a perverse face of science which, by the way, is incapable of criticizing or questioning its own foundations. The problem arises when criticism of the scientific ideal becomes another form of more subtle and eloquent absolutization on the side, now, of philosophy. It is Heidegger (2009) himself who says: "science can never criticize philosophy because it is based on it" (p. 239). The duty of philosophical criticism (necessary and urgent to a certain extent), but absolutely demanded, requires such a status of authority as that which has been triggered at the level of positive knowledge. Everything happens as if the "being" owed nothing to the "entity", and therefore every ontic discourse is ontologically uncritical. The soft underbelly of this position is that if the scientist can never descend from his throne; the philosopher even less ... Philosophy parades with "high heels" on the catwalk of events, without truly entering them. Psychology, in particular, like all science, becomes the *ancilla philosophiae*.

The fact is that, in making such a balance of the positions of three authors directly linked to the phenomenological tradition¹⁰, Merleau-Ponty does not intend to identify – only – the origin of certain misunderstandings, but to make explicit, dialectically, a certain movement of the spontaneous development of psychology. Such a process, instead of detaching itself, would be even closer to a mutual understanding with philosophy. It is in this direction that we can now move towards for that

¹⁰ One could portray, without leaving the context of this tradition, the figure of Sartre. Well, his criticisms – by the way – are not at all friendly to the various schools or tendencies of psychology such as Psychoanalysis. Sartre never opens any promising concession between, for example, phenomenology and psychoanalysis, although, in *The Being and the Nothingness*, he edits the project of an "existential Psychoanalysis". Nevertheless, he reiterates how much this program does not confuse or converge with psychoanalytic theory. (Sartre, 1939, 1940, 1943). However, what is increasingly surprising is a growing phenomenon, the fact that Sartre is so admired in various research circles, particularly among psychoanalysts, who, academically or otherwise, dedicate themselves to working in an explicit perspective of convergence.

second order of treatment, namely, that of a convergence or chiasm between psychology and phenomenology.

The essential chiasm

It is continuing its course at the Sorbonne that Merleau-Ponty is interested in showing that psychology, whether by explicit reference, in a diffuse manner, or by the pressure of the problems posed, is beginning to redefine itself radically; and this, in a closer relationship with phenomenology. In order to better accompany this "epistemological turnaround", the philosopher revives the classic *tête-à-tête* between phenomenology and psychology itself at the turn of the century (xix-xx). It was a time when "an abstract way of conceiving philosophy – which excluded psychology – and a scientific way of conceiving psychology – which excluded philosophy coexisted". (Merleau-Ponty, 2001, p. 423). There was, therefore, a latent conception, diffused even among psychologists, that philosophy is the domain of the transcendental, of the a priori and, because of this, owed nothing to experience. Psychology, in turn, refused to be subjective. In order to become scientifically rigorous, it should rather be objective and, therefore, physiological. It should be quantitative, strictly speaking, for there is no scientificity without measure and without law, since any consideration of value should be excluded concerning the phenomena observed. In short: philosophy and psychology can hardly understand each other.

In another direction, this open confrontation has been interrupted for thirty years since the beginning of the century. Merleau-Ponty lists at least four reasons that explain such a turnaround. The first is the revision of the antinomy between subjective and objective. In other words, there is the recognition that the objective is not confused with the exterior or with a simple observation of a given fact. More than a mere register of facts,

science understands itself as a methodical construction of concepts. More than simply checking, it is about interpreting, introducing new notions. The second motivation of this evolution in the field of psychology is to overcome the dualism between the consciousness and the body. The image that the psychological sciences have about the body is no longer that of objective data for the understanding of the spirit, but a profound conception of behavior in the midst of concrete phenomena. The third reason is the revision of the opposition between individual and universal. The point is that not all the objective knowledge is necessarily universal. There is a revaluation of individual and singular knowledge. This is what Goldstein rightly brings out in his clinical studies of particular cases. The classic postulate that "there is only science of the universal" (Aristotle, 1987, p. 99) becomes anachronistic in relation to the expansion of the notion of induction and, therefore, before the new science since Galileo. Finally, fourthly, there is a revision of the dichotomy between simple and complex. By deconstructing such an antinomy, psychology itself promotes a critique of the classic concept of causality that reduces the phenomena into simple causal facts¹¹.

In thesis, what these four reviews seek is a neutralization or overcoming of traditional antinomies. Merleau-Ponty recognizes, through these attempts, the sign of a promising evolution of psychology. The works of Koffka (1975), in this perspective, illustrate the originality of this progress. The psychologist works on an important distinction: the notion between "geographical environment" (inherent to the behavioral causes and conditions) and "behavioral environment" (manifested by the sense of the targeted object). This distinction is what makes possible to clarify,

¹¹ "Causality disappears in favor of a kind of 'phenomenal topology'" (Merleau-Ponty, 1995, p. 332), since "the space, the causality, before being a relation between objects, is founded on my relation with things" (Merleau-Ponty, 1945, p. 331).

therefore, the famous experiment carried out by Köhler (1927) with chimpanzees. Two chimpanzees are allocated inside a cage. In this cage there is a bench and a bunch of bananas hanging from the ceiling. One of them takes the stool, goes up and reaches the bunch while the other, indifferent, sits on the stool. For a behaviorist conception, we are facing a pure and simple fact. The behavioral differences of animals are only superficial. The body and behavior are reduced to a geographical reality, that is, they are restricted to a purely objective field of causal relationships. In a quantitative sense, all this is just a sum of stimuli and responses. Both Köhler and Koffka move away from this theoretical matrix¹². For the integrated psychology of Koffka, something quite different occurs, since "the datum is, actually, a *constructum*" (cited by Merleau-Ponty, 2001, p. 432). As described by Merleau-Ponty (2001, p. 431):

Although the geographical environment is the same, the behavioural environment is different. There is immanence in behavior, an appreciation of the object-stool, sometimes as a seat, sometimes as a point of support [...]. There remains, in any case, a descriptive difference between the two behaviors: the same stool is not the same for both chimpanzees. Any behavior that targets immanent objects might be defined by them; the regulation of behavior is done by the behavioral environment, and the results of the conduct are recorded in a geographical world.

Thus, apart from an excessively rigid or restrictive and, as a rule, mechanical field of relationships, there is a situation structure that may be interpreted in the animal behavior. It is therefore necessary to decipher the meaning of this behavior, i.e. its internal structure, since "the outside

¹² Situating ourselves next to human experience – portrays Merleau-Ponty (2001, p. 434) – "Koffka thinks that we do not see stimuli, but because of those stimuli. It distinguishes, therefore, stimulus and object from perceptual conduct; it ends up in the notion of meaning, of orientation of my conduct. For this, it does not introduce the notion of conscience; it just shows that my gesture draws in the world, objects towards which I behave because of their structure and their sense".

world is always apprehended through a situation" (Merleau-Ponty, 2001, p. 433)¹³, whether human or not. However, there is nothing anthropomorphic here, since it is not a question of equating a homonymous behavioral environment between man and animal, especially because, as Husserl says (2001, p. 107), it is important to understand that "the animal is, for us, a variant of humanity. It is a matter of making it clear that in the field of animal, child, and even pathological psychology, we always apprehend or perceive the behavior of others from our situation, from our human condition.

The reference to the works of Koffka becomes, once again, decisive in this context, especially because he also overcomes introspective psychology in two ways: first, because it "presents itself as the object of data accessible only to a witness, while the 'phenomenal' of Koffka is understandable in the conduct" (Merleau-Ponty, 2001, p. 436). Secondly, because introspective psychology privileges the cognizant consciousness. Now, the "'phenomenal' concept of Koffka is not what is presented to an inactive consciousness. Language, for example, is a conduct while it is a signification and not one that has a meaning" (Merleau-Ponty, 2001, p. 436). To put it in another way:

The cognizant consciousness is therefore only a part of the studied world; it is not the model of all consciousness. The phenomenal is the project by which a subject makes significations appear in his environment. This psychology aims at a contact with the world, a creative contact, and not a simple knowledge. The "phenomenology" (Koffka uses the word) is, therefore, the systematic study of this lived experience, a naive and as full as possible description of the direct experience, of what the thing is and is not. (Merleau-Ponty, 2001, p. 436-437).

¹³ "The decisive factor is not the elements that compose the behavior, but the internal SENSE of the conduct" (Merleau-Ponty, 2001, p. 437).

On this path, if since the last century, several psychologists – as Merleau-Ponty reminds us – proceed with the "analysis of meaning", recognizing, therefore, the inner structures of the conduct, this is probably not an accident of course or the work of chance. There is a more mature conscience and therefore refractory to all naïve and inconsequent realism in regarding its own principles. Therefore, there is no way to advance even one inch without the proper review of substantialism and causal reductionism. It is also in this perspective that the clinical research of Goldenstein is guided. What in his work, *La Structure de l'Organisme*, postulates, beyond the realistic explanatory categories, is that in the context of the relations between the organism and the environment there is an ontological background. As he describes, "it is always the total organism that appears to me as 'totality', as 'form', not the phenomena of a single domain or even, solely, 'the conscious impressions'" (Goldstein, 1983, p. 405). In favor of this, biology and psychology must renounce the analytical method if they want to deepen the essence of the organism, that is, to explore the 'original being' of the biological phenomenon.

In this way, through a dialectical progression, our experimental knowledge allows us to reach an ever more adequate understanding of the essence of the organism and an ever more precise appreciation of the essential or non-essential character in relation to the organism, of the established facts (Goldstein, 1983, p. 311).

"It is impossible to know what the organism is before you get in contact with it [...]. He (Goldstein) tries to define a physiological being according to the phenomenon, as it appears to us"¹⁴, observes Merleau-

¹⁴ This previous contact, phenomenologically original, is the background to the work of Goldstein. Gurwitsch (2002, pp. 372-373) shows, in this respect, how the "philosophical and methodological principles of the work of Goldstein" do not "imply anything mystical or metaphysical" when it comes to understanding that "the symbols employed in biology are much closer to the phenomena observed, differentiating themselves from the symbolic entities conceived

Ponty (2001, p. 452). What the German scientist seeks is to reconstitute a dynamic of behavior, that is, to question the organism in various aspects. What we have here is, strictly speaking, another epistemological program, a dialogical project that his bio-anthropological theory writes phenomenologically. With all these criticisms, should we ignore physiology? Well, "physiology is entirely legitimate, but it must be restored to the dialectics of the organism and its environment. It provides indices rather than realities, [...] since physiological knowledge is in fact indirect, it does not have the privilege of immediacy" (Merleau-Ponty, 2001, p. 461). The physiological presupposes almost always an integral movement; it is rooted, therefore, in a more dynamic structure and, to that extent, primarily phenomenal, full of meaning. By giving status to the "situational value" explored by clinical experience as Goldstein exemplarily does, he sees Merleau-Ponty (2001, p. 451)¹⁵, "we are once again faced with a fine example of convergence or unintentional chiasm between experimental research and the demands of the phenomenological method".

Besides Koffka, Köhler, and Goldstein, many theorists incorporate themselves into a new psychology program like Freud and the psychoanalytic tradition ¹⁶, and Wallon, Buytendijk¹⁷, Lewin, among others. This new psychology already has, in its DNA, the phenomenological inscription of a return to things themselves. From this

by physicists. And he says: "the good method consists in describing as completely as possible the totality of the symptoms observed, besides treating them all on the same plane". (Gurwitsch, 2002, p. 376).

¹⁵ In fact, German physician himself would later also recognize the character of convergence between his work and phenomenological research (Cf. Goldstein, 1957). See also: (Silva, 2012; 2015).

¹⁶ The dialogue with Freud and psychoanalysis is undoubtedly a separate chapter in the work of Merleau-Ponty. He incorporates increasingly, in the course of his production, much of the psychoanalytical analysis that were moved, at first, under the critical verve of Georges Politzer (1947), as Reinaldo Furlan (1997) confirms. Merleau-Ponty (2003, p. 159) recognizes a "merit of Freud: true analysis makes the patient not an object, but finally a new subject, who is not guided by the driving force of the prestige of the master [...]. The analyst and the analyzed [are] one and the other in the truth, not as possessed truth or dogma, but as ἀλήθεια, non-dissimulation, and openness (*Offenheit*)". See: (Ayouch, 2012).

¹⁷ See: (Silva, 2014).

comes, so to speak, the essential chiasm that the *Phénoménologie de la Perception* would have revived, in the middle of a colloquy with the sciences and, in particular, with psychology. If it is certain that this important work is not confused with a simple "manual of psychology", since it was radically heading towards an ontological investigation (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 230), this never implies any overlap between these two plans of research. It is, in fact, a phenomenologically oriented ontology, anticipated since the *La Structure du Comportement* (1942), without detaching from an implacable ontic ally: the living and renewed experience of psychology.

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The mind-body problem and the question of the naturalization of the phenomenology

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Introduction

In view of the epistemological and ontological weaknesses of Scientific Psychology exposed by Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), it is understood that Phenomenology is the methodological basis able to provide a safe foundation for this science. The phenomenological methodology enables a strict elucidation of the study object of Psychology, thus contributing to delimit its ontological statute. It is in this sense that Husserl proposed, through his project of constitution of a Phenomenological Psychology, the reformulation of the foundations of the psyche science, making possible the creation of an authentically scientific subject. In this way, Phenomenology is, as well as Psychology, faced with the difficult mind-body problem. So, a fruitful discussion began between the phenomenological methodology and the cognitive sciences. However, such interlocution has happened through the project of naturalization of Phenomenology, which presents mistakes that put this program at stake, as highlighted by Bello (2012; 2015b); Goto (2015); Ramstead (2015); Simanke, (2012); Sidoncha (2008), Tieszen (2016), Zahavi (2010). Thus, the following issue arises: is it possible to consider the mind-body problem through the contributions of Phenomenology without incurring in a project

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of its naturalization? It is in this sense that Edith Stein's Phenomenology (1891-1942) enters in this discussion. One searches, thus, from the philosopher's reflections about the structure of the human person, to apprehend her contributions to the mind-body problem and the possible implications for a strict and suitable enlightenment of the ontological statute of Psychology.

Disappointed with the scientific-natural Psychology of her time, that she called "Psychology without soul" (*Psychologie ohne Seele*), Stein realized that this science lacked proper basis to lay her knowledges. Faced with that, she tried to contribute to the grounds of this science, using for that Husserl's Phenomenology. However, it is necessary to say first that Stein did not directly approach in her writing the mind-body problem. But it does not mean that the ideas formed by the phenomenologist can not help to analyze this problem. On the opposite, it is not only possible but also necessary to introduce Stein's rich thinking on these fruitful discussion.

Bearing this in mind, before moving on to the discussion, some terminological/etymological enlightenments of the terms used in her analysis are necessary. The philosopher did not use the expression mind in the sense that is attributed in the current discussions about the mind-body problem in Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Sciences. To refer to the mind, she used the latin word *Mens/Espiritus*, that designates, according to the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition, the top part of the soul (Stein, 1922/2002a). Because of this, to make explicit the possible contributions of Stein's Phenomenology to the mind-body problem, we will make here a terminological approximation between the terms mind, as understood by Cognitive Sciences; and psyche, that in the philosopher's thinking refers to the dimension of the human related to the psychological phenomena. It is understood that both terms indicate the study object of

Psychology, or in other words, the ontological statute of this science (Manganaro, 2012).

In addition, it is necessary to emphasize also the linguistics issue that justifies this approximation. In German, there is no direct corresponding term for mind. In order to refer to the object of Psychology, German thinkers normally use the word *Seele* (soul) or *Psyche*. So, besides the epistemological differences, the Phenomenology and the mind sciences also have linguistics differences that, however, do not avoid an interlocution between both. For that reason, it is perfectly possible to make a lexical approximation between the words mind and psyche (Araujo, 2007). We can conjecture, then, that the mind-body problem in Stein's Phenomenology is expressed as a psyche-body problem.

Taking into account the goal of this study, we adopted as methodology the biographical qualitative research. In order to investigate the implications of Edith Stein's Phenomenology to the mind-body problem, we used as source of research some of the philosopher's literary work, in which is possible to understand her contributions to this issue. Two specific texts were analyzed: "Psychic Causality" (*Psychische Kausalität*), presente in her book "Phylosophy of Psychology and the Humanities" (*Beiträge zur philosophischen Begründung der Psychologie und der Geisteswissenschaften*, 1922) and "Introduction to Philosophy" (*Einführung in die Philosophie*, 1920). In these books, Stein performed a phenomenological analysis of the psychic reality and the spiritual dimension, searching for a foundation for Psychology and Humanities. Besides, she talked about the corporeality and structure of the psyche, also discussing the ontological position of Psychology, taken as a science of subjectivity.

The ontological region of Psychology: the *psyche*.

In the beginning of her academic life, Stein took an interest in Psychology taking psychologist William Stern's classes (1871-1938). However, she soon came to realize the limitations of this science, that because of its naturalistic setting was not able to properly investigate the essence of the psyche, lacking a safe basis to build its foundations. After studying Psychology in Breslau, the philosopher came to the following conclusion: "All my studies in Psychology convinced me that this science was still crawling. That it lacked the necessary ground of clear ideas and that this same science was not able to elaborate these assumptions" (Stein, 1920/ 2002b. p. 331).

Due to its naturalistic commitment, Psychology ended up excluding questions related to the world of the soul, reducing the psychic to something merely material, because it conceived it as a simple set of sensations with no meaning for the human life. As Stein (1962/2007) pointed out, Psychology disconnected itself from the flow of the world of the soul, abandoning its originating meaning of investigating the "inner world", what triggered a crisis in its scientific feature.

Because of that, in order to be a real science, Psychology must first enlighten the ontological region that it investigates, that is to say, the psychic. It is noticeable during the history of modern Psychology that the issue of the elucidation of its subject was not addressed in a strict and systematic way, what created several mistakes and inaccuracies. Consequently, several psychological lines came up, many times opposite to each other, resulting in a disorderly multiplicity of conceptions concerning the psychic. In face of this problem, it is important to resume an authentic and strict investigation about the psychic dimension, searching for a proper enlightenment of the subject of Psychology and an

overcoming of the ontological inaccuracies and the methodological-epistemological mistakes of this science.

That said, we emphasize that Phenomenology is a proper tool for the investigation of the psychic. It is in this sense that, following Husserl's analysis about Psychology, Stein outlined a Phenomenological Psychology aiming to enlighten what the psychic is or, in a more accurate way, how the psychic individual shows themselves. From that, there are ways to constitute a scientific Psychology and highlight its place towards the other kinds of science (natural and humanities).

The distinction between *Psyche* and Consciousness.

Stein's investigation (1922/2005a) about the psyche started from an analysis of the so-called psychic causality. This issue relates to the old discussion between determinism and indeterminism, or, in other words, freedom and necessity. Is the will dependent of a causal legality? Or is there an unrestricted freedom of will, not being possible to conceive any kind of necessity? The philosopher faced these questions, trying to analyze how the psyche enters in the scope of causal legality.

Stein tried to state if the psyche shows its own necessary connection in an analogous way to the causality in the scope of physical nature. With that, she faced the problem related to the connections between the psychic and the physical. About this issue, historically there have been the classic solutions of the psychophysical parallelism and the interaction theory; both positions show a dualistic posture, but while the former proposes a parallelism the later advocates an interactionist vision.

In her investigation about the relation between psychic and physical and the causal connection in the psychological field, Stein pointed out the lack of clarity about what is the psychic. Despite Psychology manuals address this question, they do it superficially and incur in a fundamental

mistake: the confusion between conscience and psyche. According to the phenomenologist, the psychic refers to the “Real Ego” (empiric), that is to say, the me with real qualities and states, in a way that the psyche must be understood as a transcendent reality.

It is in agreement with the idea presented by Husserl (1952/2005) in the second part of “Ideas”, that the psychic is a reality, in a way that there are two kinds of real experiences: in one side the material reality and on the other the soul reality. The psychic (soul reality) relates to the psychological subject, that is to say, the real individual that has an empirical position in the world. As the philosopher wrote: “as an entity of the world, the psyche inserts itself, in the same way as the material thing, in the supreme types of reality” (Stein, 1922/2005a. p. 799).

On the other side, there is the consciousness, that is the domain of pure experiences, free from any empirical setting. The finding of the pure consciousness comes from the phenomenological residues resulting from the transcendental reduction. By searching a safe basis for knowledge, Husserl, starting from the phenomenological method, reduced the “Empirical subject” (psychological), reaching, thus, the pure sphere of the transcendental. The transcendental consciousness does not show empirical qualities, but transcendental ones, and then was uncovered the “purê ego” (*Reines Ich*), irradiation point of pure experiences (Stein, 1922/2005a).

In summary, while the psyche refers to the “Empirical subject” –an individual with real qualities (soul reality); the consciousness relates to the “Pure Ego”, the transcendental sphere from where the pure experiences come. Despite the differences, psyche and consciousness are related, because this, due to its constitutive nature, constitutes that one. Using Bello’s metaphor (2015a), consciousness can be compared to a glass through which you capture everything outside. Thus, the psyche, as a soul

reality, is on the other side of the glass/ consciousness and is captured and constituted through it.

The difference established by Husserl and Stein between *psyche* and consciousness is the basis of another important distinction: the discrimination between Psychology and Phenomenology. As evidenced by the philosopher, Philosophy manuals confuse these concepts, what brings serious methodological mistakes in the field of psychological research. By establishing the differences between *psyche* and consciousness, it is possible to elucidate in an accurate way the fields of investigation of Psychology and Phenomenology (Stein, 1922/2005a).

Despite Husserl identified, in the first edition of “Logical Investigations”, Phenomenology as a descriptive psychology, in the second edition in 1913, in “Ideas” and in the article “Philosophy as a Rigorous Science”, the philosopher pointed out a more clear separation between phenomenological and psychological investigation. On this, Psychology has as study subject the psychic. Its task is to investigate the psychic dimension and its laws. On the other side, the study of consciousness belongs to transcendental Phenomenology, that tries to elucidate the legality of the process of constitution in the field of pure consciousness (Husserl, 1911/1965; 1913/2006; Stein, 1922/ 2005a). Said that, Stein commented that:

The difference between Psychology and Phenomenology, demanded by Husserl in “Ideas” and before in the article “Philosophy as a Rigorous Science”, published in magazine “Logos”, is based on the required separation between consciousness and psychic. Psychology, in the sense here delimited and in the sense given by psychologists that practice it in a naive way, without epistemological considerations about the method used, is a “natural” or “dogmatic” science, a theoretical investigation of certain objects that we find in the “world”, in our world, where we live and which existence is the first dogma and the most evident assumption not questioned of all of our

reflexions. In this world, besides natural things and living organisms, we find humans and animals, besides what they have in common with the things and the simple living beings, they also show features that distinguish them. The totality of these features is called psychic and its investigation is a task for Psychology (Stein, 1922/2005a. p.221).

After this discrimination, it is possible now to investigate the psychic dimension itself, without incurring in conceptual confusions. However, the psyche is a transcendent reality of the soul constituted by what is captured by the consciousness. The phenomenological investigation, taking as foundation the constituent consciousness, has the experience as a starting point.

The vital force as a foundation of the psychic mechanism

On the face of it, Stein's analysis regarding the psychic starts from the constituent consciousness, that is to say, the chain of the originating consciousness or the chain of experiences. This investigation presents a close connection with Husserl's lessons about time, a text with which Stein had direct contact. The chain of the originating consciousness establishes itself as a pure becoming, a *continuum* in which there is no succession of phases in a way that the preceding causes the subsequent.

Thus, the chain of the originating consciousness does not show a causal nexus between phases, because they take place in a row, in which the current moment finds both what has already happened and what is to come. By concluding that in the field of the originating chain there is no causal connection, Stein tried to investigate if there could be a causality in the scope of psychic experiences. In her reflexions, the philosopher pointed out that there is a connection between the experiences, since changes in the sphere of vital feelings imply in alterations in the passing of the same.

On this, we can question whether these modifications of living match a causal relation. Does the psychic sphere have a causality? If so, how is it established? Would it be similar to the physical causality, or would it show its own features? To answer these questions, Stein deepened her investigation of the psyche, trying to unveil its mechanism.

In the field of psychic reality, there are causal nexuses in a way that a causal happening is constituted by a causative event, a caused event and a cause that promotes the passage of the first to the second. It is in this way that, for example, by releasing an object from a certain height, (causative event) it will be attracted to the ground (caused event) due to the gravity force (cause). In the same way to what happens in the physical world, in the psychic field there are also causal relations. So, an impulse can generate a series of modifications in the passing of experiences, determining not only the quality but also the intensity of the resulting effect. However, despite the analogy with the physical world, the psychic causality has its own aspects that differ from the natural causality. This question is of fundamental importance to understand the essence of the psychic, because it emphasizes that the psyche, despite being part of reality as the material world, differs from it showing its own eidetic feature (Stein 1922/2005a).

It is one of the arguments that made Stein (1922/2005a) oppose to the Psychology of her time, that, by adopting a naturalistic conception of the psychic dimension, tried to know the psychic phenomena by their measurement. In this perspective, the psychophysics for example, (experimental Psychology) tried to investigate the relation between physical stimuli and sensorial experience, using for that the methodology of the natural sciences, that aims quantitative accuracy. This approach shows the lack of clarity regarding the subject of study in Psychology (the psychic), because it reduced the psyche to something merely physical,

disregarding its eidetic feature. Consequently, this notion promoted a reductionist meaning of the psychological object, what led to epistemological and methodological inaccuracies.

Having addressed like this the first questioning concerning the existence or not of a causality in the sphere of the psychic, it is necessary to elucidate now the mechanism of this causality. The causal relations in the scope of the psyche appear as a concatenation of experiences, and to understand how it happens is necessary to analyze in detail the way this process is structured. For Stein (1922/2005a), the causal bond between the experiences happens from changes in the vital sphere. It is evidenced here the existence of a vitality that influences the experiences, which tiredness and freshness mark two opposite points, from which there are several degrees of variations, forming a *continuum* (Stein, 1922/2005a).

The vital sphere, ground of the psychic dimension, shows a wide range of vitality grades. It is possible to go from a state of enormous excitement to extreme lethargy, and these variations determine causal modifications in the experience, what denotes the existence of a causal mechanism in the dimension of the psyche. So, to completely understand the psychic causality, it is indispensable to make an investigation of the vital sphere. What is this sphere and how does it work? In what ways does it influence the causal nexuses of the experiences?

In the field of psychic vitality, there are the vital states and feelings, that according to Stein (1922/2005a) show the same meaning. Those match the current state of the vital sphere and, in its turn, these designate the experience of these states, that is, the manifestation in the consciousness. However, it is important to emphasize that there is a possibility that there are states that do not express themselves in vital feelings, *i.e.*, do not show themselves to the consciousness and, so, are not experienced, like for example: there can be a state of tiredness without one

realizing it. Because of that, it is pointed out that the vital sphere expresses the qualities of a reality. The vital different feelings matching to the current conditions of the vital sphere (vital states) reveal, in this sense, a permanent real quality, the vital force, under which the psychic reality and its mechanism occur. In Stein's words:

The conditions of a reality, its states and qualities, appear in the vital feelings as immanent contents, in a similar way to what happens with data strange to the "I". In the sensation of color, the color of something appears as a momentary optical state; in the changes of this state there is the durable optical quality. In the same way, in the vital feeling there is the current state of "I" – its vital state – and in the variation of these states there is a persistent real quality: the vital force (Stein, 1922/2005a. p. 237).

In summary, the vital sphere (psychic) shows different states and vital feelings, and these variations reveal the existence of a vital force. By realizing sometimes a feeling of tiredness and sometimes of excitement, it is possible to verify the presence of the vital force as a substrate of these different states. In the state of tiredness, the vital force is reduced, while in the freshness it is high. So, the elucidation of the psychic mechanism depends on an understanding of the role of this force in the psychic sphere. The different *modus* in which the vital force presents itself match the causative event of the psychic sphere. Therefore, the changes in the psychic vitality are determined by the modifications of this force. The different vital states are a result of an increase ou decrease of the vital force. Thus, the philosopher explains the operation of the causality in the psychic scope:

The fact of the energies being provided to the vital force or taken from it is the cause of the psychic process; the "effect" consists in the changes of other psychic qualities. There is no direct causal dependency between other qualities without the existence of a mediation of the vital force. For example, the

receptivity for colors cannot be intensified or reduced by the receptivity for sounds. However, both can be intensified together by an intensification of the vital force (Stein, 1922/2005a. p. 239)

After elucidating how the causality happens in the psychic sphere, it is possible now to understand how the psychic mechanism occurs. However, it is necessary to also highlight the opposite side of this causality, that is to say, the success that the psychic states consume the vital force, causing, then, alterations in the vital sphere. That means that if on one side the experience shows a causal dependency on the vital force, on the other side the psychic states outlay a consumption of this force, promoting modifications in the psychic dimension. That is why we “have here in reality some sort of ‘retroaction’, that does not represent, however, nothing new besides the other causal relations (...). It is a bilaterality of all causal event” (Stein, 1922/2005a. p. 240).

In the state of freshness, there is an increase of the vital force, and the experiences happen in a lively way; the reading of a book, for example, can become an exciting and pleasant activity. However, the act of reading itself takes some vital force that can cause a change from freshness to tiredness. Even though the reading is pleasant, at the end of the activity you can experience a tiredness due to the consumption of the vital force. It means that every psychic causal event involves a transposition of vital force to the act of experience, while the experience itself causes a consumption of it. So, the intense demand for energy of a certain quality causes a weakness in the others. If someone is extremely concentrated on something, this activity requires a great deal of vital force, damaging the other tasks.

However, there is a condition under which the psychic activity can happen “effortlessly”, that is to say, with no expenditure of vital force. That occurs when the receptivity of the psychic sphere is marked for certain

contents by an increase in the scope of the experience or the insentification of the content of the experience. The receptivity establishes itself as a quality of the psyche that shows the following mechanism: widening the experience or intensifying the contents of the experience demands initially a consumption of vital force, but if this widening and this intensification keep permanent, there is a receptivity in the psychic sphere in a way that the experience happens without effort. In summary, the greater the receptivity the smaller the consumption of force used (Stein, 1922/2005a).

A situation that exemplifies this psychic mechanism is the process of learning: in order to learn something new a great amount of vital force is used, because the receptivity to that activity is minimum. With constant practice of what was learned, the receptivity increases, so the action is carried out effortlessly. When one learns to play a musical instrument, *e.g.*, initially it is necessary a great deal of vital force, but when one has practice, the activity becomes automatic and spontaneous (Stein, 1922/2005a).

So, when an action is carried out without effort, the vital force previously used is available to perform another activity. If this mechanism did not exist, the psychic activity would require a great amount of force, causing a huge attrition of the vital sphere. It is possible to conclude, then, that the psychic dimension is constituted as a passive sphere and as a mechanism that regulates itself automatically. As Stein wrote:

The psyche – as we use only the sphere of passivity as a foundation for our causal investigation – appears as a mechanism that regulates itself automatically; based on its constitution it adapts to a number of diverse functions, but it is provided with only a limited amount of driving force and when this is driven to only one function, the other ones are spontaneously eliminated. The whole mechanism depends on the driving force (Stein, 1922/2005a. p. 245).

Stein (1922/2005a. p. 245) concluded, so, that “there is no psychic reality without causality” and that the causal mechanism of the vital sphere is the base of all psychic activity. Hence, the constitution of the psyche with its qualities and real states occurs through this causal psychic process. The phenomenologist said, so, that there is not only a causality in the psychic dimension, which substrate is the vital force, but that the very psychic mechanism occurs in this causal event.

The body and its double aspect: *Körper and Leib*.

After the phenomenological description of the psychic dimension, it is important to go on with the investigation, going from psychic to psychophysical. In Stein’s understanding (1920/2005b), psyche does not exist in an isolated way; on the opposite, it only appears tied to the body. It is not possible to properly understand the psyche if Psychology, for example, does not take into account its close connection with the corporeal dimension. The “Empirical subject”, endowed with a real position, only enters the natural world through a body, that is to say, being a real psychophysical subject. For a strict exam of the psyche/mind-body problem, it is indispensable to also make a phenomenological analysis of the body, making way for a proper elucidation of its relationship with the psyche. So, a Psychology with solid basis can not ignore the dimension of the body.

First of all, the body is understood as a material thing. To understand this corporeal aspect, Stein performed an abstraction, suspending the experienced aspects of the body. Such abstraction is necessary, because in order to conceive the man in their corporeal peculiarity, it is necessary first highlight the material feature of the body. As the other objects of the natural reality, the body is a spatial thing with an extension. This merely physical feature is evident in a lifeless body, the dead body (Stein, 1932/2002a; 1920/2005b).

In the phenomenological analysis, the corporeal dimension considered only in its material feature is what Husserl (1952/2005) called *Körper*. In German, there are two different words to talk about the body: *Körper* and *Leib*. *Körper* indicates the material dimension of the corporeity. *Leib* refers to the materiality of the body as something animate, with life, a living body. In this sense, it is possible to say that *Leib* is an animate *Körper*, because it occurs through the materiality, but does not end in it, by reason of it shows itself as something alive. Stein follows Husserl's distinction, highlighting both aspects of the corporeal dimension (Sepp, 2017).

The material constitution of the body shows a determined figure. The *Körper* is not a disorderly tangle of different material parts, because it shows a well delimited configuration, making man a specimen of their species. The material body is structured in parts, such as limbs, upper body and head, that determine a corporeal figure of the human. Another aspect is that, as the other material things, the *Körper* also shows sensorial qualities (color, texture, smell etc), in a way that it is susceptible to the causal nexuses of the natural reality. Still, it is conceived that the *Körper* is not something static, because it can move and it is subject to causal modifications. So, if the body is part of the material world, it also takes part in the causal legality of nature, as, for example: the body suffers gravity action as any other physical object (Stein, 1920/2005b).

Consequently, in its material aspect, the human body is not different from other objects and creatures. However, it is known that the body is not only a materiality, because it shows a peculiarity that distinguishes it from the other objects in nature. The abstraction performed to investigate the material body comes, thus, to a limit and it must be conceived that the body is something more than a mere matter. The material body does not belong to a subject that has a body, but that lives it, since it shows a living

body (*Leib*). On this, Stein (1920/2005b, p. 790) said that: “with the link of the physical body to a subject or an individual consciousness, there are the peculiarities that make it a living body”.

The living body, therefore, is a material corporeal thing that shows a close connection with a conscious subject, establishing itself as a matter animated by a subject. Husserl (1976/1991) called this particularity in §53 of “Crisis” as the “paradox of human subjectivity”, since the “I” (Ego) is both subject and object for the world. When investigating the living body, Stein (1920/2005b) highlighted a fundamental aspect of its structure: the impressionability, that is to say, the capacity of having sensations. Despite its sensorial qualities, the living body has a peculiarity of being impressed. It means that sensibility is a quality of the living body, what forms, thus, a sentient body.

However, it is possible to notice that the living body has something besides the faculty of sensibility, because it also has movement. While the other material objects move due to some external factors, the living body shows the quality of its own movement, that is to say, the impulse for its mobility comes from inside (Stein, 1932/2002a). On the face of it, we can say that the *Leib* shows an internal configuration. Its external figure is configured inside, what indicates a peculiarity of the way of living beings.

Besides that, the living body is, as Husserl and Stein pointed out, an organ of will. The action of will is embodied, that is to say, it only can be carried out by the living body. For example, when you want to read a book, it is necessary to go to a bookshelf, take it and start the reading. The action of this will can, thus, be performed only through the mediation of the living body.

Thus, the subject that has a living body, thanks to its capacity to manage this body as an organ of their will, is able to have effects on the

things of the external world, to create new things from the pre-existing. While the “course of nature” with its consequences on the individuals’ soul life do not go through any interruption, we see that any intervention of will in the external means the beginning of a new causal series (Stein, 1920/2005b, p. 796).

Besides these aspects, the living body shows another essential peculiarity: the ability to express inner life. The soul life is characterized by being directed from the internal to the external part, in a way that it shows through the living body. In other words, the inner life expresses itself in the living body, giving it its peculiarities. It is in this sense that is possible to capture the psychic state of a person through their corporeal expression. A happy individual will be smiling, with the body capturing its vital state (Stein, 1932/2002a; 1920/2005b; 1917/2005c). It can be concluded that the living body, endowed with vitality, sensibility and movement is an expressive organ. As Stein pointed out, the *Leib* is foundation, expression and instrument of the soul life, because this can only occur a corporeal way, by means of the corporeal structure, understood as living body (Betschart, 2016, 2017).

After addressing the issue of the psyche and the body in Stein’s phenomenological analysis, it is possible now to approach the psyche/mind-body problem as recommended in the Cognitive Sciences. Is there an interaction between body and psyche? If so, how is this relation? Are the corporeal and the psychic two different substances? Can the psyche be reduced to the body? These are questionings imposed to this issue. In front of the analysis previously debated, it is aimed to establish the psyche/mind-body problem in the phenomenological reflections made by Stein. In face of the complexity of the problem and the limitations of this study, the proposal here is to reflect about these issues and not offer definitive answers.

The psyche/mind-body problem as a dual-unit: implications for psychological science.

In face of the limitations presented in the scope of the mind sciences and Psychology, that show predominantly a physicalist posture in third person, many researchers try, through the methodological resources of Phenomenology, to consider the experience in first person (subjective). By putting the conscious subject as an investigation focus, Phenomenology showed the methodological foundation suited for a scientific investigation of this issue.

However, the insertion of Phenomenology in this debate has occurred through the project of naturalization, in an attempt to keep the scientific idea, what shows serious mistakes. Naturalizing Phenomenology seems to dismiss it from its transcendental feature, promoting, thus, a de-characterization. In this way, if the project of naturalization showed not to be the proper way to insert Phenomenology in the discussions about the mind-body problem, it is necessary to highlight how this interlocation is possible. How can the transcendental feature of Phenomenology help in the scientific investigation of the psyche/mind-body problem?

It seems contradictory, but the interlocation of transcendental Phenomenology with the empiric subject happens first through a negative way (Sidoncha, 2011). Due to the embodied feature of the “Empirical subject”, a cease of its registration in the natural world is initially done. As Husserl (1913/2006) and Stein (1922/2005a) highlighted, in order to achieve the sphere of pure experiences, it is necessary to cease any vestige of the natural orientation. So, an abstraction of the “Empirical subject” is done, trying to reach the transcendental subject.

In this sense, it is possible to question if this abstraction implicates an exclusion of the “Empirical subject”. Despite the accusations of transcendental idealism coming from the phenomenologist’s followers,

Husserl (1952/2005) and Stein (1922/2005a) showed that instead of excluding, the phenomenological investigations try to unveil the conditions of possibility of what was suspended. Understanding the transcendental subject as condition of possibility of the “real ego”, it is necessary that this is firstly excluded to be, then, recovered by that, now in an originating way.

Still, by highlighting the constitutive feature of consciousness, Husserl (1952/2005) and Stein (1922/2005a) tried to analyze the process of constitution. Everything that was suspended by the tools of the phenomenological method (*Epoché*, reduction) was recovered through the constitutive process. In face of that, it is possible to conclude that the constitutive analysis is the most proper way for a phenomenological investigation of the empiric subject and, consequently, of the psyche/mind-body problem. As shown, by following the reflexions of her master, Stein (1922/2005a; 1920/2005b) made a fruitful constitutive analysis of psyche and body. In her investigation, the philosopher analyzed how from the “Pure – I” is constituted the “Empirical – I (psychological)”. But, in what consists of this “real – I”? Is it formed by two different substances (body and mind) as Descartes said? Or is it something only physical as proposed by the physicalist theories? (Hobbs, 2018).

As Stein (1922/2005a; 1920/2005b) and Husserl (1952/2005) pointed out, the reality shows two different aspects: the material and the animal (psychic) nature, that is to say, there is a material reality and a psychic one. Besides this distinction, it is admitted an unitary conception of reality, which is understood as the totality of the real things. In this totality, it is highlighted the merely material aspect and also the psychic, *i.e.*, the scope of animate things.

The body shows an outstanding feature, because it shares two different aspects. At the same time that it is something material, it also

shows a living feature, because it is something animate. As described by Stein (1932/2002a; 1922/2005a; 1920/2005b), the body is at the same time a simple matter (*Körper*) and also a living organism (*Leib*). So, the living body, animated by the psyche, shows a peculiarity of sharing both a material and a psychic nature. It is important to stress that the distinction made by Stein between the various aspects of the corporeity, *Körper* and *Leib*, does not establish a duality in the corporeal dimension as one could wrongly think. *Körper* and *Leib* are not different bodies, but different qualities of a same body. Stein (1920/2005b) said that the *Leib* establishes itself as the origin or ground zero of orientation of the subject (*Nullpunkt*). Thus, the body is not perceived as the same way as the other material things, because it is the point from which perception and self-perception occur.

By touching a material object, it is possible to realize that it is different from the body, because it is out of the subject, it is something transcendent. Now, the sense of touch has a fundamental importance in this aspect, because through it is possible to delimit the limits of the body. For example, when a child explores the environment touching objects, it helps them to establish their borders. What is touched is perceived as being different from them. So, the body is the point that guides the subject.

The subject is not a psyche that is in a body, but a bodily-psychic individual. The living body only constitutes as an animate matter due to its close connection with the psyche. In contrast, the psyche also only shows up through its connection with the material, constituting thus the living body. One can conclude from there the impossibility of the psychic phenomena happen in an isolated way, outside the *Leib*.

In accordance with Husserl, Stein conceived the *Leib* as a unit between matter and psyche. As Bello (2012) highlights, this union can be understood, as Stein suggested, as a “dual-unit”. It means that despite

body and psyche being two different structures, both only occurs from a unit.

The comprehension of the relation body-psyche as a dual-unit, at the same time that it tries to emphasize the double aspect of the problem, the body and the psyche, conceives that both interact in a way to form a unit. It is understood from this conception that body and psyche do not occur in isolation, because they happen only in the scope of this unit. Through the notion of the *Leib*, it is conceived that the dual-unit has as a foundation the living body, because it is in it that the bodily-psyche union takes place (Bello, 2012).

In this perspective, one tries to preserve both elements of the problem, considering the peculiarity of each one, avoiding a reductionist conception. However, one can object that such dual unity consists in a dualistic position, for considering two different domains, body and psyche. Yet, despite evidencing a dual aspect, this perspective does not imply a dualism, because in the phenomenological analysis of the experiences in Stein (1932/2002a; 1922/2005a; 1920/2005b) it is possible to identify that this duality only occurs through a unit. Still, it is worth highlighting that both elements (body and psyche) are not presented in the condition of *res*, that is to say, a substance, but as different essential aspects of a same reality (Moraes, 2016).

Another objection that can be done about this perspective is that by conceiving an unit there is a monistic posture. However, the dual unit also does not indicate that reality is constituted by only one aspect, like the monism sees. The monistic position highlights the existence of only one domain, sometimes the physical one and sometimes the mental one, depending on the modality chosen, the physicalism or the idealism, respectively. It is noticeable that in this posture, one of the elements of the

psyche/mind-body problem is neglected. In the physicalism, the mental aspect is depreciated, while in the idealism the physical element is.

However, through the notion of a dual unit, suggested in the meaning of *Leib* in Stein (1932/2002a; 1920/2005b), one understands that this unit does not indicate the consideration that reality is constituted only by one element. In face of that, it is emphasized that this conception, despite postulating an unit, tries to consider the different aspects that form it (body and psyche). So, it is not possible to understand that the perspective of a dual unit as a monism is physicalist or idealistic, because it aims to consider both elements of the question, going in the sense of a harmonization of these different aspects. Despite different, these domains, body and psyche, harmonize in an unit that constitute them (Bello, 2014).

This understanding enables the establishment of a priority of the *Leib*, since the psyche does not occur besides the living body and this only constitutes itself as something living due to its link with a psychic subject. In this sense, as Bello (2012) points out, it is necessary to make a distinction between what is the source, the originating; and what is the base, what gives support. The neuroscientific researches, for example, say that is the brain the originating source of the experiences. By assuring that a certain psychic phenomenon identifies itself with a region of the brain, it is understood that this cerebral location is what originates the psychic experience. The basic assumption of sciences of the brain is that the material substrate is the originating source of the psychic experience.

However, it is necessary to question this perspective, asking if this material basis is really the source of the soul life. Faced with the limitations of the sciences of the mind, it is stated that this perspective does not embrace the subjective experience (first person), since the impersonal language (third person) of neuroscience says nothing about the subjective qualities of the experience. It is notable, thus, that there are elements that

go beyond the material aspect. In face of these limitations, one can conclude that the material substrate is not the originating source of the psychic experiences, but its basis. It is evident that, as shown by the theory of supervenience, the mental phenomena are subsidized by a material structure, since it would be inconceivable to accomplish the mental states without the brain. However, the material substrate is the basis of the experiences and not their source.

From these considerations, one can verify that the originating source of the soul life is the psyche, the body being its substrate, support, that is to say, its basis. The brains takes part in the soul life in a secondary way, because its operation happens because it is part of an animate body by a psychic subject. So, far from devaluating, Phenomenology tries to emphasize the originating feature of the psychic, without, though, ignoring its material substrate. From the notion of the dual-unit, both material and psychic aspects are considered, highlighting their *eidetic* characteristic (Bello, 2012).

The understading of the relation body-psyche as a dual-unit, explicitly admitted by Stein´s Phenomenology questions and puts at stake the reductionist model of the mental. According to the reductionist physicalism, every psychic occurrence reduces itself to its physical substrate, that matches its explanatory or ontological basis, depending on the kind of reductionism. In this way, the main thesis of reductionist model is that the whole psychic life depletes in the biological structures of the material body, that is to say, the *Körper* (Moraes, 2016).

In this sense, against the preponderance of the material advocated by the reductionist theories, Phenomenology sustains an unequivocal priority of the *Leib*, that is, of the bodily-psychic dual-unit. From this conception, there are conditions to overcome the reductionist model, promoting a depreciation of the psyche. In contrast, the phenomenological

investigations evidence that the body is not a simple matter, because it is animate due to its union with the psyche (Sidoncha, 2011).

From these considerations, it is possible to weigh the mistakes of the analyses made by Psychology and Cognitive Sciences about the mind. Faced with the lack of clarity about the psychic and the consequent ontological imprecision, these fields of investigation see it in a wrong way, what triggers the need of a strict investigation of the psyche. In general, the psychological and cognitive researches understand the psyche from a physicalistic, reductionist and quantitative imposition, expressing its conclusions through an impersonal language in third person (Stein, 1922/2005a).

However, the question imposed is if this kind of investigation can satisfactorily embrace the totality of the human. It is perceived that Psychology and Cognitive Sciences admit the human as something merely material and the psychic with physical features. As Husserl's (1952/2005) and Stein's (1932/2002a; 1922/2005a, 1920/2005b) analyses showed, the human being shares with other things in nature a material dimension, that is, the body, understood as *Körper*. It is different from the other objects, because the body is not something merely material, The *Körper* is animate by a psychic dimension, constituting a bodily-psychic dual-unit that is established from the living body (*Leib*).

Psychology, in accordance with Stein (1922/2018), is still an immature science that needs deep enlightenments to build its foundations in a strict and proper way. Besides, this science is still unable of elaborating its own assumptions, what denotes the need of a philosophical foundation. The consolidation of Psychology as an authentic science of the psychic depends, so, of the constitution of a safe basis on which the psychological investigations can build on.

The insertion of Psychology in the scientific environment happened in a problematic and controversial way. First, the young science needed to delimit its goal of investigation to circumscribe its ontological and epistemological field. With that, it inherited a complicated philosophical problem: the mind-body problem. In order to establish its ontological statute, Psychology should face this problem trying to answer what the mind is and how it relates to the body.

Heir of the cartesian tradition, Psychology is constituted as a science of mental/psychic phenomena, that is to say, everything that is not part of the essentially material being. However, due to the complexity of its investigation field and its epistemological immaturity, Psychology found difficulties to delimit its object in an accurate way. Because of that, it still faces the problem of the uncertainty of its object of study, what compromises its scientific statute. If Psychology does not have a domain of the limits of what it studies, it cannot be an authentic science. So, a strict elucidation of the mind-body problem is necessary for an accurate delimitation of its ontological field and, consequently, the consolidation of Psychology as a science.

So, a naturalist conception of the psychic was adopted, allowing the insertion of Psychology in the scope of natural sciences. However, it brought serious consequences to the psychological investigation: by conceiving the psyche as something natural, Psychology came to a reductionism, not considering the peculiarity of its object of investigation. So, instead of defining it accurately, scientific-natural Psychology assumed a wrong conception of the psychic.

In face of this naturalistic conception of the psyche, Psychology assimilated the physicalist objectivism of natural sciences. As Husserl (1936/1991) and Stein (1962/2007) pointed out, as consequence, Psychology neglected the psychological subjectivity that she should

originally investigate. So, an inside epistemological crisis came up, hitting the core of its scientific character, because by establishing itself as a natural science, it abandoned its originating sense of investigating questions related to the subjectivity.

Not taking into account the soul life, Psychology stuck only to the natural aspect of the phenomena. It was then established what Stein (1962/2007) called “Psychology without soul”, which lost its sense for humanity due to its inability to investigate the soul issues. Understanding the soul as what cheers up, that is, gives life, one can take from this expression that Psychology does not consider the living dimension of the subject.

From these considerations, one can conclude that Psychology has not precisely elucidated its object –despite it proposed to investigate the psyche, it does not know what it is. This picture promoted several mistakes that resulted in the fragmentation of this science, generating many “psychologies”, many times opposite to each other. The incomprehension towards its own object led to a multiplicity of conceptions about the psyche, making it difficult to have a strict foundation of Psychology.

Both in the scientific and professional scopes there is a diversity of psychological approaches and conceptions that show the intense fragmentation of Psychology. Besides these factors, the deficiency in the formation of psychologists also contributes for the division of the psychological science. Worried mostly about practical issues, the psychologists often neglect the aspects related to the foundation of their science. One can notice, in this sense, that the crisis of Psychology affects all the spheres, from the scientific to the academic-institutional. Thus, in order to consolidate its scientific statute, Psychology must face the mind-body issue.

In this context that the research tried to insert the phenomenological analyses made by Edith Stein in the debate about the mind-body issue, highlighting its implications to Psychology. Disappointed with the Naturalistic Psychology of her time, the philosopher tried to ground Psychology through the phenomenological method. With that, she outlined a Phenomenological Psychology with a rich analysis about the psyche aiming to unveil its essential structure (Moraes, 2016).

So, one can conclude that a truly scientific Psychology it is necessary to carry out a strict investigation of the *Leib*, what will allow an authentic delimitation of its ontological statute, understanding that the psyche shows up only through the bodily-psychoic dual-unit from the living body. It is understood from these considerations that Stein's investigations can contribute significantly to a proper elucidation of the psyche/mind-body problem. Therefore, the notion of *Leib*, understood as a dual unit, seems to be a pertinent proposal for the discussion of this issue. However, this questioning requires an ongoing investigation to achieve a strict understanding of the psyche/mind-body problem.

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Husserl's transcendental phenomenology and phenomenological psychology

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Introduction: Psychology and Phenomenology

“Science is the creation of the spirit that pursue
 certain ends and should be judged,
 therefore, according to that end”
 Edmund Husserl

It is common to claim that throughout the history of the modern sciences, Psychology would only in the end of the 20th century be officially inaugurated as a natural science, even though different arguments point to this century's beginning. The separation of Psychology regarding Philosophy – going through Physiology – officially happened with the foundation of the “Experimental Psychology Laboratories”, which were realized through the incorporation and the practice of the natural-scientific model in the psychological investigations. It is however necessary to highlight that the institutionalization of the disciplines of Psychology, promoted by the German educational reform in 1824 together with Psychology's progressive interest on other areas, do not coincide with the institutionalization of experimental Psychology and the consequent

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propagation of the laboratories; fact that promoted this definitive emancipation from Philosophy (Araújo, 2013).

However, it can be said, that during Psychology's emancipation process as a natural science, a methodology of its own was not developed. In other words, if on the one hand Psychology did not delimitate its object, on the other it did not elaborate for its own investigations – specific or unique as a paradigm, as Kuhn (1991) postulates – both a single theory and method. On the contrary, it started to – predominantly – be grounded through the direct incorporation of natural science's normative models, such as observation, experimentation and quantification, originated from the ideological imposition of the then reigning Positivism. Thus it was parting from the natural and positive science that Psychology presented itself as a true science of consciousness (of subjectivity, about the “psychological”), and afterwards also of behavior and cognition.

It is worth remembering that in his *Course of Positive Philosophy*, Augusto Comte (1830-1842/1975) claimed that the validity of humans' observation, as consequently the possibility of a Scientific Psychology, would be limited to external observation, being – therefore – an enterprise of Biology or ultimately that of Sociology (as knowledge qua moral history).

Thus, or abides Psychology to its object's specificity and, once it slips away to external observation, immediately gives up of being inscribed in science, mistaking itself both with metaphysics or literature; or it is submitted to the positivistic method and, in that case, becomes a science of nature, losing the sight of its object: the subject (Silveira, 2018, 15-16).

As is common to all, scientific psychology began in the german philosophical tradition, but alike many psychology manuals indicate, its emancipation did not specifically occur due to Wundt's Experimental

Psychology Laboratory establishment in the Leipzig University. Much in another way, the scientific achievement of Psychology elapsed since the 18th century from a conceptual and epistemological change in its own theoretical framework, ceasing to be the reflection and care of the soul, to be a natural science of consciousness or of the psychical phenomena, something that consequently led to a naturalistic psychic science. It is also worth emphasizing that in the mid of the 20th century, Psychology was not anymore exclusively referred to the psychic phenomena – due to epistemological problems of studying subjectivity – but rather to behavior, therefore constituting as a behavioral science. Heidbreder (1981) comments that “Scientific Psychology is nothing more than an extension of the scientific method to a field where the disinterested observation has been particularly difficult” (p. 72).

The original motivation of psychology since its elaboration in the Greco-Roman Antiquity was, however, to reflect upon the soul, exploring human interiority (or subjectivity) and all that of non-material nature, therefore historically defining objects such as: the “mental”⁴ (the spiritual), the psyche, the person’s interiority, the mental act, and finally consciousness. As it became a science, Psychology turned to make an exclusive use of the objective methods in its analysis, causing for the explanation of its presuppositions both a internal confusion as well as the creation of a “legitimacy problem” (Canguilhem, 1956/2012).

About this process, stands out the position of the philosopher and founder of Phenomenology Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), one of the main critics of the scientific (experimental) Psychology of his time, pointing its

⁴ In portuguese, the words “anímico”, “psíquico” and “espiritual” have complex meanings. Sometimes, those concepts are used like the same. For this text, we made option to designate – based in many husserlian translations, and more specifically on Diccionario Husserl (<https://www.diccionariohusserl.org/>) and “Glosario-guía para traducir a Husserl” (<http://www.ggthusserl.org/enlaces/sitios.html>), by Antonio Zirion Quijano, from UNAM – “anímico” by *mental*; “psíquico” by *psychic* and “espiritual” by *spiritual*. So, “mental”, here, has other correspondences – like “of the mind”, “spiritual” or “intellectual” – and can be the translation of *geistig*, in deutsch.

various epistemological problems on this science's constitution as it tried to be established as a fundamental psychology. He was also among the leading philosophers that elaborated the "Declaration against the experimental psychologists", first published in 1913 in the Journal *Logos* and afterwards in other journals and German newspapers⁵. It is important to highlight that the main purpose of this "Declaration" was to claim for the creation of experimental psychology's professorships in the courses of German universities, once that experimental psychologists were occupying ca. twenty percent of the philosophy chairs.

The critique that Husserl directs to Scientific Psychology should not only be understood as a political act, such as the Declaration, but – as Merleau-Ponty (1973) analyzes – the evident existence of a serious "conflict – philosophical, and therefore epistemological – between the demands of a pure rational interiority, and the demands of a psychology considered the science of the conduct of men's external determination" (p. 30). This confusion is for Husserl, located in the subordination of the spirit's life to the natural life, therefore stating the spirit as an element derived from physical nature. About this matter, the philosopher further comments that

In all seriousness, I think that an objective science of the spirit, an objective theory of the soul – objective in the sense that it attributes to souls, to personal communities, inexistence in the forms of space-time – has never existed and will never exist. (Husserl, 1954/1970, p. 297).

⁵ Originally: "Erklärung gegen die Besetzung philosophischer Lehrstühle mit Vertretern der experimentellen Psychologie" ("Declaration against the occupation of philosophy professorships with representants of experimental psychology"), was also published in *Archiv für Geschichte der Psychologie*, v. 26, n. 3, p. 399-400; *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*, v. 19, n. 2, p. 273-274; *Kant-Studien*, v. 18, n. 3, p. 306-307; *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie*, v.37, n. 2, p. 341-343 (Araujo, 2013).

On that sense, by adopting the natural sciences' physical-mathematical model, scientific Psychology assumed the reality of natural objectivism in both worlds – the physical and the psychical –, in that way naturalizing the psychical (consciousness). Also, by assuming itself as an empirical, natural and probabilistic science, grounding itself with the methods of the objective sciences, Psychology lost the sight of the true meaning of a Psychology, as such that will be here attempted to be characterized. The scientific Psychology has, as Husserl (1954/1970) states, "(...) failed, however, because, even in its primal establishment as a new kind of [science] alongside the new natural science, it failed to inquire after what was essentially the only genuine sense of its task as the universal science of psychic being" (p. 203). To grasp all of the remnants of a positivistic understanding of doing Psychology is to realize that, to focus or privilege only objective features really means the naturalization of knowledge, the subject, of consciousness and of the psychic life. Thus Husserl (1954/1970) already advocated that

In our vital need — so we are told— this science has nothing to say to us. It excludes in principle precisely the questions which man, given over in our unhappy times to the most portentous upheavals, finds the most burning: questions of the meaning or meaninglessness of the whole of this human existence (Husserl, 1954/1970, p. 06).

The Psychology that was in charge of studying *per si* the psychic life and the task of that of scientifically access the essence of subjectivity in reality, do not fulfill it. Much on the contrary, it has deviated from this task as a result of Positivism's incapacity of grasping the true foundation of subjectivity. The problems faced in Psychology are, for Husserl (1954/1970), reflections of what he has named "crises of the sciences", due to the non-comprehension of scientists that, much on the contrary of what

they claim, objective nature has a relative autonomy, not an absolute one. What Husserl tried to show is that only the “(...) spirit and, exclusively the spirit that exists in itself and for itself; only the spirit is autonomous and can be treated with this autonomy in a truly rational and radical way” (Gómez-Heras, 1989, p. 57).

It is therefore from this keenly adopted objectivism that is the failure of modern psychology derived, once that it became an autonomous science that neither reached the singular essence of consciousness nor understood the nonsensical psychophysical interpretation of subjectivity and human existence. Thus, is for Husserl necessary to found in scientific psychology the critique of a predominance of objective nature over the psyche, or, as the philosopher thinks, over the spirit, once “like physics, in which the science of nature is in the habitual sense an empirical science of material facts, psychology is likewise the empirical science (as a natural science) of the spiritual facts” (Husserl, 1975, p. 279).

Life has various dimensions, *i.e.* life does not only have a natural-physiological meaning, but “it signifies purposeful life accomplishing spiritual products: in the broadest sense, creating culture in the unity of a historical development” (Husserl, 1954/1970, p. 270). It seems hence a nonsense to subordinate the life of the spirit to nature, once spiritual life itself produces the meaning of science and nature. By exposing and analyzing the dead ends of scientific psychology, Husserl affirms, (in almost all of his works), that only through Transcendental Phenomenology would Psychology be able to reestablish both a method and a foundation, that could in its turn automatically retake the spiritual sciences’ motivation (human and social sciences), becoming then an authentic Psychology, namely a Phenomenological Psychology.

The relationship between Psychology and Phenomenology is present since the Logical Investigations of 1900/1901; however, its differences and

collaborations between themes were previously defined in the text “Philosophy as a Rigorous Science”, published in 1910 in the Journal *Logos*. In this text, Husserl (1910/1965) claims among other things that “(...) it is to be expected beforehand that phenomenology and psychology must stand in close relationship to each other, since both are concerned with consciousness, even though in a different way, according to a different “orientation.” This we may express by saying that psychology is concerned with ‘empirical consciousness’ (...)” (p. 91). Regarding Phenomenology, it is important to highlight that it is a philosophy which radical project concerns the return to the transcendental subjectivity and to the lifeworld, seeking to methodologically recover the origin of all lived experiences, that is, the very self-manifestation of transcendental subjectivity. It is both a philosophy and a method that in general terms consist of a rigorous and descriptive study of phenomena, namely it constitutes itself as a “science of phenomena”. The urge of investigation should come, for Husserl (1929/1977) neither from philosophy nor science, but from the very problems and things.

However, what did Husserl understood by phenomena, namely, “the things themselves”? By phenomena, Husserl understood the modes of appearance of all things. The word “phenomena” (φαινόμενον, *phainomenon*) is for Husserl understood as everything that appears, i.e. everything (*Sachen*) that show itself for someone. It should be observed that “thing” in this context should not only be understood as a physical thing (*Ding*) as a book, a beach, etc., present “in flesh and bone”. The things (*Sachen*, *Sache*) that show themselves to people should be treated as phenomena, since it is immediately possible to understand in its presentations not only its physical meanings, but its various meanings. Thus is this search for the meaning of things (*Sachen*) to Husserl identified as the fundamental problem in Philosophy.

It is possible to perceive this in the very history of western thought, in which many philosophies described the meaning of things. However, as Husserl (1954/1970) analyzes, Philosophy and Psychology (that also studies the objects of consciousness and its contents) have only partially reached the things (or phenomena), i.e. sometimes as physical thing, another times as idea; now as an organic thing, then as a psychic thing, etc. Therefore when it is said that something show or presents itself, it is understood that that which shows itself, shows itself for someone, to us, human beings. That is a very important point of Phenomenology: the idea that both the phenomena and human consciousness are always in a constant correlated movement (Fernandes, 2011; Goto, 2015).

It is also possible to assert that Husserl's main objective was to find the foundation of all sciences in order to guarantee that the act of thinking had an unshakable reliability, therefore giving back to knowledge the trustworthiness of human rationality. To do that it is, for Husserl's understanding, necessary that Phenomenology constitute itself as both a foundation and a method -a philosophical attitude- and not as a philosophical doctrine, once its motivation is that of finding and discussing the question of knowledge, and that by following a rigorous criteria be it enough to reestablish the position of knowledge and the relationship of human beings with the world (Goto, 2015). Thus Husserl conceives Phenomenology as:

[...] pure phenomenology, the way to which we seek here, the unique position of which relative to all other sciences we shall characterize and show to be the science fundamental to philosophy, is an essentially new science which, in consequence of its most radical essential peculiarity, is remote from natural thinking and therefore only in our days presses toward development. It is called a science of 'phenomena'. [...] No matter how varied the sense of the word "phenomena" in such locutions may be, and no matter what further

significations it may have, it is certain that phenomenology also relates to all these “phenomena” and does so with respect to all significations of the word “phenomenon.” But phenomenology relates to them in a wholly different attitude whereby any sense of the word “phenomenon” which we find in the long-known sciences becomes modified in a definite way (Husserl, 1913/1983, p. XVII).

Taken by this philosophical enterprise, Husserl arrives to the fundamental feature of philosophical phenomenology: the “universal correlation *a priori*” between the experienced object and the modes through which it gives itself. That means that each consciousness or mode of consciousness is originally correlated with the world and its objects and, that the world and every object have particular modes of being given to consciousness. In Husserl’s last writings, posthumously published in 1954 with the title “The Crisis of European Sciences and the Transcendental Phenomenology”, the author further comments that the:

The first breakthrough of this universal *a priori* of correlation between experienced object and manners of givenness (which occurred during work on my Logical Investigations around 1898) affected me so deeply that my whole subsequent lifework has been dominated by the task of systematically elaborating on this *a priori* of correlation (Husserl, 1954/1970, p. 166).

It was with the discovery of the “universal correlational *a priori*” that Husserl has significantly modified the concept of Intentionality, previously developed by Husserl’s master and friend Franz Brentano (1838-1917), who claimed that every consciousness is always consciousness of something, namely that every thought is a thought of something, every feeling a feeling of something etc. Husserl notoriously kept intentionality’s general idea, considering it a great philosophical progress since Descartes; however, differently from Brentano, Husserl revisited this concept,

highlighting that the intentional consciousness was not really only psychological, but was actually constituted of multiple intentional acts, i.e., that every mode of consciousness has its objects (phenomena) and vice-versa, going beyond Brentano's psychologicistic claims (Goto, 2012). Furthermore, intentionality is not only a connection or link with the objective realm, but an act which aims to grasp the object that exists due to many other acts. In the *Investigations*, Husserl (1900-1901/2001) describes Consciousness in many ways, going beyond the psychological and empirical meanings attributed to it at the time, understanding it as an unity of lived experiences (flow of lived experienced), as internal perception of lived experiences (the conscious being) and finally as intentional lived experience.

As Husserl (1900-1901/2001) analyzes, the intentional lived experience is everything that is lived, i.e. everything that one has consciousness of, and through it can record something. It is however important to highlight that this should not be mistaken with the commonsensical meaning of "lived experience". Husserl (1900-1901/2001) writes "(...) that our concept of experience [phenomenological] does not tally with the popular notion", in the sense of a "experiencing" consists here in perceptions, judgements and other acts, in which these events appear as objects, and often as objects of certain assertions which relate them to the empirical ego." (p. 8). This idea is related to experience (*Erfahrung*). Much on the contrary, the phenomenological meaning of lived experience does not mean living in the common sense of experience, but the "realization" of that which is being lived, i.e, "what it is, that is lived", referring then to the "characteristic acts of human beings' interiority that ranges from perception to remembrance, imagination, thought and so on, understood as structural and constitutive elements of consciousness" (Bello, 1998, p. 26). In addition, the lived

experience of something is, so to say, the lived experience of a subject that lives in a world that; “a) always finds the world as something pre-given and pre-existent and that, b) finds itself on this world. However, the lived experience of one that encounters the world and itself is the lived experience of a subject that experiences things as consciousness’ most originary experiences” (Gómez-Heras, 1989, p. 211).

It is for Husserl (1954/1970) only with this new philosophy that it will be possible to access subjectivity as such and transcend the positivistic and objectivistic conception of the subjective reality, therefore regaining the meaning of humanity in its original motivation. In order to do that, Husserl proposes another method of accessing subjectivity in Psychology, avoiding the rupture between object and subject with all its boundaries’ confusions, namely The Phenomenological Method. The Phenomenological Method has its most fundamental principle that of redirecting the attention to the “things themselves” (*Zu den Sachen selbst*). That means that one should direct all the attention directly to the phenomena, that is, everything that immediately appears to the intentional consciousness.

The going “back to the things themselves” consists on retaking the pre-theoretical world, a world that is living, originary, and from which emerges every posterior scientific idealization. According to Husserl (1954/1970), the phenomenological method provides a recovery of the originary and pre-scientific experiential world, constituting it while grounded on the argument of a fundamental universal science, since it is only in the lifeworld that the “realm of originary evidences” is given. Husserl affirms in the text “*Die Lebenswelt. Auslegung der Vorgegebenen Welt und ihrer Konstitution. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1916-1937)*”, that dates back from 1916 to 1937, that “the world is pre-given to us. If we actively and directly point our gaze to something, it was already

there affecting me, motivating me to ‘turn to’ and, in that way, can now be directly grasped by me” (Husserl, 2008, p. 26).

However, in order to immediately access the phenomena it is foremost necessary to give a methodical step, once that to be able to redirect towards the phenomena, it is fundamental to leave aside or “out of circulation” both theories or theoretical concepts. Still, one should mainly “leave aside” the natural way by which everything in the world and the world itself is accepted, i.e. every already established belief and the factual world. Husserl named this natural way or orientation that one has of the things and the world as “natural attitude”. Husserl describes:

By my seeing, touching, hearing, and so forth, and in the different modes of sensuous perception, corporeal physical things with some spatial distribution or other are simply there for me, “on hand” in the literal or the figurative sense, whether or not I am particularly heedful of them and busied with them in my considering, thinking, feeling, or willing. Animate beings too — human beings, let us say — are immediately there for me [...] (Husserl, 1913/1983, p. 51).

For that, Husserl conceives the universal epoché as a first step, that synthetically consists of “put out of action” or “parenthesize” the natural orientation. That means to:

[...] put out of action the general positing which belongs to the essence of the natural attitude; we parenthesize everything which that positing encompasses with respect to being: thus the whole natural world which is continually ‘there for us’, ‘on hand’, and which will always remain there according to consciousness as an “actuality” even if we choose to parenthesize it (Husserl, 1913/1983, p. 61).

Edith Stein (2003) reaffirms the importance of the phenomenological method by saying that, practically speaking, the epoché consists of “(...)

leaving aside much as possible what we hear and read, or what we ourselves produce in order to find the best solution for the situation. That is, so to say, to approach things without prejudices, enabling to absorb ourselves from the immediate intuition” (p. 33). In this way, the phenomenological method promotes a passage from the natural attitude to the phenomenological attitude, i.e. a new attitude that leaves aside all previously accepted positions by science and the everyday life, being then able to start a new radical and more embracing analysis. However, it should be noted that this “bracketing” or suspension of the natural world should not be mistaken with that those which positivists or naive realists have understood by neutrality, namely a “theory-free” science, even free of metaphysics.

The Phenomenological Attitude enables the phenomenologist (psychologist) to distance himself from the natural attitude’s, putting him back in face of the intentionality’s themselves, i.e. contemplating them. Still in accordance, San Martin (1986) claims that the phenomenological attitude allows to find at least three levels or features of phenomena: 1) the subject’s acts themselves (to perceive, to love, to hate, to wish, to judge, etc.); 2) that which is given in such acts and, finally, 3) reality itself. For the philosopher, it is only through the universal epoché possible to grasp the essential and the unrealities, i.e., everything that is beyond the effective, factic and real world. Once that perception/intuition allowed the immediacy of the phenomena by itself, that is, in its “original self-presentation”, the grasping of the phenomena in its essence is then given, present in its various modes of presentification. Stein (1932/2003) comments that “intuition is not only the sensual perception of something determined and particular, as it is here and now. There is an intuition of what something is as essence, and that contains a double meaning: what something is by its own being and what it is by its universal essence” (p. 23).

Husserl (1913/1983) designates as “essence” (*Eidos*) that which is found in one’s being as what it is, but that for every one of those “what” be then put into idea. For that reason, already on the first part of the 1913 book *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy* Husserl distinguishes the *facts* of essences, since “according to which an essential composition belongs to each individual object as its essence – just as, conversely, to each essence there correspond possible individua which would be its factual singularizations” (p. 15-16). To this methodic process of grasping the essential and assuring the evidence of that which is analyzed, Husserl calls *eidetic method*. One could say that the eidetic phenomenology is an eidetic science, once it is characterized as a direct “grasping” of the things themselves, collecting from them, via intuition/perception, the “eidetic constitution”, whose purpose is that of starting by what is originally (*Originär*) given as the foundation of all knowledge. Only through this path, we would be certain of that which shows itself, conducting us to the path of evidence (*Urevidenz*).

It is with a method of a radical proposition that one will be able to originally and genuinely access subjectivity, therefore overcoming the crisis of sciences and regaining the meaning of humanity in its original motivation. It is with the Transcendental Phenomenology, and consequently with the Phenomenological Psychology, that there will be the possibility of resuming a new system of relations between subjectivity and objectivity, avoiding the rupture between object/subject and lived and theoretical world.

The Constitution of Husserl’s Phenomenological Psychology

With the foundation of transcendental phenomenology and Husserl’s critique of scientific psychology – and psychologism (Husserl, 1910/1965; 1954/1970) – there was, consequently, the proposal of reformulating

modern/scientific psychology, to be then constituted a Phenomenological Psychology. It should be noted that Husserl's closeness with Psychology was, since his contact with Brentano, very frequent, although even if paralleled positions were established, it was never his proposal that of establishing an identity between the two disciplines, neither the alienation of one another, but actually that of constituting an Eidetic Psychology upon which Empirical Psychology would be grounded (Farber, 1956; Rafaelli, 2004; Peres, 2016; Reis, Holanda & Goto, 2016; Goto, Holanda & Costa, 2018).

It is however also convenient to say that the very development of the Phenomenological Psychology has gone through many different moments, making it more evident the relationship that this Psychology still maintained with Phenomenology. It is also possible to hereby highlight at least three of these moments: 1. the “pre-transcendental” moment, characterized by the critique to psychologism and scientific psychology, whose purpose was that of differentiating Phenomenology and Psychology, mainly present in the *Logical Investigations* (1900-1901), in the *Philosophy as a Rigorous Science* (1911) and the *Fundamental Problems of Phenomenology* (1910-1911); 2. the “transcendental moment”, mainly characterized by the concept of Phenomenological Psychology, i.e. a specific discipline that Husserl will definitively claim as parallel and complementary to the Transcendental Phenomenology, available in the works *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy* (1913), *Phenomenological Psychology* (1925), the Text for the Encyclopedia Britannica (1927); and finally the 3. post-transcendental moment what will show up in the *Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* (1935-1937), characterized by that which Husserl discovers and considers impressive, namely the identification of Phenomenological Psychology to the Transcendental

Phenomenology, claiming then the very Psychology as transcendental, as Husserl in the following comments: “The surprising result of our investigation can also, it seems, be expressed as follows: a pure psychology as positive science [...]. There is only a transcendental psychology, which is identical with transcendental philosophy” (Husserl, 1954/1983, p. 257). This moment can be understood as a radical transformation of the psychological science in a “Transcendental Psychology”, that by its turn will not anymore understand the human-being’s psychic life as reduced to a physiological organism but will be grounded in the transcendental subjectivity.

It should be said that these “moments” are not excludents but point to both the genesis and the development of Phenomenological Psychology. This article sought to highlight only the “transcendental moment”, since this moment would be closer to the contemporary psychologists, be it in their empirical research or even on the possible thoughts that may become part of their practices, precisely because it seeks to know the intentional psychic lived experiences’ peculiarities, psychic habitualities, that is, “the whole configuration of a psychic life in general” (Husserl, 1927/1997).

Given this, Husserl (1925/1977) questions if it would not be more important and fundamental to primarily know what are and how are psychological objects constituted, instead of, as experimental psychology does, only to put them in experiments. Naturally is Husserl with these questions not denying every type of contribution that may be offered by psychology, because he himself agrees that in fact there is a psychology given upon the pre-given world, that is, that of men and animals merely on the world. However, scientific research is, for the philosopher, still is, such as the positive sciences, relative and limited, once it does not put into question that which is essential for the psyche or the very consciousness. For this reason, has Husserl proposed a Phenomenological Psychology,

that has for itself a reformation enthusiasm in the sense of rescuing through the phenomenological method the “essence” of psychic life. Husserl, in the introduction of his 1927 Encyclopedia Britannica article, clarifies:

[...] Together with this philosophical phenomenology, but not yet separated from it, however, there also came into being a new psychological discipline parallel to it in method and content: the a priori pure or "phenomenological" psychology, which raises the reformational claim to being the basic methodological foundation on which alone a scientifically rigorous empirical psychology can be established. An outline of this psychological phenomenology, standing nearer to our natural thinking, is well suited to serve as a preliminary step that will lead up to an understanding of philosophical phenomenology (Husserl, 1927/1997, p. 159).

It was with the phenomenological analysis of the transcendental consciousness that Husserl arrived to a conception of Phenomenological Psychology (via psyche) lined with the necessary primordial clarification of the psychic life's nature, the concretely lived structures, and the totality of the modes of psychic consciousness. This should also be understood not as an empirical psychology in its various relations with the physical world (as scientific psychology is oriented), but as a pure psychology, i.e. a psychology that investigates the lived psychic experiences *per se* and that transcends the psychophysical connection. “Pure psychology simply knows nothing other than the subjective; to admit into it something objective as existing is already to abandon pure psychology” (Husserl, 1954/1970, p. 259).

The delimitation for this “new” place of Psychology may well be clarified in that which Husserl defines in his 1925-1928 lectures as its starting points: let us take the §5, in which Husserl demarcates Phenomenological Psychology, starting from the distinction with the other

spiritual and natural sciences; he then affirms in his §6 the “Necessity of the return to the pre-scientific experiential world and to the experience in which it is given (harmony of experience)” (Husserl, 1925/1977, p. 40). Therefore, the Phenomenological Psychology appears as a radical psychology when contrasted to the other psychologies (empirical and experimental), because only this Psychology is genuinely directed to the psychic life itself altogether with its structures, truly and genuinely directing its “gaze” to psychic interiority. In front of this conception, the Phenomenological Psychology may be then summarized as Husserl (1925/1977) describes, as having basic characteristics, namely it is constituted as an *a priori* science; as a descriptive and eidetic science, possessing an intuitive *ethos*.

The Psychology as descriptive science - already demarcated in the Logical Investigations - refers to a propaedeutic disposition for a naturalistic psychology, that is, the former would serve as a background for the latter’s grounding. “on the one hand, an ancillary to psychology conceived as an empirical science” (Husserl, 1900-1901/1970, p.166). Phenomenological Psychology, using the phenomenological method, can analyze and describe, “in their essential generality – in the specific guise of a phenomenology of thought and knowledge – the experiences of presentation, judgement and knowledge, experiences which, treated as classes of real events in the natural context of zoological reality, receive a scientific probing at the hands of empirical psychology” (Husserl, 1900-1901/1970, p. 166).

Psychology as an eidetic and *a priori* science means that, in its full meaning, psychology must be grounded as a science of universalities (essential necessities) of psychic lived experiences, i.e., a science of the psyche’s essential universals, without which the psychological beings would be inconceivable. As an eidetic science, the Phenomenological

Psychology should focus on the description of the psychological structure' essences (purity), as they show themselves intuitively to reason; that means to apprehend the mental life's essence. Thus, Husserl (1954/1970) establishes that the psychologist who searches for a rigorous science of the internal and intentional life, should then adopt the psychological-phenomenological reduction (eidetic reduction), because only through this will, is one going to be able to get rid of all natural-scientific orientation, as well as the natural attitude in which everyone -including the psychologist- lives. Husserl suggests that:

To the psychologist, in the midst of this, but with his attitude of "disinterested observer," every intentional life as it is lived by each subject and each particular community of subjects, the performance of acts, the perceptual and other sorts of experiencing activity, the changing acts of meaning in respect to being, will, etc.— to the psychologist, all this is accessible thematically (Husserl, 1954/1970, p. 240).

The so-called reduction, enabled through the psychological epoché, allows the psychologist to bracket his naive stance -that of the natural attitude-, being conducted to his rightful object: the spiritual life, the pure psyche. According to Husserl, the psychologist has "as his first and most fundamental subject matter, he has the pure act-life of the persons, i.e., primarily the conscious life in the narrower sense" (Husserl, 1954/1970, p. 240). Husserl further complements in the appendix XXI (to the §37) from The Amsterdam Lectures (1925-28): "In the psychologically pure attitude, I thematically bracket my humanity, operating the reduction to the pure psychic, (...) in a certain way that I have the apperception of the, (...) so that I attribute nothing else than the apperception of the world while subjective fact, but not as objectivity put into validity" (Husserl, 2011, p. 306).

Proceeding this way, Phenomenological Psychology further thematizes the main features of psychic life, i.e., the essential e basic modes of being: intentionalities. The psychic life is, so to say, the life of consciousness, consciousness itself, for that consciousness is always consciousness of something. Husserl (1925/1977) further comments that intentionality had already been considered by the Scholastics - however re-signified in Brentano's "empirical psychology- as a fundamental feature of the psychic life. However, one may affirm that it was only with the Logical Investigations that intentionality definitely received the necessary groundwork to develop a rigorous knowledge, by showing that not only has intentionality a psychological feature, but also transcendental, better expressed through the "universal correlational *a priori*".

In summary, the new psychology proposed by Husserl (1927/1997) conducts to the reformulation of empirical and scientific psychology, once it, as phenomenological psychology, proposes the clarification of the main concepts used in psychology (consciousness, perception, affectivity, imagination, phantasy, cognition, etc.) by themselves, i.e. by their own identity and constitution of the already referred psychological processes. However, psychic life is not analyzed through natural and scientific lens, but by understanding how they are in our human life, seeking to describe it as so, therefore identifying both its synthetic and universal structures. Thus, Phenomenological Psychology affirms itself as propaedeutic, analytic and eidetic, taking the psychological phenomena as pure phenomena, and indicating that which is known – in modern psychology – as "basic psychological processes", something that was however welcomed by natural sciences because of their manifestations, and not because of its phenomenal essence.

Lastly, one can say that there is through the Phenomenological Psychology the foundation of a "new Psychology", that is not confused

with an “approach” from Psychology (be it old or new). Much on the contrary, altogether with Husserl’s critique against naturalism and relativism in psychological analysis that were current in his time (and that are still present in many different regions of psychology, something easily observed in the fragmentation of the “psychological schools” and the doings of contemporary psychology), and that afforded the foundation of scientific psychology; it is then possible for one to stand against the establishment of a concept of “approach” in Psychology, since psychology is, for the philosopher, founded in the constitution of an eidetic science. Husserl (1954/1983) came, together with the development of transcendental phenomenology, to an impressive result regarding psychology, expressed in the following: “(...) a pure psychology as positive science, a psychology which would investigate universally the human beings living in the world as real facts in the world, similarly to other positive sciences (both sciences of nature and humanistic disciplines), does not exist” (p. 257). In addition, it is also important to note that, as Husserl explains, psychologists are not (and neither should be) philosophers, once the former searches for the “essential theory of the psyche” starting from the natural men, from the individual and the psycho-social, while the latter seeks for a transcendental philosophy, one that is based on the transcendental life.

It is set into motion – as we hope, rescued, and still open – the proposal for the construction of an effective Phenomenological Psychology, with such conceptions that should not be mistaken neither with “psychological approaches” nor “therapeutic schools’ theories”, but that are constituted in the founding ground of a new, purely human, empirical science.

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